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I. INTRODUCTIONT HE Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (BHCA)I "regulates
the acquisition of state and national banks by bank holding
companies." 2 The BHCA also regulates the nonbanking activities
I. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1988)) [hereinafter BHCA].
2. Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 472 U.S. 159, 162-63
(1985). The BHCA requires that all bank holding companies receive approval of
the Federal Reserve Board (the Fed) before they are formed and whenever they
acquire additional banks. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a) (1988).
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of bank holding companies and their nonbank subsidiaries. 3 The
BHCA was enacted and remains on the books for two fundamen-
tal reasons: 1) to prevent undue concentration in banking; and 2)
to avoid the mixing of banking with other businesses unrelated to
banking (generally called "commerce"). 4 Both of these purposes
have been or are being discredited, and it is time to ask whether
the BHCA should be repealed.
There are different bases for discrediting the two purposes of
the BHCA. As for the first purpose, to prevent undue concentra-
tion in banking, the BHCA, in combination with other United
States banking laws, has successfully kept the U.S. banking system
highly diffused, consisting of many small banks. Specifically, the
BHCA has impeded the growth of large aggregations of individ-
ual banks through holding company systems. For example, there
are probably more banks per capita in the United States than in
any other country in the world. Robert Clarke, Comptroller of
the Currency, has testified that "the United States currently has
roughly ten times as many commercial banks per capita as the rest
of the G-10 5 combined." 6 As this Article will demonstrate, a basic
3. Board of Governors v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 49 (1981).
BHCA § 4(c)(6) prohibits a bank holding company and its nonbank subsidiaries
from engaging in a business other than banking without a showing that the other
business, subject to limited exceptions, is "so closely related to banking or of
managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto." BHCA,
§ 4(c)(6), 70 Stat, at 137 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)).
4. See S. REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1955), reprinted in 1956
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2482, 2483 (indicating that primary problems with bank holding
company structure were unrestricted ability of bank holding companies to in-
crease number of units and arrangements that allowed banks to engage in non-
banking activities); see also Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 46
(1980) (same).
5. G-10 is an abbreviation for the Group of Ten, which consists of the fi-
nance ministers and central bank chief executives of Belgium, Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the
United States. Switzerland attends the periodic meetings (two to three times a
year) of the G-10 as an observer.
6. Bank Mergers: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban
Affairs, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. 154 (1991) (testimony of Robert L. Clarke, Comp-
troller of the Currency). Testimony such as this, while undoubtedly correct in
principle, requires some examination as to its specifics. Foreign institutions that
take deposits in some form and offer various forms of credit frequently do not
conform to the United States concept of a commercial bank, and it is difficult to
know precisely if such a numerical comparison is appropriate. Germany, for ex-
ample, has 3604 institutions it calls cooperative banks. Credit Institutions in Euro-
pean Community Are Numerous, BANKING EXPANSION REP., Sept. 4, 1989, at 2, 2.
The United States, on the other hand, has other institutions not generally called
"banks," such as credit unions and savings and loan associations, which have
broad deposit and lending powers. Therefore, discrepancy in terminology alone
may add to the inaccuracy of numerical comparisons.
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assumption of the U.S. financial system has been the continued
presence of small banks. As a result of this national policy, U.S.
banks are dropping out of the running in the international mar-
ket. The largest U.S. bank, in terms of assets, now ranks only
twenty-sixth in international competition. 7
Despite, or perhaps because of, the assumption favoring
small banks, banking institutions find it increasingly difficult in to-
day's depressed financial markets to produce a continuing stream
of profits. These banking institutions perceive mergers as one
method of reducing costs relative to total income.8 The result has
been a wave of mergers among banking institutions throughout
the country, some involving the largest institutions. The conse-
quence of these mergers is a developing concentration of banking
resources consisting of fewer and larger banks.
One finds increasing support in the United States for the
concept of large banks. Concentration in banking services is in-
creasing on a national basis as the number of banks decreases.
The total number of banks has declined from 14,434 in 1980 to
12,338 in 19909 and, over the same period, the number of bank-
ing organizations decreased from 12,679 to approximately
9,688.10 In addition, the proportion of domestic banking assets
accounted for by the 100 largest banking organizations decreased
from 58% in 1940 to 44.4% in 1969," t and then rose to 62% at
year-end 1990. 12
To accelerate this concentration in banking services, legisla-
7. The World's 100 Largest Banks, WALL ST.J., Sept. 24, 1992, at R27 (ranking
as of Dec. 31, 1991).
8. For a discussion of whether mergers reduce costs, see infra notes 121-24
and accompanying text.
9. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1991 at 501 tbl. 807 (111 th ed. 1991) [hereinaf-
ter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT].
10. Statement of John P. La Ware Before the House Banking, Finance and Urban
Affairs Committee, 77 Fed. Res. Bull. 932 (1991) [hereinafter LaWare]. This
number includes organizations like bank holding companies that own more than
one bank. Id.; see also STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, FIN. & URBAN AF-
FAIRS, 102D CONG., 2D SESS., ANALYSIS OF BANKING INDUSTRY CONSOLIDATION
ISSUES 12 (1992) [hereinafter ANALYSIS OF BANKING CONSOLIDATION] (reporting
decrease from 14,727 "banks and savings associations" in 1985 to 12,096
"banks and thrifts" in 1991).
11. See BENJAMINJ. KLEBANER, COMMERCIAL BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES:
A HISTORY 184 (1974).
12. LaWare, supra note 10, at 932. Another statistic that shows the concen-
tration of U.S. banking is that in 1920, branches represented 4% of all commer-
cial bank offices. KLEBANER, supra note 11, at 126. By 1989, branches
represented 80%. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 9, at 500 tbl. 805.
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tion was proposed by the Bush Administration, rejected by Con-
gress and proposed again by the Administration. 13 It is uncertain
how the new national concentration patterns will evolve at the
state and local levels,' 4 or if these patterns ultimately will be ac-
ceptable. All that is certain is that unless the law changes, the
United States will be measuring new patterns by old assumptions.
As for the second purpose of the BHCA, to avoid the combi-
nation of banking and commerce, the BHCA has been less suc-
cessful. On several levels, banking is combined with commerce
and has been both before and after adoption of the BHCA in
1956. It is, nevertheless, regularly asserted when discussing the
BHCA that the United States has a long tradition of keeping
banking and commerce separate.' 5 This Article questions that as-
sertion. Banking has never been separate from commerce. Their
interrelation has only varied throughout our history, depending
upon the dates and the types of institutions involved. The Bush
Administration proposed a new law to make this more apparent
and to make the joinder of banking and commerce more
available. 16
With the crumbling of the two BHCA building blocks comes
the question of whether the statute is useful.' 7 In the thicket of
U.S. banking law, the elimination of a complex statute is, other
things being equal, a good-idea. The BHCA, with its unduly com-
plex system of prohibitions, preconditions, applications and re-
13. For a discussion of the proposed legislation, see infra notes 153-64 and
accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of markets, concentration levels and banking institu-
tion size, see infra notes 127-52 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Board of Governors,
890 F.2d 1275, 1280 (2d Cir. 1989) (observing that major purpose of BHCA was
to continue keeping commerce and banking separate), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 810
(1990); Note, The Demise of the Bank/Nonbank Distinction: An Argument for Deregulat-
ing the Activities of Bank Holding Companies, 98 HARV. L. REV. 650, 651 (1985)
(same). For a discussion of the banking and commerce issue, see infra notes
165-443 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the proposed legislation, see infra notes 425-42 and
accompanying text.
17. See generally Peter C. Hayward, Prospects for International Cooperation by
Bank Supervisors, 24 INr'L LAw. 787, 799 (1990) (stating that "[t]he only major
country to supervise [bank] holding companies is the United States"). But see E.
Gerald Corrigan, The Banking-Commerce Controversy Revisited, FRBNY Q.
REV. 1, 4 (Spring 1991) (statement of President of Federal Reserve Bank of New
York) (reporting that Italy and Mexico "within the very recent past" enacted
legislation limiting corporate ownership of banks to absolute ceiling of 15% and
10%, respectively).
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porting is a particularly likely candidate for elimination.' 8 Other
things are, however, not equal and the BHCA has always been
considered one of the fundaments of bank regulation. To suggest
its repeal is an uphill climb, but it seems time for a debate on the
subject. The issues raised are serious, even if they are of less than
crisis proportions. Such a debate can be engaged in without the
sense of imminent disaster that regularly colors bank legislation
in the United States and without the need for immediate resolu-
tion that may stimulate panic rather than reasoned thought.
Questions of politics and emotion, so entwined with our banking
legislation and unquestionably present when the BHCA is ad-
dressed, might be kept to a minimum. Perhaps the principal es-
pouser of the two rationales described above, the Treasury
Department, should take the lead in this investigation.
Part II of this Article deals with the first issue, concentration
and size in banking. It discusses, from a historical perspective,
the United State's attitude towards this matter. It places the
BHCA among the other statutes and regulations with similar rela-
tionships to bank size and concentration. Part III discusses the
mixture of banking and commerce, to some extent within banks
themselves, but more significantly through holding company sys-
tems. Part IV considers the regulation of the banking system
without the BHCA burdens and part V suggests some
conclusions.
II. THE NATIONAL ATTITUDE TOWARD LARGE BANKING
INSTITUTIONS
A. The Small Bank
In order to understand the place of the BHCA in the Ameri-
can legal structure, a good starting point is the consideration of
the small bank within the U.S. banking system. From the time of
the American Revolution, the large bank has been the bad boy of
American banking. The tendency towards small banks meant the
overall number of banks would be greater. As one commentator
noted: "In 1794, a century after the founding of the Bank of Eng-
land, the British Isles had five chartered banks. In the same year
• . . there were eighteen banks in the United States."' 9 If the
18. See Note, supra note 15, at 651 (criticizing burden of "additional layer of
regulation" imposed by BHCA).
19. KLEBANER, supra note 11, at 3. As the Supreme Court has explained,
"control of commercial banking [in the United States] is diffused throughout a
very large number of independent, local banks- 13,460 of them in 1960-rather
[Vol. 38: p. I
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United States was to have commercial banks at all, the American
tradition insisted on keeping them small from the beginning. 20
Thomas Jefferson and the Republicans believed that the
United States should not have commercial banks at all. 2 1 Jeffer-
son opposed the first Bank of the United States, asserting that it
was unconstitutional. 22 This attitude continued among the Jack-
than concentrated in a handful of nationwide banks, as, for example, in England
and Germany." United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 325
(1963).
This Article does not attempt to trace this tradition to its source other than
to observe that the small, locally owned bank was compatible with the adventur-
ous spirit of the new world. See LYNNE P. DOTI & LARRY SCHWEIKART, BANKING IN
THE AMERICAN WEST 4 (1991) ("Western values demanded openness and fair-
ness in competition, which translated into unit-bank [no branching] laws from
Texas to North Dakota."); W. RALPH LAMB, GROUP BANKING 28 (1961) ("The
spirit of independence and enterprise that characterized a young and rising de-
mocracy was reflected in part by the individualistic tradition of American free
banking.").
England began nationwide branching in the nineteenth century to meet the
growing needs of business. As one commentator explained:
When Lloyds Bank, hitherto confined to the midlands, absorbed two
well-known London banking houses in 1884, when the Birmingham
and Midland Bank took over the Central Bank of London in 1891, and
when Barclays united fifteen private firms into one large company in
1896, it was plain that the day of the small local bank.., was very near
its end.
W.F. CRICK &J.E. WADSWORTH, A HUNDRED YEARS OFJOINT STOCK BANKING 37
(2d ed. 1938).
20. As one commentator noted: "Most of the farmers and shopkeepers of
the new world, and scarcely less the large land owners and conservative
merchants, were not disposed to have large scale, corporate, monied organiza-
tions at their thresholds." BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA 25
(1957). The basis of the American predilection may have been a national dis-
trust of banking power or, as has also been suggested, simply a desire on behalf
of small, local bankers to protect their own competitive positions. See George J.
Benston, Federal Regulation of Banking. Historical Overview, in DEREGULATING FINAN-
CIAL SERVICES 1, 8 (George G. Kaufman & Roger C. Kormendi eds., 1986).
21. Jefferson was concerned with the concept of commercial banks as being
the creators of money by issuing notes or establishing demand deposit accounts.
See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John W. Eppes (June 14, 1813), in 6 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 141 (H.A. Washington ed., 1854) ("But it will
be asked, are we to have not banks? ... I answer, let us have banks; but let them
be such as are alone to be found in any country on earth, except Great Brit-
ain."). Jefferson later recanted and acknowledged that commercial banks were
necessary because the role of manufacturing was at least as important to the
national economy as that of farming. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, THE AGE OF
JACKSON 18 (1946). For a discussion of the method by which banks lend money
and thereby create money, see CHARLES L. PRATHER, MONEY AND BANKING 136-
40 (7th ed. 1961).
22. HAMMOND, supra note 20, at 210. In a letter to Albert Gallatin dated
December 13, 1803, Jefferson wrote concerning a national bank: "This institu-
tion... is one of the most deadly hostility existing, against the principles & form
of our Constitution." 4 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 172
(1919). Despite such objections, the Supreme Court held that the United States
19931
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sonians.23 Despite Jefferson's ideals, the earliest period of United
States banking, starting immediately after the Revolution, was
more monopolistic than any seen since.2 4 The first U.S. bank, the
Bank of North America, was chartered in 1781, by the United
States Congress under the Articles of Confederation. 25 Massa-
chusetts and New York had doubts as to the validity of a charter
granted under the Articles and soon granted charters to the bank
in their own states. Similar legislation was enacted in Connecti-
cut, Rhode Island and Pennsylvania.2 6 The Bank of North
America had, for the three years after its chartering, a virtual mo-
nopoly in the United States. 27
A new bank was chartered in Massachusetts in 1784, and, as a
result of state legislative acts, four banks were in existence by
1790.28 For some sixty-five years after the Revolution, the only
way a bank could be created in corporate form was by an act of a
state or federal legislature. Charters were difficult to obtain and
every bank, upon its creation, had a high degree of immunity
from threats of new entrants-threats that today are considered
important to the concept of competition in banking.2 9 Although
technically not monopolies, banks within this banking system
were of grave concern to Jefferson, who in 1802, expressed his
distaste for the "monopoly of a single bank."30 The Jacksonian
had the implied power to create a bank and to protect it against state interfer-
ence. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 331 (1819).
23. Andrew Jackson has been reported as saying to Nicholas Biddle, Presi-
dent of the first Bank of the United States: "I do not dislike your Bank any more
than all banks. But ever since I read the history of the South Sea Bubble I have
been afraid of banks." 1 FRITZ REDLICH, THE MOLDING OF AMERICAN BANKING
164 (photo. reprint 1968) (1951).
24. See JOHN J. KNox, A HISTORY OF BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES 91
(Bradford Rhodes & Elmer H. Youngman eds., 1900) ("The idea that the privi-
lege of banking should be a monopoly to be exercised only by capitalists who
were granted exclusive rights by the Government was the one that at first
prevailed.").
25. HERMAN E. KROOSS & MARTIN R. BLYN, A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL IN-
TERMEDIARIES 19 (1971) (observing that historians are fairly certain that Bank of
North America, located in Philadelphia, was first U.S. money bank); see also I
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF BANKING AND CURRENCY IN THE UNITED STATES 216-
20 (Herman E. Krooss ed., 1969) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY] (re-
printing copy of Continental Congress' resolution to establish first bank).
26. HAMMOND, supra note 20, at 50-51.
27. Id. at 65-66.
28. Id. at 66.
29. 1 REDLICH, supra note 23, at 96-100.
30. Id. at 21. For a discussion of a type of charter provision that spread
stock ownership in order to reduce the threat of monopoly, see infra notes 264-
89 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 38: p. I
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Democrats also condemned the legislatively chartered banks as"wicked monopolies. ' ' 1
As far back as the 1760s, commentators voiced the economic
philosophy that banks should be subject to the same concepts of
competition and free enterprise as businesses generally. This
philosophy found early expression in the writings of Adam
Smith32 and later in the views of the Jacksonians. 33 Through the
early years of the nineteenth century, branch banking also devel-
oped and, in combination with the legislatively organized banks,
sustained the tendency of the U.S. banking system toward con-
centration if not monopoly. 34 Movements to liberate banks from
the legislative charter were supported by libertarian interests and
forcefully opposed by conservatives committed to the charter.
The legislative charter saw its demise in statutory enact-
ments, first in Michigan in 183735 and then in New York in
1838.36 These banking statutes allowed the formation of banks
without legislative action to the extent that the economy could
support them. The term given to the system introduced by these
statutes was "free banking" under which "all are freely permitted
to embark in [banking] who comply with the rules prescribed."3 7
Other states rapidly enacted free banking acts and the monopoly
of the legislatively chartered banks came to an end.38
After passage of the free banking acts, the philosophy of the
Jeffersonians and the Jacksonians dominated the banking scene.
Branching was tightly limited by law and unit banks (banks with-
out branches) became the rule. "Only then did unit banking be-
come one of the characteristic features of our national economy.
Whatever the merits or demerits of this kind of banking, one must
concede that it fitted well into typical American thinking . ... 39
Subject to the restrictions on branching, banks became subject to
the play of the market and proliferated. From roughly 1900 into
the 1920s, the investment bankers led by J.P. Morgan were hard
at work developing concentrations of power.40 They were more
31. HAMMOND, supra note 20, at 562.
32. 1 REDLICH, supra note 23, at 188.
33. SCHLESINGER, supra note 21, at 336-37.
34. See 2 REDLICH, supra note 23, at 193-94.
35. Act of Mar. 15, 1837, No. XLVII, 1837 Mich. Pub. Acts 76.
36. Act of Apr. 18, 1838, ch. 260, 1838 N.Y. Laws 245.
37. HAMMOND, supra note 20, at 573 (quoting Millard Fillmore, Comptroller
of New York).
38. GERALD C. FISCHER, AMERICAN BANKING STRUCTURE 18, 176 (1968).
39. 2 REDLICH, supra note 23, at 194.
40. Id. at 187-90.
1993]
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than offset, however, by state and federal laws that ensured a
banking system composed principally of many small banks, in a
number well above that required by an uncontrolled free mar-
ket.4 ' The laws supported the philosophy of small banks, and, as
affairs later developed, ensured that the United States would also
have a system of small banking aggregations-bank holding com-
panies as well as banks themselves. The next section reviews
those laws.
B. Statutes and Regulations Stimulating
Small Banks and Small Banking Institutions
1. The McFadden Act
In discussing statutes and regulations that stimulate small
banks and small banking institutions, foremost are the laws that
make interstate branching virtually impossible in the United States.
It is illegal in almost all states for state banks to branch from one
state into another. Exceptions do exist 42 but they are insufficient
to conceal a national pattern prohibiting interstate branching. 43
National banks are governed in their branching opportunities by
the McFadden Act, which prohibits interstate branching.44
In the early years of the national bank system, branching was
not a crucial issue. It was not even mentioned in the original Na-
tional Bank Act. 45 When the issue arose, however, it incited fury
41. See DONALD R. FRASER & JAMES W. KOLARI, THE FUTURE OF SMALL
BANKS IN A DEREGULATED ENVIRONMENT 10 (1985) ("The fragmented nature of
the U.S. banking structure reflects the types of regulations that have been ap-
plied to commercial banks throughout the development of the U.S. financial
system.").
42. Exceptions that have been found, or manufactured, do not alter the na-
ture of the basic rule. See, e.g., In re State Savings Bank, Merger Decision 91-7,
1991 OCC Ltr. LEXIS 73 (Comptroller of the Currency, Apr. 8, 1991) (allowing
national bank to branch interstate based upon strained interpretation of Rhode
Island law governing savings banks); Sam Zuckerman, Utah Has Opened Door to
Interstate Branch Banking, AM. BANKER, July 12, 1990, at 1 (discussing Utah's con-
sent to Arizona-chartered bank's entry into Utah banking market).
43. See Is Interstate Branching Measure in Massachusetts Beginning of a Trend?,
BANKING POL'Y REP., Jan. 18, 1993, at 8, 8 (describing proposed interstate
branching legislation and discussing how majority of states continue to prohibit
interstate branching but allow interstate banking expansion through
acquisitions).
44. See McFadden Act of 1927, ch. 191, 44 Stat. 1224 (codified as amended
at 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1988)). The McFadden Act permits national banks to branch
only "within the State in which said association is situated." 12 U.S.C.
§ 36(c)(2).
45. The National Bank Act was actually two acts. See Act of Feb. 25, 1863,
ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665; National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99. The failure
to mention branching supposedly represented a lack of interest in the subject
[Vol. 38: p. I
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that stemmed from opposition to large banks. In 1898, a bill that
mentioned branching was introduced in Congress and approved
by the House Banking Committee. A minority report stated: "But
our choice must be made between one great 'United States Bank'
with ten thousand branches, and on the other hand, ten thousand
independent local banks." 46 The bill was not enacted.
The McFadden Act was a crucial juncture insofar as the size
of American banks was concerned. 47 When the Supreme Court
held in 1924 that national banks did not have the power to branch
at all, 48 Congress immediately appreciated that branching rights
should be given to the national bank system so that it could com-
pete effectively against state banks. The state banks, in response
to the expanding economy of the early twentieth century were
branching intrastate as necessary to meet the needs of their cus-
tomers. Congress, a federal institution not limited in its legisla-
tive powers by state boundaries, could have given the national
banks any branching power it deemed appropriate. 49 It could
have legislated national branching, and did indeed consider this
possibility. 50
What Congress did was to give national banks, 5' and state
banks that were members of the Federal Reserve System, 52 the
smallest possible branching power necessary to address the prob-
lem. The McFadden Act prescribed limits on branching to au-
rather than a policy that there should be no branching. See Gerald C. Fischer &Carter H. Golembe, The Branch Banking Provisions of the McFadden Act as Amended:
Their Rationale and Rationality, in SUBCOMM. ON FIN. INSTS., SENATE COMM. ON
BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., COMPENDIUM OF
ISSUES RELATING TO BRANCHING BY FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 1, 4 (Comm. Print
1976) [hereinafter BRANCHING BY FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS].
46. H.R. REP. No. 1575, 55th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 45 (1898).
47. For a background discussion of the McFadden Act, see Stanley M.
Gorinson, Depository Institution Regulatory Reform in the 1980s: The Issue of GeographicRestrictions, 28 ANTITRUST BULL. 227, 240-42 (1983) (describing reasons for and
impact of McFadden Act branching provisions).
48. First Nat'l Bank v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640, 657 (1924).
49. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 334-36 (1819) (stat-
ing that power to create bank included power to authorize branches).
50. During a debate in 1926, Representative McFadden stated: "[I]t is well
to bear in mind that Congress has the power to permit the establishment of
nation-wide branch banking systems in this country." 67 CONG. REC. 2831
(1926).
51. See McFadden Act of 1927, § 7, 44 Stat. at 1228 (indicating that existingbranches could be continued if maintained for preceding 25 years, if brancheswere state banks converted to national banks, or if, in limited circumstances,
such branching was permitted by state law).
52. Id. § 9, 44 Stat. at 1229 (requiring state bank desiring to acquire stockin Federal Reserve bank to relinquish branches outside its municipal limits).
1993]
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thorized national and state member banks: "[The banks may
branch only] within the limits of the city, town or village in which
said association is situated, if such establishment and operation
are at the time permitted to State banks by the law of the State in
question."5 3 The reference in federal law to state law-that is, a
national bank can branch within a state only where the state banks
can branch-has had a further limiting effect upon size when one
considers the nature of state branching laws. In 1926, twenty-two
states were "unit banking states" that did not permit branching at
all for their state banks and, by derivation, prohibited branching
for national banks as well. 54
In 1933, as state banks continued to broaden their branching
activities, the federal authorization was expanded to permit na-
tional banks to branch within a state. 55 Again, the authority was
measured by the extent to which state banks were permitted to
branch.5 6
In more recent years, state bank branching authority has ex-
panded thereby permitting the establishment of larger banks.57
Today there are only three unit banking states.58 Despite these
changes, however, the inability of state banks to enter into inter-
state branching, a movement entirely in the hands of the state
legislatures insofar as state banks are concerned,5 9 has remained
essentially unaffected and subject to the McFadden Act's general
philosophy on interstate branching.
The concern of Congress throughout its consideration of the
McFadden Act was that branching might enable national banks to
53. Id. § 7(c), 44 Stat. at 1228.
54. 68 CONG. REC. 2174 (1927) (statement of Rep. Strong).
55. See Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 23, 48 Stat. 162, 189 (current version
at 12 U.S.C. § 36(c)).
56. See First Nat'l Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252, 261
(1966) (enunciating concept of competitive equality in branching).
57. See George E. Lent, The Changing Structure of Commercial Banking, TUCK
BULL. No. 24,July, 1960, at 10, 10 (dating "modern era in branch banking" from
1909, when California authorized statewide branches).
58. Summary of State Branch Banking Laws, BANKING POL'Y REP., Apr. 15,
1991, at 13, 13 (noting that states generally prohibiting branch banking are Col-
orado, North Dakota and Wyoming).
59.. For insight into whether Congress recently undermined this concept
when it created state bank powers that go beyond the powers of national banks
still subject to prior approval of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC), see Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991,
Pub. L. No. 102-242, § 303(a), 105 Stat. 2236, 2349 (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1831a (Supp. III 1991)). Such a discussion, however, is beyond the scope of
this Article.
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grow too large.60 The concept of monopoly or undue concentra-
tion of bank resources pervaded the committee hearings and the
congressional debates.6 1 As a country, the United States was
more than comfortable with the small unit bank; we were commit-
ted to it. Whatever benefits might be derived from bigness faded
into insignificance when compared to the vision of small, rural,
friendly bankers and the local businesses that they understood
and serviced. Studies have indicated that banks with branching
powers are generally stronger than unit banks62 and that larger
banks, when permitted to enter a previously restricted commu-
nity, bring in money for local businesses that had been unavaila-
ble from the protected rural bank. 63 This concept had little
public appeal, instead the public believed, however erroneously,
that the local banker was part of, understood, and was dedicated
to, the local community. 64
If Congress had given national banks the power to branch
from coast to coast one may reasonably surmise that the face of
the banking landscape would be very different today. 65 Under
60. The arch-villain was Amadeo Peter Giannini, Chief Executive Officer of
the California Bank of America. See 68 CONG. REC. 5817 (1927). Giannini was
said to have been vocal in support of branching rights from the time he heard
Woodrow Wilson, President of Princeton University, commend the device in
1908. MARQUIS JAMES & BESSIE R. JAMES, BIOGRAPHY OF A BANK: THE STORY OF
BANK OF AMERICA 41-43 (1954).
61. See, e.g., 68 CONG. REC. 2167 (1927) (statement of Rep. Hull) (declaring
that "the public interest does not rest in the encouragement of banking
monopoly").
62. See Bruce L. Rockwood, Interstate Banking and Nonbanking in America: A
New Recipe for an Old Prescription or Why Does the Elephant Banker Wear Tennis Shoes
and Waterwings, and Carry an Economist Pocket Diary?, 12 SETON HALL LEGIS. J.
137, 195-96 (1989) (indicating that specific bank failures may not have occurred
if banks had been able to branch).
63. See Thomas E. Snider, The Effect of Merger on the Lending Behavior of Rural
Banks in Virginia,J. BANK RES., Spring 1973, at 52 (describing research study that
showed that mergers between urban and rural banks did not "materially affect[ ]
the amount or type of bank credit available in rural areas"). Against arguments
that large banks will go into needy neighborhoods and remove their deposits, it
has been observed that local banks may be unduly complacent with their pro-
tected positions and lend less locally than is appropriate. Id. at 53. If there is a
need for funds, it is a natural function for branch banks to supply them. Another
study revealed that larger banks with branch offices "had higher loan ratios than
unit banks in the same area" and were better able to transfer funds to the areas
of greatest need. See Jack M. Guttentag, Branch Banking. A Summary of the Issues
and the Evidence, in BRANCHING BY FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, supra note 45, at 99,
104.
64. See LAMB, supra note 19, at 39 (indicating that, at its 1916 annual con-
vention, in response to pressure from local bankers, American Banking Associa-
tion passed resolution opposing all branch banking).
65. See Douglas H. Ginsburg, Interstate Banking, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1133,
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this assumption, as national banks branched nationwide, state leg-
islatures would have given equivalent competitive powers to the
state banks just as national banks had been given powers in 1927
and 1933 to counter state bank branching. Large banks would
thereby have become more dominant and quite possibly could
have become the predominant American banking institution.
However, as the House Banking Committee stated in 1955:
Repeatedly Congress has been urged to break down
the restrictions in the national banking law regarding
branches of national banks. Congress has been urged to
permit branches, regardless of State bank laws, on a
trade area basis, on an interstate or Federal Reserve dis-
trict basis, and in fact on a nationwide basis. Each time,
however, Congress has declared its approval of the
American system of local independent and competitive
banks, and has left the matter of branches to the States
to determine, each State for itself.66
2. The Douglas Amendment
As stated, one dominant goal of the BHCA was to retain the
pattern of small, diffused banking organizations that dominated
the American banking scene. The BHCA drafters focused on the
possibility that many small banks could be grouped together into
one corporate framework, thereby providing the levels of size and
concentration denied to a single bank under the McFadden Act's
branching limitations. During one of the final House Banking
Committee hearings preceding BHCA passage, Federal Reserve
Board Chairman Martin described the then current, pre-BHCA
condition: "Consequently, there can well be situations in which a
large part of the commercial banking facilities in a large area of
the country may be concentrated under the management and
control of a single corporation." 67
The linchpin of the original BHCA in this respect is section
1286 (1981) (concluding that interstate branching "would be a net improvement
over state-by-state banking").
66. H.R. REP. No. 609, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1955).
67. Control and Regulation of Bank Holding Companies: Hearings on H.R. 2674
Before the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 13.14 (1955)
[hereinafter 1955 Hearings] (statement of William McChesney Martin, Jr., Chair-
man, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve Board).
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3(d). 68 Often called the "Douglas Amendment" after its sponsor,
Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois, section 3(d) provides that no
bank holding company can acquire a bank outside the state where
its principal banking activities are conducted unless that state spe-
cifically authorizes, by statute, such an acquisition. 69
The Douglas Amendment is a double-edged sword designed
not only to keep bank holding companies small but to protect the
unit bank system that might suffer in the face of competition from
large, widespread bank holding companies. 70 Senator Douglas,
somewhat inaccurately, stated his intent that the amendment
would:
carry over into the field of holding companies the same
provisions which already apply for branch banking under
the McFadden Act-namely, our amendment will permit
out-of-state holding companies to acquire banks in other
States only to the degree that State laws expressly permit
them; and that is the provision of the McFadden Act.7 '
The inaccuracy of Senator Douglas' statement has been high-
lighted by recent events. The McFadden Act, as previously
noted, 72 does not permit interstate branching for national and
other member banks regardless of what the states do. A state
statute cannot vary this, but it can enable interstate banking
through a holding company system.
Senator Douglas' conception of his amendment was perfectly
accurate for almost twenty years during which time no state en-
acted the kind of interstate authorization contemplated by section
3(d). In 1975, however, Maine introduced authorizing legislation
and by statute permitted out-of-state bank holding companies to
acquire Maine banks but only so long as Maine banks could enter
the other jurisdiction. 73 Obviously there was no reciprocal state
at that time, and the statute went unused for some years. In 1976,
68. BHCA, § 3(d), 70 Stat. 133, 135 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1842(d) (1988)).
69. Id.
70. Bank Holding Company Act Amendments: Hearings on H.R. 6778 Before the
House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1105 (1969) [hereinaf-
ter 1969 Hearings] (statement of Rep. Patman, Chairman, House Committee on
Banking and Currency).
71. 102 CONG. REC. 6858 (1956) (statement of Sen. Douglas).
72. For a discussion of the McFadden Act, see supra notes 47-64 and accom-
panying text.
73. 1975 Me. Laws ch. 500, § 1 (current version at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
9-B, § 1013 (West 1980 & Supp. 1992)).
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Alaska followed Maine's lead with a statute of its own.74 Through
the mid-1980s, in response to increasing pressure from expan-
sion-minded banks, various states enacted legislation that, in one
way or another, allowed out-of-state holding companies to enter
their jurisdiction. 75
A key issue in the development of interstate banking was set-
tled in Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors.76 Regional and
local banks had been concerned with the specter of toe-to-toe
competition from large money-center bank holding companies
that might ultimately be authorized to enter their states. In re-
sponse, some states devised a method of introducing interstate
banking gradually. 77 Through a variation on the Douglas
Amendment state authorization device, some state statutes al-
lowed entry only to bank holding companies from similarly situ-
ated states in one state's immediate region of the country. The
approach, generally called "regional interstate banking," allowed
banking regions to develop in New England, the southeast, the
southwest and elsewhere. 78 Thus, states could exclude the gar-
gantuan and frightening international money-center holding
companies from such cities as New York, San Francisco, Chicago
and Houston. In addition, local banks, through their own holding
company structures, could grow in size and strength in order to
meet the competition now seen as inevitable.
A few large bank holding companies, together with some of
their trade associations, challenged the New England regional in-
terstate banking scheme as involving an unconstitutional asser-
74. 1976 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 218, § 18 (current version at ALASKA STAT.
§ 06.05.235(e) (1992)).
75. The interstate banking movement was spurred substantially by a move-
ment begun by South Dakota in 1980. The Supreme Court had held that a na-
tional bank could export the interest rate of its home state nationwide.
Marquette Nat'l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp, 439 U.S. 299, 308 (1978).
In response, South Dakota was the first state to invite out-of-state holding com-
panies to establish national banks in South Dakota and to liberalize its usury
laws. 1980 S.D. Laws ch. 331 (current version at S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN.
§ 51A-2-40 (1990)). Other states, led by Delaware, followed suit in order to
attract banking business. See, e.g., 63 Del. Laws ch. 2, § 2 (current version at
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 803 (1985)) (allowing out-of-state bank holding com-
pany to acquire and hold no more than two in-state banks, subject to specific
conditions).
76. 472 U.S. 159 (1985). In Northeast Bancorp, the Supreme Court approved
the acquisition of an in-state bank by an out-of-state holding company under a
state statute found to be within the contemplated scope of the BHCA's Douglas
Amendment. Id. at 169-73.
77. Id. at 163-64.
78. Id. at 164-65 (describing New England's regional interstate banking
statute and referring to similar statutory enactments in other regions).
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tion of state power under the Commerce, Compact and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Constitution. 79 Rejecting the chal-
lenges, the Supreme Court in Northeast Bancorp unanimously up-
held the validity of the regional banking concept.8 0
Northeast Bancorp broke the dam. States rushed to attract out-
of-state holding companies, usually limited in whatever manner
the inviting state deemed appropriate, to invigorate the local
economy. Small banks, that still had not found security in their
ability to compete, could now welcome a purchaser with lined
pockets. By April, 1991 forty-seven states and the District of
Columbia had some form of Douglas Amendment enabling
legislation.8'
There has been no change in the Douglas Amendment since
1956, when it could reasonably be viewed as the equivalent of the
McFadden Act's prohibition on interstate branching. Despite
this, the national attitude 'toward large bank holding companies
has undergone significant change. As can be seen from the state
invitations to out-of-state bank holding companies, the rejection
of the large banking institution was replaced nationally with a
much more accepting posture.
3. Convenience and Advantage Requirements
The McFadden Act limiting bank branching and the Douglas
Amendment limiting the spread of holding companies are the two
most significant statutes sustaining the small banking institution.
Another noteworthy type of statutory approach is called the "con-
venience and advantage" requirement or "C&A." This type of
provision peppers bank statutes and regulations at both federal
and state levels. Before a bank can obtain a charter, C&A re-
quires, even under "free banking" statutes, that the bank demon-
strate to the charter issuer that the bank serves the convenience
and advantage (sometimes referred to as the convenience and
needs) of its community.8 2 The same requirement exists when
79. Id. at 166.
80. Id. at 178. The attack on the New England compact began in a proceed-
ing before the Federal Reserve Board (Fed), was reconsidered on appeal to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and finally was appealed
to the Supreme Court. In these three forums, the objectors failed to win a single
vote,
81. State Bank Supervisors Formally Publish Their Proposal for Interstate Branching,
56 Banking Rep. (BNA) 643 (Apr. 8, 1991).
82. The Comptroller of the Currency has promulgated a C&A requirement
in chartering national banks. See 12 C.F.R. § 5.20(c)(4) (1992). On a national
level, the C&A requirement is a bank regulation, not a statutory requirement.
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obtaining permission to open a branch.83 Indeed, when Congress
enacted the Community Reinvestment Act in 1977,84 it wrote that
it 'finds that . . . regulated financial institutions are required by
law to demonstrate that their deposit facilities serve the conven-
ience and needs of the communities in which they are chartered
to do business."85
The import of C&A requirements is that a bank cannot ob-
tain a charter in the first instance or, if expansionist by nature,
branch under an existing charter if it cannot demonstrate that
there is an actual need for a new bank in that location, even when
it can satisfy the restrictions of the McFadden Act. C&A require-
ments protect local banks from competition and, as a result, pro-
hibit greater size.8 6
4. Antitrust Standards In Banking Statutes
Banks and bank holding companies are both subject to the
federal antitrust laws.8 7 This principle standing alone does not
favor small institution banking beyond whatever smallness stan-
dards antitrust laws generally impose upon business. The princi-
ple is, however, subject to an important qualification: the antitrust
standards are applied as prior restraints by both the BHCAs s and
by the Bank Merger Act89 to bank and bank holding company ac-
This is probably due to the fact that the National Bank Act was modeled after the
original New York State free banking act. The C&A requirement, however, is a
statutory precondition to obtaining insurance under the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation Act (FDIC Act), without which national banks, and most state
banks, cannot get their charters. 12 U.S.C. § 1816 (Supp. III 1991). Most states
also have similar requirements. See, e.g., N.Y. BANKING LAW § 24 (McKinney
1990). New York did not incorporate the C&A requirement into its banking
laws until 1932. 1932 N.Y. Laws ch. 118, § 2 (current version at N.Y. BANKING
LAw § 24(1)).
83. See, e.g., N.Y. BANKING LAW § 29 (McKinney 1990) (example of state ver-
sion). A national bank must abide by state law on this issue. First Nat'l Bank v.
Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252, 258-62 (1966) (interpreting McFadden
Act to require national banks to abide by appropriate state law).
84. Pub. L. No. 95-128, 91 Stat. 1147 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 2901-2907 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
85. 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (emphasis added).
86. In the consumer finance field, and applicable largely to nonbank finance
companies, it was noted: "Although the intent of C&A licensing is purportedly
to encourage the growth of the size of loan offices to attain economies of scale,
misdirected application of the rule can lead to substantial lack of competition."
NAT'L COMM'N ON CONSUMER FINANCE, REPORT OF CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE
UNITED STATES 114 (1972).
87. See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963)
(discussing application of § 7 of Clayton Act to bank merger).
88. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (1988).
89. Pub. L. No. 86-463, 74 Stat. 129, 129 (1960) (codified as amended at 12
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quisitions. Although the normal posture of the antitrust laws al-
lows them to be generally imposed after the event to eliminate a
discovered illegal situation or occurrence, the banking statutes es-
sentially require that antitrust standards be satisfied before permit-
ting such events as acquisitions, mergers, entry into new
businesses and even branch openings. 90 The Supreme Court has
held that the standards enunciated in these banking statutes are
no different than the antitrust laws from which they were de-
rived;9' any difference lies in the element of precondition.
a. The BHCA Antitrust Standards
In addition to the specific restrictions discussed, the larger
structure of the BHCA also imposes limitations favoring bank
smallness. One primary example is the BHCA's antitrust provi-
sions. Section 3 regulates the creation of bank holding compa-
nies and the acquisition within existing bank holding companies
of additional banks. 92 When enacted in 1956, the BHCA imposed
several preconditions on such additional acquisitions. One pre-
condition required the Federal Reserve Board (Fed) to consider
whether such acquisition, merger or consolidation would "ex-
pand the size or extent of the bank holding company system in-
volved beyond limits consistent with adequate and sound
banking, the public interest, and the preservation of competition
in the field of banking." 93
U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1988 & Supp. III 1991)). The Bank Merger Act derived from
an act which applied only to mergers of national banks. See Act of Nov. 17, 1918,
ch. 209, 40 Stat. 1043.
90. See 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5) (1988) (prohibiting any merger, acquisition
or consolidation that would result in monopoly or substantially lessen competi-
tion); 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (same). The Bank Merger Act provides that in any
antitrust action the court "shall review de novo the issues presented." 12 U.S.C.
§ 1828(c)(7)(A); see also United States v. First City Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361, 368
(1966) (reviewing premerger denial by Comptroller of Currency under Bank
Merger Act).
Conditions precedent are not, of course, unknown in commerce generally.
See, e.g., Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
435, § 201, 90 Stat. 1383, 1390-91 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1988)) (requir-
ing premerger notification to Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and compliance
with mandated waiting period in specified mergers and acquisitions). Hart-
Scott-Rodino, however, only requires advance notice to the FTC of larger acqui-
sitions. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a). The FTC has the power to stop acquisitions it
deems to be in restraint of trade, but its prior approval is not required. Id.
§ 18a(f).
91. United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171, 182 (1968).
92. BHCA, § 3, 70 Stat. 133, 134 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a)
(1988)).
93. Id. § 3(c), 70 Stat. at 135.
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As amended in 1966, the foregoing test was replaced by a
new test that essentially adopted the standards of section 7 of the
Clayton Act and section 2 of the Sherman Act. 94 Thus, a bank
holding company, before acquiring a bank, must now prove in ad-
vance of the acquisition that the tests prescribed by the antitrust acts
are satisfied.95
Section 4 of the BHCA addresses the relationship of a bank
holding company to any activity of a company other than a bank
within the holding company.96 The current version requires that
for approval by the Fed, the other activity must be both closely
related to banking and "a proper incident thereto. ' '97 In defining
the latter test, the BHCA states:
In determining whether a particular activity is a proper
incident to banking or managing or controlling banks,
the Board shall consider whether its performance by an
affiliate of a holding company can reasonably be ex-
pected to produce benefits to the public, such as ... in-
creased competition ... that outweigh possible adverse
effects, such as undue concentration of resources, [or]
decreased or unfair competition .... 98
As with the antitrust standards injected into BHCA section
3(c), the section 4 tests also serve as preconditions. Unlike sec-
tion 3, however, in applying the more generally written section 4
tests, the Clayton and Sherman Acts standards are not directly
used. Instead, the Fed 'applies tests such as the Herfindahl-
94. Act of July 1, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-485, § 6(c), 80 Stat. 236, 237 (cur-
rent version at 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (Supp. III 1991)) (amending § 3(c) of BHCA
to allow Fed to preclude any merger, acquisition or consolidation that would
result in monopoly or lessen competition). The amended § 3(c) does permit
acquisitions that violate the adopted standards if the acquiror can show that the
probable effect of the transaction in meeting the "convenience and needs of the
community" to be served "clearly outweigh[s]" the anticompetitive effects. 12
U.S.C. § 1842(c)(1)(B) (Supp. III 1991). The same language is used in the Bank
Merger Act. See 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5)(B) (1988).
95. See United States v. First City Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361, 364 (1966)
(describing premerger consideration of antitrust implications); Mercantile Texas
Corp. v. Board of Governors, 638 F.2d 1255, 1260-61 (5th Cir. 1981) (establish-
ing principle that Clayton Act tests are to be applied under amended BHCA).
96. BHCA, § 4, 70 Stat. at 135 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1988
& Supp. III 1991)); see also Citicorp v. Board of Governors, 936 F.2d 66, 76 (2d
Cir. 1991) (holding that supervision of Board of Governors of Federal Reserve
System did not extend to nonbank subsidiaries of banks within holding com-
pany), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 869 (1992).
97. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1988).
98. Id. § 1843(c)(8)(F).
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Hirschman Index and the Department of Justice Merger
Guidelines .99
b. The Bank Merger Act Antitrust Standards
The BHCA is not the only banking regulation that establishes
antitrust standards. The Bank Merger Act imposes additional an-
titrust considerations on the banking industry. The Bank Merger
Act was enacted in 1960, as a result of a perceived concentration
of banking resources. 100 Addressing a different mix of institu-
tions from those covered by the BHCA, the Bank Merger Act is
part of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act (FDIC
Act) and is consequently directed to mergers of insured institu-
tions.' 0 ' In 1966, an amendment to the Bank Merger Act
adopted as a precondition to a merger (which includes consolida-
tions, acquisitions of assets and assumption of liabilities) essen-
tially the same antitrust tests that were incorporated into section
3(c) of the BHCA.' 0 2 Under the current version of the Bank
Merger Act, an institution must demonstrate to its governing fed-
eral agency 103 that the merger does not violate the Clayton Act
and the Sherman Act. 10 4 The Bank Merger Act and the BHCA
amendments thus confirm the continuing dedication of the nation
to the small bank.
99. See Mid Am, Inc., 76 Fed. Res. Bull. 962, 963-64 (1990) (using these
tests in § 4(c)(8) hearing, Fed determined that results warranted approval of ap-
plication by bank holding company to acquire savings association). For a discus-
sion of the Justice Department merger guidelines, see infra notes 138-40.
100. H.R. REP. No. 1416, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1960), reprinted in 1960
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1995, 1996. The number of banks had decreased from 14,174 on
January 1, 1950 to 13,460 on December 31, 1959. Id. Whether, in our inflated
banking structure, this loss of 714 banks over a ten-year period demanded cor-
rective legislation is a reasonable question.
101. For a discussion of the body of banking regulation, including the Bank
Merger Act, that is distinct from the BHCA, see infra notes 462-78 and accompa-
nying text.
102. Act of Feb. 21, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-356, 80 Stat. 7,8 (current version
at 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1988 & Supp. III 1991)). For a discussion of the similar
amendment to the BHCA, see supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
103. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(2) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). For a discussion of
relevant federal agencies, see infra note 109.
104. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5) (1988) (proscribing "any proposed merger
transaction which would result in a monopoly ... or ... substantially ... lessen
competition"). The text of this statute was written in the House. See H.R. REP.
No. 1416, supra note 100, at 1, reprinted in 1960 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 140. The Senate
bill had prescribed a less specific test: whether the merger would "unduly lessen
competition or tend unduly to create a monopoly." Id. at 3, reprinted in 1960
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1996. This language was rejected. Id. at 12, reprinted in 1960
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2005.
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5. Deposit Insurance
Another type of banking regulation that tends to promote the
small bank structure is the deposit insurance system. Branch
banking, with the benefits derived from diversification of product
and of geography, was, until 1933, generally perceived as a
source of bank safety.l 0 5 Earlier deposit insurance systems, as en-
acted by the states, had been designed principally to protect unit
banking structures; 1° 6 such insurance was largely unknown in
branching states. The legislation that established federal deposit
insurance in 1933 continued this pattern. It was intended to pro-
tect unit banking and the small bank and to prevent branching
with its risks of bigness.' 0 7
6. Variegated Regulation
Finally, although certainly not designed for the protection of
the small bank, the nation's unfortunate regulatory structure does
tend to reinforce the lines among the different institutions and
promote smallness.i08 The number of regulatory agencies and
the way the regulations keep the various banking entities separate
and distinct makes establishment of a nationwide banking system
difficult. 10 9 For example, to the extent that interinstitutional
mergers might tend to reduce the dominance of the small bank,
105. See generally KLEBANER, supra note 11, at 126-27 (discussing growth of
bank branches in 1920s).
106. For a discussion of the relationship between deposit insurance and
branching, see Benston, supra note 20, at 20 (indicating that fractionalized U.S.
banking system was major factor in bank failures that prompted need for federal
deposit insurance); Charles W. Calomiris, Regulation, Industrial Structure, and In-
stability in U.S. Banking: An Historical Perspective, in STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN BANK-
ING 19, 91 (Michael Klausner & Lawrence J. White eds., 1993) (noting that
benefits of branching, such as diversification and coordination, provided alterna-
tive stability to banking and thereby minimized need for liability insurance).
107. KLEBANER, supra note 11, at 136-37 (noting that bankers generally con-
sider deposit insurance to be ineffective but federal deposit insurance enacted
because of public demand); Carter H. Golembe, The Deposit Insurance Legislation of
1933.: An Examination of Its Antecedents and Its Purposes, 75 POL. SCe. Q. 181,195-97
(1960) (discussing historical relationship between insurance and unit bank and
describing debates leading to enactment of federal deposit insurance).
108. See The Depository Institutions Amendments of 1982: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Financial Institutions, Supervision and Insurance of the House Comm. on Bank-
ing, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 383-84 (1982) (statement of David L. Paul, President of
the National Association of State Savings and Loan Supervisors) (defending S&L
industry as separate business and defending need for regulatory division be-
tween state and federal institutions).
109. The federal regulatory structure includes the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency for national and district banks, the Federal Reserve for state member
banks, the FDIC for state nonmember banks, the Office of Thrift Supervision for
federal savings and loans (S&Ls) and the National Credit Union Administration
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they are correspondingly inhibited. " 10
C. The Evolving Picture
The heyday of the U.S. small banking institution may have
been 1921, when the number of banks had grown to more than
30,000."'1 Perhaps it arrived in 1977, when Senator William
Proxmire, Chairman of the Senate Banking Committee and cham-
pion of the small bank, introduced a bill (subsequently defeated)
which would have flatly prohibited any bank acquisition when a
bank holding company controlled more than twenty percent of
the banking assets of its state.l 12 This mechanistic standard was
designed to replace the reasonable man tests of the antitrust laws
and the flexible examinations the Fed regularly applied to each
bank acquisition application. Senator Proxmire stated that the
legislation was necessary because "[t]he largest institutions ac-
quired an increasing share of the Nation's banking resources over
the past several years and State markets are highly con-
centrated." 113
Since that statement was made, there has been an increase in
the presence of the large bank holding company and an apparent
shift in the country's attitude towards the diminishing number of
banks.' ' 4 There is a natural pressure upon banks to grow in size
as their customers grow in number. As banks get larger, bank
holding companies are able to meet their customers' needs for
larger credit lines and for increasingly diverse and sophisticated
products. Banks can better deal with customers who have them-
selves developed geographic dispersion.
It has long been recognized that the traditional American
for federal credit unions. In addition, there are 50 different mixes of state bank
and thrift regulators.
110. See, e.g., Financial Institutions Emergency Acquisitions Amendments
of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 623 (current version at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1823(0 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)) (providing for four types of emergency inter-
state acquisitions; only fourth category includes possibility of inter-institutional
acquisition).
111. Lent, supra note 57, at 9 (indicating that number of commercial banks
reached all time high of 30,456 in 1921).
112. S. 72, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (subsequently defeated).
113. 123 CONG. REC. 625 (1977) (statement of Sen. Proxmire). Senator
Proxmire became Chairman of the Senate Banking Committee with a desire to
"legislate a limit on the size of banks." Bartlett Naylor, Proxmire to Seek Bank Size
Limits, AM. BANKER, Dec. 10, 1986, at 1, 1.
114. See Franklin R. Edwards, Concentration in Banking. Problem or Solution?, in
DEREGULATING FINANCIAL SERVICES, supra note 20, at 145, 150-51 (discussing
changes in banking industry arising from larger bank size and movement toward
holding company organizational structure).
1-993]
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
dedication to the unit bank structure has not only weakened
banks but has had an adverse effect upon consumers.' 1 5 A wide-
spread unit bank structure diminishes bank competition for the
consumer because the banks, restricted to their local communi-
ties, do not meet each other in face-to-face competition. 1 6 In-
creased branching within individual states and, more recently, the
development of interstate banking through holding company ex-
pansion under the Douglas Amendment, have tended to diminish
these problems.
Two recent developments, one in foreign commerce and the
other in domestic bank mergers, are now accelerating the shift to
fewer and larger banking institutions.
1. Developments in Foreign Commerce
In 1956, the United States had five of the top ten banks in the
world. By 1978, the number had reduced to three. By 1988,
there were none. 1 7 Today no United States bank appears in the
world's top twenty; only three rank even in the top fifty." 8
Comptroller of the Currency Robert Clarke put it this way: "A
nation with a second-rate banking system is a second-rate na-
tion." 119 When viewing proposals for change in the bank regula-
tory system, one of the considerations that is increasingly taken
into account is whether a proposal might impede a bank from get-
ting larger and thereby diminish its international capabilities. 20
115. See Lent, supra note 57, at 9 (noting that "overbanked" condition leads
to too many banks for available business).
116. Id. at 15 ("The existence of many independent banks does not assure
competition."). For a further exploration of this issue, see Arnold A. Hegges-
tad, Market Structure, Competition, and Performance in Financial Industries: A Survey of
Banking Studies, in ISSUES IN FINANCIAL REGULATION 449 (Franklin R. Edwards
ed., 1979) (analyzing various studies of relationship between structure and per-
formance of banks).
117. Jim McTague & Mindy Fetterman, Banks on the Brink; Rough Times Ahead
for USA's Banks; Bad Loans, Competition Take Their Toll, USA TODAY, May 29, 1990,
at BI.
118. The World's 100 Largest Banks, supra note 7, at R27. Citicorp ranked
22nd in 1990, but dropped to 26th in 1991. Id. BankAmerica ranked 49th in
1990 but rose to 32d in 1991. Id. Chemical Bank rankied 79th in 1990, but rose
to 44th in 1991. Id.
119. McTague & Fetterman, supra note 117, at BI (quoting Comptroller of
the Currency Robert L. Clarke).
120. The Department of the Treasury noted in 1981:
The domestic commercial bank share of both national and world mar-
kets for banking and financial services has been on the decline in recent
years .... [W]hile the potential for unrestricted branching leading to a
possibly undesirable increase in national concentration in banking can-
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2. Cost-Saving Mergers
The United States has experienced a spate of large bank
mergers over the last few years. The purpose of these mergers is
to reduce costs in a difficult economic period.' 21 Pressed for
profits in the face of soft business conditions, banks and their
holding companies are seeking to join forces, principally in order
to reduce overall costs relative to income. Whether such econo-
mies will in fact be accomplished is beyond the scope of this
Article. 122
An important consideration in any discussion of bank merg-
ers is the situation of a bank facing liquidation. An impending
bank failure can be reversed if, through merger or acquisition, a
not be ignored, it is not a compelling reason to maintain the current
inefficient and inequitable restrictions.
DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, GEOGRAPHIC RESTRICTIONS ON COMMERCIAL BANKING IN
THE UNITED STATES: THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 13 (1981) [hereinafter GEO-
GRAPHIC RESTRICTIONS].
Meanwhile, one commentator anticipates that Japan, the leader in world
banking, will further concentrate its banking, structure, leading to fewer and
larger institutions. HERVE DE CARMOY, GLOBAL BANKING STRATEGY: FINANCIAL
MARKETS AND INDUSTRIAL DECAY 83 (1990). While Mr. de Carmoy's predictive
ability may be open to question, he clearly indicates the direction in which the
United States is headed: "Moreover, it appears inevitable that-the American
banking sector's spectacular world decline will be the prelude to a phase of na-
tional concentration, followed ten to twenty years later by the emergence of an
American oligopoly." Id. at 179.
121. The three largest banking mergers in the United States were Chemical
Banking Corporation with Manufacturers Hanover Corporation (Chemical to
survive with $135 billion in assets); NCNB Corporation and C&S/Sovran Corpo-
ration (survivor to be called Nationsbank. with $116 billion in assets); and
BankAmerica Corporation and Security Pacific.Corporation (combined assets of
$ 192 billion). See Barbara Rose, First Chicago's Last Stand, CRAVIN'S CHI. Bus.,
Nov. 30, 1992, at 13. For a further discussion of the Chemical Banking Corpora-
tion and Manufacturers Hanover Corporation merger, see infra note 147.
122. A recent study on economies of scale in banking concluded, based
upon "limited" analysis leading to a "tentative" conclusion, that "profitability
... typically decreased as the size of the bank becomes larger." ANALYSIS OF
BANKING CONSOLIDATION, supra note 10, at 16. It seems clear that size does re-
sult in an economy of scale when modern electronic transfers are at issue. See
Jeffrey Kutler, Superregionals Make Their Mark on ACH, AM. BANKER, Apr. 13, 1992,
at 1 (reporting that consolidation of automated clearing house activities can
yield economies of scale and other competitive advantages).
Using a more empirical approach, another commentator has noted that
large banks are not necessarily more efficient than small banks and, therefore,
mergers are not likely to produce efficiency and cost savings. John P. Danforth,
Merger Economies and Recent Trends in Bank -Consolidation, BANKING POL'Y REP., Oct.
7, 1991, at 1, 8; see also Richard Layne, Does Merging Pay? Fed Studies Say No, AM.
BANKER, Feb. 12, 1992, at 1 (indicating that 1992 Fed study provided additional
proof that increased profitability is generally not achieved by large bank merg-
ers). But Danforth commented: "The suggestion that merger-related cost sav-
ings are unattainable, even in the context of in-market mergers where significant
branch consolidation is possible, is simply ludicrous." Danforth, supra, at 8.
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healthy institution infuses new capital into the failing bank. What
can emerge is one stronger bank. 123 This form of assistance by
the stronger to the weaker banks is encouraged by the FDIC as
one method of avoiding resort to the insurance fund. A statutory
pattern sustains this procedure. 124 Such statutes reinforce the
growing acceptance of the larger bank, particularly when such
banks perform public policy functions.
The BHCA had been presented to Congress as a specialized
statute designed to protect the small banking institution. As Sen-
ator Morse explained: "[T]he Bank Holding Company Act is an
antimonopoly measure."' 125 One doubts that a banking statute
presented in this manner would receive as warm a welcome today
as the BHCA did in 1956. It appears that the public no longer
views large banks as generally offensive. Instead the public seems
to regard the quality of service as being more important than
size. 126
D. Markets, Concentration and Banking. Institution Size
The relationship between bank or holding company size and
the relevant competitive market is in some confusion. 27 The in-
123. For a detailed discussion of this private sector role in resolving the
thrift crisis, see Lissa L. Broome, Private Market Solutions to the Savings and Loan
Crisis: Bank Holding Company Acquisitions of Savings Associations, 59 FORDHAM L. RE-
VIEW 111 (1991).
124. The FDIC may, for example, "merge the insured depository institu-
tion with another depository institution." 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(G) (Supp. III
1991). In addition, emergency powers enable the FDIC to ignore the interstate
banking restrictions of the Douglas Amendment and permit a holding company
in one state to acquire a large failing bank in another. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(0 (1988
& Supp. III 1991). For a review of the FDIC merger procedure, albeit slightly
out-of-date in view of more recent legislation, see Jeffrey L. Portis, FDIC's Powers
After a Bank Failure, 65 U. DET. L. REV. 259 (1988).
125. 111 CONG. REC. 20,541 (1965) (statement of Sen. Morse).
126. Given our vast banking structure of approximately 13,000 banks, it is
inconceivable that the development of more large banks will mean the end of the
small bank. If this eventuality should occur, it will necessarily be over decades
with ample public opportunity to observe and fine tune. We have seen confir-
mation of this most clearly when state unit bank structures, i.e., no branching,
have given way to statewide branching. Although banks have grown larger,
there has been room for the small bank to "continue to fill an important niche in
the marketplace." S. REP. No. 167, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1991); see also id.
(statement of Robert Carswell, former Deputy Treasury Secretary) (describing
New York experience in which growth of large banks did not affect health of
small independent banks); Gorinson, supra note 47, at 246 (discussing number
of reasons why "the potential for the demise of the small bank is greatly
exaggerated").
127. Edward W. Hill, Current Antitrust Policy: A Liability in Today's Deregulated
Banking Industry, 18 POL'Y STUD. J. 591, 591 (1990) (taking note of increasing
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creasing size and decreasing number of banking institutions must
inevitably have an effect on market concentration. How this effect
will manifest itself on national, state, local or other market levels
is uncertain.12
The BHCA plays a significant role in the development of this
issue. Under the BHCA, the Fed must evaluate market concentra-
tion when reviewing any bank or nonbank acquisition by a bank
holding company.' 29 Although the BHCA uses other statutes for
its sources, the necessary considerations of the relevant market
and the appropriate level of concentration are based upon the
mandates of the BHCA.' 3 0 Other laws govern as well, particularly
for situations, such as bank mergers or simple internal expansion,
that are beyond the ambit of the BHCA. The BHCA, however,
sets the tests that must be satisfied for certain crucial events: the
creation of a bank holding company; the acquisition by a bank
holding company of a bank; and the entry by a bank holding com-
pany and its nonbank subsidiaries into new businesses.' 3'
The Senate Report to the original BHCA cites as one of its
purposes the prevention of "the concentration of commercial
bank facilities in a particular area." 32 The current tests of market
concentration were inserted into the BHCA with its 1966133 and
1970134 amendments. There are two sets of tests. The first set
derives from the 1966 BHCA amendments and is used when eval-
uating the acquisition of banks. The test applies, with some mod-
ifications, the standards established by the antimonopoly
provisions of section 2 of the Sherman Act' 35 and the provisions
of the Clayton Antitrust Act protecting competition.' 36
number of large bank mergers and observing that "current measures of market
share are outdated and inadequate").
128. A Fed study examined the effects of the increased intrastate branching
powers given to banks. Stephen A. Rhoades, Geographic Expansion of Banks and
Changes in Banking Structure, 65 Fed. Res. Bull. 221, 221 (1979). This study con-
cluded that there was increased state concentration and questionable local mar-
ket change as a result of such geographic expansion. Id.
129. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1842-1843 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. S. REP. No. 1095, supra note 4, at 2, reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N at
2483.
133. Act of July 1, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-485, 80 Stat. 237 (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1842(a) (1966)).
134. Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
607, 84 Stat. 1760 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1970)).
135. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
136. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988).
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Under this test, the market defined and the calculation of
concentration within the market depend upon the nature of the
underlying legal test used, the bank services offered and the cus-
tomers for those services. Whether an antitrust law is violated
turns on a calculus built on factors of bank size, concentration
and competition, 37 combined with an evaluation of more subjec-
tive market qualities such as ease of entry, the reality of potential
competitors and whether the firm to be acquired is a market
leader.138 None of these factors necessarily has a positive correla-
tion with the others. In a continuing attempt to establish the cor-
rect mix, reevaluation is necessary.' 39 There is no fixed concept
of a relevant bank market.' 40 For example, for Sherman Act mo-
nopolies, the Supreme Court has said that any relevant market
will serve. 141 On the other hand, for Clayton Act purposes, the
Court has specifically identified discrete market parameters. 142
The second set of tests is applied to the acquisition of compa-
137. See Edwards, supra note 114, at 145 (examining whether concentration
is necessary result of current financial revolution).
138. For a discussion of these BHCA antitrust tests, see supra notes 92-99
and accompanying text. The U.S. Department ofJustice also publishes merger
guidelines to provide information regarding its antitrust enforcement practices.
See Merger Guidelines-1992, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,104, at 20,569. The
Fed frequently utilizes the Justice Department. guidelines. .47 Fed. Reg. 9017
(1982).
139. In 1982, the Fed proposed a policy statement aiming to provide gui-
dance on the Fed's own analytical framework for assessing proposals for merg-
ers, acquisitions, and consolidations. 47 Fed. Reg. 9017 (1982) (proposed
March 3, 1982, but never adopted). On a broader basis, the Justice Department
has used the merger guidelines since 1968, with the most current revision occur-
ring in 1992. Merger Guidelines-i 992, supra note 138, at 20,569; see also Joe Da-
vidson, Merger Guidelines Are Being Revised by Justice Agency, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20,
1992, at B4 (noting that most current revisions will have little effect on numbers
of mergers challenged, but will clarify Justice Department's analysis for deter-
mining whether proposed merger is anticompetitive). See generally William F.
Jung, Note, Banking Mergers and "Line of Commerce "After the Monetary Control Act: A
Submarket Approach, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 731, 760 (stating that "[a] new 'line of
commerce' standard is in order").
140. See Jack M. Guttentag & Edward S. Herman, Banking Structure and Per-
formance, BULLETIN (Inst. of Fin., N.Y.U. Graduate Sch. of Bus. Admin.), No.
41/43, Feb. 1967 (discussing methods of measuring bank concentration, bank
products and bank markets); Merger Guidelines, supra note 138, at 20,569 (same).
141. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 225-26 (1947).
142. See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 361
(1963) (selecting four-county Philadelphia market as "meaningful banking com-
munity"). The Court approved a statement of the Comptroller of the Currency
that read in part: "With respect to the effect upon competition, there are three
separate levels and effective areas of competition involved. These are the na-
tional level for national accounts, the regional or sectional area, and the local
area of the City of Philadelphia and the immediately surrounding area." Id. at
361-62.
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nies that are not banks. These tests were enacted in the 1970
BHCA amendments. In establishing these tests, Congress was
much less specific and supplemented the section 4(c)(8) tests 143
with general language that spoke in terms of "undue concentra-
tion of economic resources." 144 The tests offer little specific gui-
dance to the Fed. "Undue" concentration could have several
meanings having to do with effects upon markets, combinations
of banking and commerce or the aggregation of immense eco-
nomic power.' 45 The targeted market might mean the national,
the state or the local banking market.' 46
Federal Reserve Board decisions have so far concentrated
upon state and local markets.147 The law defining an appropriate
banking market is, however, in need of refinement. Both the Fed
and the Justice Department engage in the quest, sometimes to-
gether, sometimes separately. 48 State regulators concerned with
143. For a discussion of the BHCA § 4 tests, see infra notes 96-99 and ac-
companying text.
144. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1747, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1970), reprinted in
1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5561, 5567 (report on BHCA amendment).
145. Cynthia A. Glassman & Robert A. Eisenbeis, Bank Holding Companies
and Concentration of Banking and Financial Resources, in BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF
THE FED. RESERVE Sys., THE BANK HOLDING COMPANY MOVEMENT TO 1978: A
COMPENDIUM 211 (1978) [hereinafter THE BANK HOLDING COMPANY MOVEMENT].
146. Id. at 220-28.
147. See, e.g., Chemical Banking Corp., 78 Fed. Res. Bull. 74 (1992) (ap-
proving merger of Manufacturers Hanover Corporation with Chemical Banking
Corporation); First Bancshares of St. Landry, Inc., 78 Fed. Res. Bull. 136 (1992)
(approving merger of two Louisiana bank holding companies).
In the decision on the merger of Manufacturers Hanover Corporation with
Chemical Banking Corporation, the Fed dealt with a transaction that had na-
tional, state and local implications. The decision clearly stressed the local scene:
the banking markets in metropolitan New York-New Jersey, Albany, Buffalo,
Rochester and Syracuse. Chemical Banking Corp., 78 Fed. Res. Bull. at 76-77. The
market concentration in New York State was referred to almost in passing. Id.
Both merging corporations have national operations, principally through the
ownership of nonbank subsidiaries throughout the country. As for those compa-
nies, the Fed merely noted that "the markets for these nonbanking services are
unconcentrated" and "the proposal ... would not result in a significantly ad-
verse effect on competition in any relevant market." Id. at 82-83; see also Philip
C. Meyer, Antitrust Remedies Highlight Fed Approval of B of A-SecPac Deal,
BANKING POL'Y REP., Apr. 6, 1992, at 2 (observing that in approving BankAmer-
ica-Security Pacific merger, Fed dealt with 116 separate markets).
148. The Fed's 1982 proposed policy statement indicated that the Fed
would withhold the issuance of its own merger guidelines until the correspond-
ing guidelines of the Department ofJustice became available. 47 Fed. Reg. 9017
(1982) (proposed March 3, 1982, but never adopted). Furthermore, the Fed
"incorporated the current Department of Justice Merger Guidelines into com-
petitive analysis involving the elimination of existing competition." Id. For a
discussion of cases in which the Justice Department pursued antitrust actions
despite approval of the acquisitions by other bank regulatory agencies, see infra
notes 489-91 and accompanying text.
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antitrust issues add to the complexities. 49 Whether the banking
industry needs this tandem review and whether the BHCA adds
qualitatively to the considerations at issue are two questions to be
addressed in this Article. Meanwhile, it must be noted that the
Justice Department and the Fed disagree on the definition of a
relevant bank market.' 50 The Fed also disagrees with the
courts. 15
In observing the changes that have taken place and continue
to take place in the U.S. attitude towards bank size and banking
concentration, this Article does not attempt either to identify a
relevant market or to recommend the percentage tests of concen-
tration that should be applied. Instead, the Article observes the
development of what can only be perceived as a new set of stan-
dards. The comfort that the United States has traditionally exper-
ienced with its many small banks is reducing. Ideas of
appropriate concentration on the national level are evolving as
banks grow larger and fewer.' 52 The effect that these factors will
have upon market concentrations is impossible to predict.
Whatever uncertainties the regulators already have in applying
congressional BHCA tests will be exacerbated as new ideas about
bank size and power take hold.
The goal of this Article is to encourage a fundamental reex-
amination of the BHCA and its usefulness as basic banking law.
Should that reexamination occur, the ideas of appropriate market
concentration must be tested in the light of conditions vastly dif-
ferent from those that existed in 1956, 1966 and 1970, the three
key years for the BHCA.
149. See, e.g., Maine Antitrust Official Criticizes Fed on Antitrust Enforcement in
Bank Mergers, 58 Banking Rep. (BNA) 587, 587 (Apr. 6, 1992) (noting that "state
attorneys general will continue to be a strong force in evaluating merger
guidelines").
150. See Justice Objects to Fed Bank Merger Proposal, Citing Anti-Competitive Effects,
Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), Oct. 12, 1990, 12 at A-9 (discussing Justice
Department objection to merger based on current, narrow Fed definition of
banking market, although Fed could approve merger based on different, expan-
sive definition of banking market); see also Gregory E. Elliehausen & John D.
Wolken, Banking Markets and the Use of Financial Services By Small and Medium-Sized
Businesses, 76 Fed. Res. Bull. 801, 815 (1990) (concluding that current technol-
ogy, market factors and changes in regulation justify use of broad definition of
banking market).
151. See, e.g., United States v. Central State Bank, 817 F.2d 22 (6th Cir.
1987) (upholding district court finding that "cluster of banking services tradi-
tionally offered by commercial banks" was relevant product market).
152. For a discussion of the concentration statistics, see supra notes 9-12
and accompanying text.
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E. Today-The Treasury Proposal
A wider acceptance, even encouragement, of the large bank
and the large bank holding company is becoming part of the na-
tional policy. The new view was exemplified in a 1987 interview
with George D. Gould, Under Secretary of the Treasury, who
called for the creation of large banks that could better compete
with Japan. 5 3
As already observed, the dominance of the small banking in-
stitution is sustained in this country principally through the Mc-
Fadden Act and the Douglas Amendment to the BHCA. Other
laws join and play their supporting roles. All prevent true na-
tional banking and, therefore, inhibit the development of large
banks. Although many have advocated the repeal of these laws
for years, the Department of Treasury has only recently
agreed. 154 A 1991 Treasury Department proposal that is sup-
portive of Under Secretary Gould's views, represents the
unashamed position of a credible federal department in support
153. See Nathaniel C. Nash, Treasury Now Favors Creation of Huge Banks, N.Y.
TIMES, June 7, 1987, at AI (quoting Mr. Gould, who "acknowledged that any
policy promoting the creation of very large financial institutions encounters
deep-seated sentiments that date from the founding of the Republic"). Alan
Greenspan, who was at the time President Reagan's nominee for Chairman of
the Federal Reserve Board, also endorsed the Treasury plan. Id. He stated that"the plan would provide multibillion-dollar pools of investment capital for a
banking industry that was 'severely undercapitalized.'" Id. The Fed is the
agency that enforces the provisions of the Bank Holding Company Act, which
tends to sustain the small bank. See id. ("Formation of ... large banks has been
hampered by... the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, which prohibits non-
banking companies from owning banks.").
Gould was encouraged "that the nomination of Mr. Greenspan could pro-
vide an important stimulus for change [because] Greenspan contends that many
of the laws restricting commercial banks severely limit their ability to adapt to a
changing marketplace." Id.
Officials at smaller banking institutions feared that these proposed
"superbanks" would threaten the existence of the smaller banks, which would be
unable to compete with the large banks. Eric N. Berg, Many Bankers Upset By Talk
of "Superbanks, " N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1987, at D1. In response to this reaction,
the Treasury Department denied that the government had plans to create
superbanks and stated that Gould's views "were solely his observations." Id.
154. See Department of the Treasury, Modernizing the Financial System: Rec-
ommendations for Safer, More Competitive Banks, Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) No.
1377 (1991) [hereinafter Modernizing the Financial System]. The Treasury Depart-
ment recommendations carried forward an earlier Reagan Administration posi-
tion to a similar effect that stated: "Today, the nation's major corporations and
wealthy individuals frequently effect transactions with banks across state lines; it
is only the small business and household customers who continue to be deprived
of the benefits of a competitive interstate banking system." GEOGRAPHIC RE-
STRICTIONS, supra note 120, at 2.
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of the large bank. As the Treasury Department proposal
explains:
Nationwide banking would lead to safer, more effi-
cient, and more competitive banks, directly decreasing
taxpayer exposure to losses. Yet the United States is the
only major industrialized country in the world that does
not have a truly national banking system.
The continuing usefulness of branching restrictions
is particularly questionable . . . . Interstate branching
would promote safety and soundness; provide immedi-
ate cost savings; and increase consumer benefits.' 55
How different this rings from a House Banking Committee
Report some twenty-five years earlier:
Controls over the acquisition of banks by holding
companies are needed to preserve the traditional Ameri-
can system of locally owned and operated independent
banks competing to serve the needs of their communi-
ties, and to avoid the dangers of concentrating control of
bank credit in a few large institutions.' 56
With respect to the first barrier, the McFadden Act, the
Treasury Department has stated: "Congress should authorize a
national bank to branch into any state in which the bank's holding
company could acquire a bank, which would effectively end the
branching restrictions of the McFadden Act."' 1 7 As to the Doug-
las Amendment, the Treasury proposal simply states: "The Doug-
las Amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act should be
repealed." 5 8
The Treasury Department submitted the proposal to Con-
gress in a bill that would eliminate the restrictions of the McFad-
den Act and Douglas Amendment while encouraging branching
and interstate banking.' 59 The Banking Committees of both the
155. Modernizing the Financial System, supra note 154, at 52.
156. H.R. REP. No. 534, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1965).
157. Modernizing the Financial System, supra note 154, at 53.
158. Id.
159. S. 713, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 261-262 (1991) (subsequently de-
feated); H.R. 1505, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (same proposal). This bill, ti-
tled The Financial Institutions Safety and Consumer Choice Act of 1991, proposed an
amendment to the BHCA Douglas Amendment. The Douglas Amendment pre-
vents "any bank holding company or any subsidiary thereof to acquire ... inter-
est in ... any additional bank located outside the State in which the operations
[Vol. 38: p. I
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Senate 160 and the House 161 reacted favorably to the proposal.
The Senate Banking Committee Report noted: "In light of the
technological and other changes that have blurred the distinc-
tions between distinct geographic banking markets, [the pro-
posed Treasury bill] removes outdated restrictions on interstate
banking and branching." 62
The Treasury bill, however, was subsequently defeated in the
House and not even considered by the Senate. 163 Its reintroduc-
tion was recently proposed. 64
of such bank holding company's banking subsidiaries were principally con-
ducted." 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1988). The proposed bill would have expressly
permitted a bank holding company to control a financial services holding com-
pany "in any State." S. 713, § 261. The proposed bill also provided for inter-
state branching. Id. § 262. This provision would have lifted the McFadden Act
restriction on nationwide branching. See id.; see also 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1988) (cur-
rent McFadden provisions).
160. The Senate considered the bill as part of its evaluation of the Compre-
hensive Deposit Insurance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of 1991. See S.
REP. No. 167, supra note 126, at 69 (noting that "[o]utdated restrictions on in-
terstate banking and branching expose our banking system to greater risks.").
Additionally, FDIC Chairman L. William Seidman, SEC Chairman Richard C.
Breeden and Comptroller of the Currency Robert L. Clarke all favored repeal-
ing the ban on interstate affiliations and branching. Id. at 68-69.
161. H.R. REP. No. 157, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 116 (1991). The House Re-
port unambiguously asserted: "The need for this legislation is clear." Id. The
report explained that "[tlhe United States needs a safe, stable and viable bank-
ing system." Id. To achieve this goal, the report stated that banks must invest
prudently. Id. Further, "[t]o encourage safe investment, banks should be well-
capitalized and closely supervised." Id.
President Bush supported the Treasury Department proposal and
threatened (and then reneged upon) a veto of any bill that did not provide for
interstate branching. See Robert M. Garsson, White House Threatens to Veto Bill,
AM. BANKER, Oct. 30, 1991, at 1.
162. S. REP. No. 167, supra note 126, at 6. But cf H.R. REP. No. 174, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1985) (asserting that larger banking organizations present
greater problems with respect to cost of potential failures).
163. The defeat of the bill resulted not so much from a conceptual conflict
in Congress, but from the failure of the various banking interests to unite behind
the Treasury Department's position. The American Bankers' Association's se-
nior lobbyist described it as "lobbying gridlock." David E. Rosenbaum, An Effort
to Salvage Bank Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1991, at DI, D5.
164. In early 1992, the Bush Administration, joined by bipartisan support,
"kicked off a drive.., to enact an interstate banking law." Robert M. Garsson,
Brady Launches Drive For Interstate Law, AM. BANKER, Feb. 7, 1992, at 1. Treasury
Secretary Nicholas Brady, at a press conference on February 5, 1992, stated that"the administration will put interstate branching on its front burner." Id. Presi-
dent Bush sent proposed bank reform legislation called the Financial Institutions
Safety and Consumer Choice Act of 1992 to Congress as part of his economic growth
plan. Banking Reform Provisions Part of Economic Growth Plan, Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(CCH) No. 1429, at 4 (1992); see also S. 2217, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., tit. IV (1992)
(bill containing reintroduced proposal); H.R. 4150, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., tit. IV
(1992) (same).
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III. BANKING AND COMMERCE
A. Introduction
It was correctly written in 1989, that "[t]he extent to which
banks should be permitted to engage in nonbanking activities is a
major controversy in this country, attracting the increasing atten-
tion of Congress, administrative agencies, and courts."' 165
Whether "commerce" such as automobile manufacturing and
hamburger cooking, which are not traditionally considered bank-
ing, belong in the same corporate unit as banking is currently a
hotly debated issue. Philosophies about banking and its place in
our social fabric, enlightened self-interest and unenlightened
emotion all play a part when establishing an opinion concerning
this issue.
This Article does not take sides in the debate.' 66 Rather, this
Article asserts two positions. First, banking and commerce have
not been definitively separated in our banking history. Second,
there is currently substantial opinion arguing that banking and
commerce should be less separate than they are. The leader in
this view is, once again, the Treasury Department which has
floated a proposal that businesses in "commerce" be permitted to
acquire banks. 167
B. The Concepts of Banking and Commerce
As a preliminary matter, it is essential to understand what is
meant when using the term "commerce" in contrast to "bank-
ing." There are two possible approaches. First, the entry of
banking into commerce may mean the exercise of an essentially
unrestricted ability by banks and their holding companies to en-
gage in any activity. That is, banks could, for example, manufac-
ture automobiles. The following discussion will concentrate on
this approach.
165. Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Board of Governors, 890 F.2d
1275, 1277 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 810 (1990).
166. Evidence is accumulating on both sides of the issue. For a summary of
some of the economic studies on this topic, see John T. Rose, The Effect of the
Bank Holding Company Movement On Bank Safety and Soundness, in THE BANK HOLD-
ING COMPANY MOVEMENT, supra note 145, at 151 ("This suggests that direct risk
exposure of BHC banks is unaffected by the extent of expansion into nonbank-
ing activities (of whatever type).").
167. For a discussion of this aspect of the Treasury Department's proposal,
see infra notes 425-42 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the nation-
wide banking and branching aspects of the Treasury Department's proposal, see
supra notes 153-64 and accompanying text.
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Second, an alternative approach assumes that banking is all
that a bank can do, but then questions how far the concept of
banking may extend. The current controversies under this ap-
proach focus on questions such as whether banks can enter the
fields of insurance, 68 securities activities,' 69 real estate develop-
ment' 70 and data processing. 171 Although the line drawn be-
tween (permissible) banking and (impermissible) commerce is a
question this Article will occasionally address, it is not a central
question in this investigation. 172
C. Contrary Views of History
An appropriate starting point appears to be the related ques-
tions of whether banking and commerce have been historically
separate in the United States and whether, in fact, they are sepa-
rate today. As to history, one's view generally seems to derive
from one's opinion on the current Treasury proposal. For exam-
ple, in a statement made to Congress, a prior Chairman of the
Federal Reserve System, the regulatory body that today has the
primary authority to keep banking and commerce apart, noted:
168. See, e.g., Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L.
No. 97-320, § 601, 96 Stat. 1469, 1536 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)
(1982)). Section 601 removed certain insurance activities from those considered
closely related to banking under BHCA § 4(c)(8), thereby rendering these activi-
ties impermissible commerce. Id.
169. See, e.g., Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 839 F.2d 47
(2d Cir.) (approving Fed action that allowed bank holding companies to engage
in certain securities underwriting activities), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988).
170. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 225.25 (1992) (suggesting in proposed amend-
ment to Fed regulations that "activities . . . so closely related to banking [that
they] may be engaged in by a bank holding company" include leasing real prop-
erty and community development investing).
171. See, e.g., National Retailer Corp. v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 411 F. Supp. 308
(D. Ariz. 1976) (prohibiting national bank from marketing data processing ser-
vice to public), aff'd in part and dismissed in part, 604 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1979).
172. The cases and commentaries discussing how far a bank may go in its
business of banking are legion. As early as 1857, a New York court advocated
implied powers for a bank to give effect to a bank's express powers. Curtis v.
Leavitt, 15 N.Y. 9, 210 (1857). This view of the implied powers of banks was
reaffirmed more than a century later. See Ralph F. Huck, What Is the Banking
Business?, 21 Bus. LAW. 537, 542 (1966) (stating that "the function of a bank and
of the banking system is to mobilize money resources ... and to in turn put the
money to work wherever it is needed"); see also Henry Harfield, Sermon on Genesis
17:20; Exodus 1:10 (A Proposal for Testing the Propriety of Expanding Bank Services), 85
BANKING L.J. 565, 567 (1968) (approving of Huck's approach and advocating
broad powers for banking institutions). But see To Prohibit Banks From Performing
Certain Nonbanking Services: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Bank Supervision and In-
surance of the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1966)
(statement by Library of Congress legal counsel) (asserting that Huck's liberal
construction of banking statutes goes beyond power granted).
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"The United States has had a long tradition of legislative separa-
tion of banking and commerce."' 73 However, in testimony given
before a House Subcommittee, a previous General Counsel to the
Treasury Department stated: "There never has been a national
policy of separating banking and commerce." 74 Other commen-
tators on the banking scene have gone down one path or the
other, largely depending upon their opinion of what should be
done today.' 75 If might makes right, those who assert the tradi-
tional separation of banking and commerce clearly have the upper
hand. 176
In reviewing the history related to the issue of banking and
commerce, the next section examines the degree to which banks
themselves have been engaged in commerce. The following sec-
tion then discusses the extent to which banking and commerce
have been joined-and also have been separated-through a bank
holding company system.
D. Banks Themselves in Commerce
When comparing banks as contrasted to bank holding com-
panies, the limitation of the former to banking activities, and their
exclusion from commerce, is more pronounced. History is con-
siderably more supportive of a tradition that banks shall not be in
commerce.' 77 Banks, as they have been principally perceived in
173. Structure and Regulation of Financial Firms and Holding Companies: Hearings
Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
142 (1986) [hereinafter 1986 Hearings] (statement of Paul A. Volcker, Chairman,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
174. Financial Services Restructuring: Hearings on H.R. 797 Before the Subcomm.
on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. 86 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 Hearings] (statement of PeterJ. Wal-
lison, attorney, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher).
175. 1991 Hearings, supra note 174, at 620 (statement of Ralph Nader) (tes-
tifying that "one of the longest standing rules of United States banking law [is]
the separation between banking and commerce"); Cynthia C. Lichtenstein,
Thinking the Unthinkable: What Should Commercial Banks or Their Holding Companies Be
Allowed to Own? 67 IND. L.J. 251, 251 (1992) (indicating that when Congress sep-
arated banking and commerce in BHCA, it "enshrined [a] shibboleth").
176. This upper hand is most evident in the testimony given by witnesses,
who were principally representatives of the Fed and other federal regulatory
agencies, spokesmen for trade associations and bankers, to Congress between
1943 and 1970 in connection with the federal BHCA, in which almost all took
the generally accepted view on separation. For a discussion of this testimony,
see infra notes 334-73 and accompanying text.
177. The reach of permissible banking activities and the grey area of bank-
ing's division from commerce remain, of course, an issue, but, as previously
noted, this issue is beyond the scope of this Article. For a discussion of activities
falling within this grey area, see supra notes 168-72 and accompanying text.
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this country, perform the function of creating money. Originally,
they did this largely through the issue of bank notes whose
acceptance in the marketplace depended upon the creditworthi-
ness of the banks that stood behind them.' 78 Today, they do it
mainly through the creation of demand deposit accounts. Money
created in this manner is based upon the ability of banks to honor
their obligations to their customers under the deposit accounts in
existence between them. Because the solvency of the banks is
based principally upon their ability to collect the business and
commercial loans owed to them, 179 the value of bank-created
money is fundamentally based upon the country's wealth as mea-
sured by its trade and business.'8 0
Banks, in creating money, perform a quasi-governmental
function and were from the start "considered as some sort of pub-
lic utility."' 8's It must be remembered, however, that banks were,
and are, typically owned by stockholders. This has led one com-
mentator to conclude that the reality is that "most of the bank
founders were then, as later, after profit only."' 82 Profit-driven
stockholders are expected to encourage their banks to seek profit
from whatever source it legally may be obtained. Assuming some
synergy between banking and commerce, the motivation to draw
upon its financial benefits would seem to have existed from the
dawn of banking. That is, if a bank can make more money by
being in the automobile business, it would be motivated economi-
cally to go into that business and, unless barred by operation of
some external force like a law, would probably have done so. If
178. See 1 REDLICH, supra note 23, at 6-7 (discussing distinction between
early "money banks" and "land banks").
179. See KLEBANER, supra note 11, at 25-27. For convenience at this point,
the discussion excludes the role of deposit insurance in directly protecting ac-
counts of $100,000 and less, and also in providing, indirectly, some measure of
protection to accounts in higher amounts. See, e.g., FDIC Improvement Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, § 141(a)(4)(A)(ii), 105 Stat. 2236, 2273-74 (codified
at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A)(ii) (Supp. III 1991)) (restraining FDIC from "insur-
ing" deposits in amounts above legal limit of $100,000).
180. This measure is based upon the so-called "mercantilist" theory of
wealth. A contrasting theory is the concept of measuring wealth based upon
land and property. The two concepts were hotly debated in the early days of the
republic, with Madison and the mercantilist theory the clear victor. See FRITZ
REDLICH, ESSAYS IN AMERICAN ECONOMIC THEORY 107-30 (1944) (arguing that
early American banking was based on mercantilist theories).
181. 1 REDLICH, supra note 23, at 7. In a less recognizable form, this idea
continues (quite correctly) today. See, e.g., Community Reinvestment Act of
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-128, 91 Stat. 1147 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2907
(1988 & Supp. III 1991)) (requiring bank to use funds to benefit community).
Banks do derive income from these quasi-governmental functions.
182. 1 REDLICH, supra note 23, at 8.
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banks make such moves, there is no separation of banking and
commerce; if they do not, either the synergy does not exist or
there is an external barrier.
The synergy does exist and became apparent to American
banks in the eighteenth century. The banks focused their atten-
tion on financial services that had a functional relationship to core
banking. "[A]s the American economy grew, its individuals and
corporations developed more sophisticated financial needs-for
insurance and securities, as well as [for] traditional banking serv-
ices." '83 The benefits that result from the spread of risk, diversity
of investment and even geographic dispersals are fundamental
and obviously considered by the banking industry. There is un-
doubtedly also a countervailing tendency for every business to re-
main in its own sphere. There is no particular reason, for
example, that a hardware store should open a lunch counter even
if it appears to be profitable. Businesses, however, frequently
perceive the benefits of diversification and so diversify. Banks, on
the other hand, despite the benefits they may anticipate from be-
ing in commerce, have made extreme moves only rarely.
1. Early Prohibitions Against Mercantile Activities
Because a synergy does exist, it is necessary to look for exter-
nal barriers. The historic source of the division between banking
and commerce has been identified as the creation of the Bank of
England in 1694.184 Before that time, bankers such as Italian
merchant banking houses and English goldsmiths had engaged in
commerce without limitation. 8 5 The charter of the Bank of Eng-
land contained various provisions limiting its operations to those
generally deemed financial, as contrasted with commercial. For
183. ROBERT E. LITAN, WHAT SHOULD BANKS Do? 12-13 (1987).
184. See The Tunnage Act, 1694, 5 & 6 W. & M., ch. 20 (Eng.) (establishing,
inter alia, provisions relating to Bank of England and known as The Bank of Eng-
land Act). For a more detailed presentation of this history, see HAMMOND, supra
note 20, at 128-29 (discussing English banking structure); Bernard Shull, The
Separation of Banking and Commerce: Origin, Development, and Implications for Antitrust,
28 ANTITRUST BULL. 255, 257-70 (1983) (describing gradual separation of bank-
ing from commerce in Europe and impact on early American banking).
Subsequent statutes reinforced the restriction of banking business to incor-
porated banks. See, e.g., The Bubble Act, 1720, 6 Geo., ch. 5 (Eng.). This Act
was enacted after the financial disaster of the South Sea Company and the "bub-
ble" its stock seemed to represent. The Bank of England was not, however, as
adversely affected by the South Sea Company's bubble as was the First Bank of
France, which participated more directly in the scheme and was ruined as a con-
sequence in 1720. KNOX, supra note 24, at 7.
185. See Shull, supra note 184, at 258.
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reasons that are not entirely clear, but related to its establishment
as a government-sponsored entity, the charter also contained the
limitation that the Bank "shall not at any time.., deal or trade...
in the buying or selling of any goods, wares or merchandise
whatsoever."' 86
2. General Approach of Early Bank Charters
By 1790, the United States had four commercial banks lo-
cated in the major cities of Philadelphia, New York, Boston and
Baltimore. 18 7 All were, of course, legislatively chartered. Three
of the charters showed a clear intent to limit the banks to banking
as contrasted with commerce. 188
The first of the new banks, actually chartered before the first
Bank of the United States, was the Bank of North America. As
noted previously, it was originally created by Congress, but five
states also granted charters to this bank. 189 It was the "first real
bank, in the modern sense, on the North American continent."' 190
The Bank of North America's short congressional charter
says almost nothing about its powers and must be read carefully
to discover that it is actually creating a bank. 19 1 The state enact-
ments largely reiterated the congressional approach and did not
delineate the bank's specific powers or prohibitions. 192 The prin-
cipal state charter was the Pennsylvania charter enacted on April
1, 1872.193 The bank's place in supplying money and credit in the
new country was controversial, however, leading to repeal of the
Pennsylvania charter in 1785.194 The charter was renewed in
1787 as a result of a political compromise; the renewed charter
186. The Tunnage Act, supra note 184, § 26.
187. HAMMOND, supra note 20, at 66.
188. KLEBANER, supra note 11, at 29.
189. HAMMOND, supra note 20, at 51. For a discussion of the Bank of North
America, see supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
190. FISCHER, supra note 38, at 9. Congress had created the Pennsylvania
Bank in 1780, but its functions were limited and it was liquidated in 1784. Id.
191. See 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 25, at 139-44 (reprinting
copy of charter).
192. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LEWIS, JR., A HISTORY OF THE BANK OF NORTH
AMERICA 43 (1882) (indicating that Connecticut's act declared that Bank of
North America's notes could be used for payment of state taxes; that Rhode
Island's act prohibited counterfeiting of Bank of North America's notes; and that
Massachusetts created Bank of North America as corporation according to Mas-
sachusetts laws).
193. HAMMOND, supra note 20, at 51.
194. LEWIS, supra note 192, at 55-56.
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was a more specific instrument.1 95 For example, the new charter
reiterated the English-based prohibition against "buying or sell-
ing of any goods, wares or merchandise whatsoever."' 196 In addi-
tion, after a recital of a series of other prohibitions, the charter
affirmatively stated that "nothing herein contained shall any wise
be construed to hinder the said corporation from dealing in" vari-
ous described financial instruments and deposits.'9 7
Of the remaining three banks, the Banks of New York and of
Massachusetts had similar versions of the provision against buy-
ing or selling merchandise.' 98 The third, the Bank of Maryland,
had a much shorter charter which, although dealing with various
banking functions, did not appear to limit the bank to those
functions. 199
The first Bank of the United States was chartered in 1791.200
The charter, after according the bank the right to take deposits
and discount notes, contained the following prohibition:
And be it further enacted, That if the said corporation ...
shall deal or trade in buying or selling any goods, wares,
merchandise, or commodities whatsoever, contrary to
the provisions of this act, all and every person and per-
sons . . .who shall have been concerned as parties or
agents therein, shall forfeit and lose treble the value of
the goods .... 201
195. Id. at 73.
196. Act of Mar. 17, 1787, 1787 Pa. Laws ch. MCCLXVII, § 5.
197. Id.
198. See Act of Mar. 7, 1782, 1782 Mass. Acts ch. II; Act of Mar. 21, 1791,
1791 N.Y. Laws ch. 37. The Bank of New York began business in 1784 without a
state charter. The Bank of New York's governing document was a constitution
drafted by Alexander Hamilton. The constitution identified the institution as a
bank but said nothing about limitation of the bank's powers. HENRY W.
DOMETr, A HISTORY OF THE BANK OF NEW YORK, 1784-1884, at 11 (3d ed. 1984).
199. Act of Feb. 17, 1790, 1790 Md. Laws ch. V (providing for establish-
ment of bank in "Baltimore-town" with preamble observing that "the experi-
ence of commercial nations, for several ages, ha[s] fully evinced the utility of
well regulated banks").
200. Acts to Charter the Bank of the United States, Feb. 25 and Mar. 2,
1791, chs. X-XI, 1 Stat. 191, 196, reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 25, at 307, 314.
201. Id. ch. X, § 8, 1 Stat. at 196, reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 25, at 313. A similar prohibition appeared in the charter of the second
Bank of the United States. Act to Charter the Second Bank of the United States,
Apr. 10, 1816, ch. 44, § 12, 3 Stat. 266, 274, reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTARY His-
TORY, supra note 25, at 460, 471. The prohibitions persisted despite statements
in the congressional debates that the second bank be given "the greatest possi-
ble power." 14 ANNALS Or CONG. 246 (1816).
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The Bank of the United States charter also contained limita-
tions stating that the bank's real estate uses "shall be only such as
shall be requisite for its immediate accommodation," 20 2 and that
its banking offices shall be established "for the purposes of dis-
count and deposit only." 20 3 These general charter provisions
limiting banks to the banking business, which derived from the
Bank of England charter, have served as a model for future bank
charters in the United States. 20 4
Thus, there was a definite strain running through the early
federal and state bank charters requiring banks to limit their activ-
ities to the banking business. At the same time, however, a sub-
stantial number of institutions existed that were permitted to
engage in both commerce and banking. An excellent example
was the Manhattan Company. Aaron Burr 205 was instrumental in
obtaining a New York State charter for the Manhattan Company
in 1799.206 Its principal purpose was to supply New York City
with water.20 7 The company was authorized to use its surplus
funds in any way it chose; it chose to create a bank which existed
simultaneously with the water company.20 8 Because of difficul-
202. Acts to charter The Bank of the United States, supra note 200, Ch. X,
§ 7, cl. VIII, 1 Stat. at 194, reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 25, at
312.
203. Id. § 7, cl. XV, 1 Stat. at 195, reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 25, at 312.
204. HAMMOND, supra note 20, at 129.
205. Aaron Burr (1756-1836) held various public offices in the course of his
life. He was Attorney General of the United States (1789-1791), a United States
Senator (1791-1797) and Vice President of the United States (1800-1804).
What would otherwise have been a distinguished public career was marred when
he killed Alexander Hamilton in a duel in 1804, and later when he apparently
attempted to conquer Texas, make it a separate republic and "dismember" the
union. For this latter escapade, he was tried (and acquitted) for treason in 1807.
Having been shunned by society for the better part of 25 years, he died in 1836.
See CAMBRIDGE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 234 (Magnus Magnusson et al. eds.,
1990).
206. For a detailed description of the Manhattan Company story, see HAM-
MOND, supra note 20, at 149-56; William G. Sumner, A History of Banking in the
United States, in 1 A HISTORY OF BANKING IN ALL THE LEADING NATIONS 1, 42
(Editor of the Journal of Commerce and Commercial Bulletin ed., 1896); Ed-
ward L. Symons, Jr., The "Business of Banking" in Historical Perspective, 51 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 676, 687 (1983).
207. Symons, supra note 206, at 687.
208. HAMMOND, supra note 20, at 153-54; Symons, supra note 206, at 687.
The operation of the bank by the Manhattan Company was challenged in a quo
warranto proceeding. People v. Manhattan Co., 9 Wend. 351 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1832). The court held that the company's unlimited statutory authority gave the
company the power to operate a bank. Id. at 388. Hammond noted that "there
was nothing grotesque in the union of a water works with a bank." HAMMOND,
supra note 20, at 154-55.
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ties, the Manhattan Company subsequently severed its connec-
tion with the water company and retained the bank. 20 9
The experience of the Manhattan Company exemplifies other
early American ventures that combined banking and com-
merce.210 For example, the early nineteenth century saw, among
others, the creation of the Georgia Railroad and Banking Com-
pany, the Morris Canal and Banking Company (New Jersey), the
Salem Steam Mill and Banking Company (Massachusetts) and the
New Orleans Gas Light and Banking Company.2 1 The Miami
Exporting Company, incorporated in Ohio in 1803, also had
"banking privileges. '-2 1 2 American, banking was said to have a"rich and lusty history of product diversification." 2 1 3
209. HAMMOND, supra note 20, at 155. The Manhattan Company apparently
chose to relinquish the water works because of the difficulty of combining bank-
ing with that type of commerce, a difficulty shared by many banks of the time
that attempted such a combination. Id. By later merging with the Chase Na-
tional Bank, the Manhattan Company became the Chase Manhattan Bank. Id. at
150.
210. Some of these early charters expressly allowed the entity to engage in
banking and commerce. For example, the New York Manufacturing Company
received a charter authorizing the company to engage in the "manufacturing of
iron and brass wire, and of cotton and wool cards," and also to engage "in the
general business of banking." Act ofJune 15, 1812, ch. CLXVII, § XI, 1812 N.Y.
Laws 509, 510. For a discussion of the New York Manufacturing Company, see
HAMMOND, supra note 20, at 161. The company later changed its name to the
Phoenix Bank. KROOSS & BLYN, supra note 25, at 25.
Other charters did not grant such explicit authority, but a banking-com-
merce mix was permitted based on a broad reading of the charter language. For
example, the Kentucky Insurance Company "was supposed only to insure river
boats and cargoes, [but] began also to do an open and profitable discount busi-
ness." HAMMOND, supra note 20, at 169. The company's charter authorized the
insurance business and also permitted "aiding and assisting individuals engaged
in the commerce of this country." Act of Dec. 16, 1802, ch. LXVI, § 24, 1802
Ky. Laws 149, 159. The Ohio charter of the Miami Exporting Company of Cin-
cinnati allowed the president and directors to "dispose of the funds of the com-
pany in such manner as they shall judge." Act of Apr. 15, 1803, ch. XXXIII, § 6,
1803 Ohio Acts 126, 131. This language was the basis of the corporation's
banking business. HAMMOND, supra note 20, at 170.
211. KLEBANER, supra note 11, at 32.
212. Sumner, supra note 206, at 59. Sumner writes: "The New Hope Dela-
ware Bridge Company is a good specimen of one class of companies which were
in fashion at the time. It had a charter for building a bridge across the Delaware
river, with perpetual banking privileges, dating from 1812." Id. at 172.
213. Carter H. Golembe Associates, The Future of Bank-Related Activities
14 (Feb. 28, 1973) (unpublished report, on file with the Villanova Law Review).
The authors suggest that
the origins for this attitude [that banking and commerce should not
mix] are to be found in treatises on banking which appeared during the
19th and early decades of the 20th century, which held that the ideal
commercial banking institution is one which accepts funds from the
public and makes short-term, self-liquidating loans. The fact that
American commercial banks never really fitted this pattern-and in-
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The major forays by the banking system into extreme exam-
ples of commerce occurred during the second quarter of the nine-
teenth century. "It was not uncommon for the 'less financially
orthodox' states to charter internal improvement companies to
build canals, railroads, hotels, and turnpikes with powers to issue
notes in order to raise capital or to require banks to invest in the
stocks of various public works projects." 214 Historical accounts of
the early nineteenth century, unconcerned with this specific mat-
ter, fail to distinguish between banking and commerce to such an
extent that it is frequently difficult to determine which of the two
is being discussed. On the other hand, the health of banking-
commerce institutions was reported to deteriorate with the health
of their commercial projects. Integrated commercial and banking
institutions went out of style before the Civil War. 2 15
In the six years following the panic of 1837,216 one quarter of
the banks in the country-a percentage approaching that of the
Great Depression-went out of business.2 1 7 Banks not combined
with commerce were also subject to failures, thereby making
deed during the 19th century had a rich and lusty history of product
diversification-was of little consequence.
Id. Actually, the origins for the attitude that banking and commerce should mix
predate the 19th century, going back to the Bank of England. For a discussion
of the Bank of England, see supra notes 184-86 and accompanying text.
214. 1986 Hearings, supra note 173, at 394 (appendix to statement by Fed-
eral Reserve Board Chairman Paul Volcker); see also HAMMOND, supra note 20, at
155 ("[In the 19th century [banks were established] scores of times to build
turn-pikes, canals, railways, and what not."). One must, however, be circum-
spect in dealing with these early examples of banks in commerce. Banks were
relatively few and tended to be controlled by a merchant elite who, naturally,
encouraged the participation by the banks in their personal business ventures.
KROOSS & BLYN, supra note 25, at 23-24.
215. Hammond comments that "as subsequent experience was to prove re-
peatedly, banking could not be successfully combined with other projects."
HAMMOND, supra note 20, at 155.
216. In 1836, President AndrewJackson, in an effort to halt speculation in
land, issued an order mandating that those who wished to buy land must do so
with gold or silver. See JOHN A. GARRATY, THE AMERICAN NATION 249 (5th ed.
1983). As a result, the demand for land slackened and prices dropped. Specula-
tors were unable to meet their mortgage payments and banks foreclosed on the
properties in lieu of receiving loan repayments. Id. Because of the drop in
price, the banks could not recoup their losses. When depositors sought to with-
draw their money in the form of gold and silver, the banks' supplies were quickly
exhausted. Panic swept the country in the spring of 1837 as every bank in the
nation suspended payment of gold and silver. Id.
217. KLEBANER, supra note 11, at 48. Between 1930 and 1933, approxi-
mately 9,000 of 25,000 banks went out of business. KROOSS & BLYN, supra note
25, at 180. Overall failures of the early commercial banks were substantial. See
KNOX, supra note 24, at 319-23 (giving detailed accounts of early state bank
failures).
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it difficult to correlate bank failure with connections to
commerce.2'8
The "commercial" experience of early banking might be de-
scribed as a combination of commercial banking with investment
banking, meaning, simply, the investment of the bank's funds in
business enterprises.21 9 For example, Redlich mentions the early
nineteenth century investments by the Philadelphia Bank "in
stocks of turnpike and bridge companies." 220 The combination
accomplished through bank investment in subsidiaries, common
in early U.S. banking, continued, but to a constantly diminishing
extent. The Banking Act of 1933 signalled the end of the practice
as a major commercial banking activity.22 1
3. Free Banking
The free banking system was spearheaded by the seminal
New York Act of April 18, 1838.222 The specific prohibition
against buying or selling merchandise was not part of that stat-
ute.223 The New York Act provided that a bank could be formed
218. The history of banking and commerce should probably be read with
the caution of another bank scholar:
The historian searching for materials will usually find no difficulty
in obtaining minute accounts of all the wars that have devastated the
earth, but will find long intervals of silence in regard to the peaceful
developments of mankind. So it is in banking history-the failures and
losses seem to have been recorded with painstaking accuracy, but the
great and incalculable benefits which banks have conferred upon the
business of the country are seldom mentioned.
KNOX, supra note 24, at 305.
219. For a discussion of early commercial and investment banking, see 2
REDLICH, supra note 23, at 304-423.
220. 1 REDLICH, supra note 23, at 13.
221. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 21, 48 Stat. 162, 189 (current version at
12 U.S.C. § 378 (1988)) (describing purpose of Act to provide safer and more
effective use of bank assets, to regulate control and to prevent diversion of funds
into speculative operations). The Banking Act of 1933 is also commonly re-
ferred to as the Glass-Steagall Act.
222. Act of Apr. 18, 1838, ch. 260, 1838 N.Y. Laws 245. A free banking
statute in Michigan actually preceded that of New York by one year, but it did
not have the national significance of New York's statute. See Act of Mar. 15,
1837, No. XLVII, 1837 Mich. Pub. Acts 76.
223. See 1838 N.Y. Laws 245. The Michigan statute took a restrictive atti-
tude toward banks and provided that a bank "shall not directly or indirectly deal
or trade in buying or selling any goods, wares, or merchandize." § 26, 1837
Mich. Pub. Acts 85. Such a provision was incorporated into the New York bank-
ing law in 1958, not as a general control on the powers of New York state banks,
but only as a prohibition against activities that could be conducted in foreign
branches of such banks. See N.Y. BANKING LAw § 96(10) (McKinney 1990) (cur-
rent version) (stating that foreign branch office may engage in usual business of
place in which branch is located except branch may not buy or sell goods, wares
or merchandise).
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through the incorporation process much like an ordinary business
corporation, eliminating the necessity of a separate act of the leg-
islature. 224 The New York free banking act "spread like wildfire"
through the states.225 After almost three decades, it served as the
model for the National Bank-Act of 1864.226 It is generally
credited with opening banking to the play of normal business
competition.
New York included the following powers clause in its free
banking statute: "Such association shall have power to carry on
the business of banking, by discounting bills; ... receiving depos-
its;.., buying and selling gold and silver; ... loaning money; and
by exercising such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry
on such business." 227 As contrasted with the usual corporate em-
powerment clause which, except as specifically limited by its own
terms, essentially allows a corporation to engage in any form of
business, 228 banks are typically limited to the business powers
that are specifically granted to them in their charters and
whatever others are incidental thereto.229 Thus, a statute provid-
ing for a bank and authorizing it to engage in banking is generally
accepted as restricting a bank to the banking business, subject to
what may be deemed a power "incidental" to banking. "Com-
merce" is generally not regarded as an "incidental" power.
224. See § 16, 1838 N.Y. Laws 249.
225. REDLICH, supra note 180, at 159.
226. National banks were created in 1863. For a discussion of the scope of
national banks' powers, see infra notes 238-42 and accompanying text. For
political and public relations reasons, the original national bank enabling statute
was called the National Currency Act. The Act went through a process of
amendment and was reenacted in 1864 as the National Bank Act, a name it re-
tains today.
227. See § 18, 1838 N.Y. Laws 249.
228. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 201 (McKinney 1986) ("A corporation
may be formed under this chapter for any lawful business purpose or purposes
except ....").
229. "The enumeration of powers granted a bank incorporated under a
legislative charter implies the exclusion of all others ...." 4 MICHIE ON BANKS
AND BANKING ch. 7, § 1, at 3 (1990). This principle was applied to New York
State banks in O'Connor v. Bankers Trust Co. O'Connor v. Bankers Trust Co., 289
N.Y.S. 252, 269-73 (N.Y. App. Div. 1936), aff'd, 278 N.Y. 649 (1938). The court
in O'Connor stated that the exercise of power not expressly granted to a bank is
prohibited. Id. at 269. The court, however, noted that even though a statute
does not authorize a bank to conduct certain activities, a bank may do so if the
activity is necessary for the purpose of conducting the business of banking. Id.
at 270. The court held that based on the facts of the case, a bank's guarantee of
a lender was necessary to conduct the business of banking. Id. at 272; see also
Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of Independent Ins. Agents, Inc., 399 F.2d 1010, 1013
(5th Cir. 1968) (holding that banks do not have implied power to act as insur-
ance agents if state did not expressly grant that power).
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The New York Court of Appeals tested the incidental power
clause of the New York banking law in Curtis v. Leavitt.230 The
North American Trust and Banking Company, chartered in New
York under the free banking act, had borrowed money and, to
evidence the debt, issued $1,000,000 in bonds whose validity was
brought into question.23 1 The issue was whether, in view of the
fact that no specific power to borrow money or issue bonds for
that purpose was included in the bank charter, the bank could
legally issue those bonds. 232 The court held that borrowing
money was an incidental power included within the language of
the free banking act. 23 3
Later controversies have dealt with whether Curtis should be
read narrowly or broadly in defining what "banking" entails.23 4
As previously noted, the issue need not concern us. 23 5 Curtis tests
the reach of the banking powers granted under the particular stat-
ute. It does not suggest that those powers, including their adap-
tations through the incidental powers clause, extend beyond
some form of financial service. It cannot be read to put banks
into the farther reaches of commerce.23 6 The general approach
230. 15 N.Y. 2 (1857).
231. Id. at 17.
232. Id. at 24-25.
233. "The power of the North American Trust and Banking Company to
borrow money may be maintained, as an incidental power necessary to carry on
the business of banking." Id. at 210. For the text of the pertinent statutory
language of the New York Act, see supra text accompanying note 227.
234. See, e.g., Harfield, supra note 172, at 567 (noting that Curtis stands for
proposition "that there are no rigid limits as to the business of banking and that
whatever is consistent with the mobilization of capital, use of credit and provi-
sion of financial services to the public-and not affirmatively prohibited by law-
is appropriate for the business of banking"); Huck, supra note 172, at 537-38,
540-41 (stating that some commentators contend that term "business of bank-
ing" should be read narrowly when considering reach of incidental or implied
powers of banks).
235. For a discussion of how far banks can go in the "business of banking,"
see supra notes 168-72 and accompanying text.
236. Curtis also touched on the omission from the free banking act, of the
provision prohibiting banks from buying and selling merchandise. Curtis, 15
N.Y. at 211-13. The court held that inclusion of such a clause in prior statutes
was unnecessary because "[t]he chartered banks would not have possessed the
power to trade in goods and stocks, had this restrictive clause been omitted.
Their powers were restrained by the nature and purposes of their incorpora-
tion." Id. at 211-12; see also Nassau Bank v. Jones, 95 N.Y. 115, 119-22 (1884)
(holding that bank could not be stockholder in railroad corporation); Savings
Banks Trust Co. v. Comptroller, 475 N.Y.S.2d 607, 607 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984)
(stating that bank may not impose service charges "on unclaimed property held
in its custody income clearance account"); O'Connor v. Bankers Trust Co., 289
N.Y.S. 252, 271 (N.Y. App. Div. 1936) (noting that in crisis, "a guaranty by one
bank of the deposits of another is essential," and "the law does not withhold that
1993] BANK HOLDING COMPANY ACT
to a bank's incidental powers is consistent with this reading.23 7
4. National Banks
Following the New York State free banking model, Congress
did not include a prohibition against buying and selling merchan-
dise in the National Bank Act of 1864.238 The National Bank Act
did, however, contain a provision much like the New York powers
clause quoted above that described the basic banking business
and otherwise limited a national bank's powers to those "inciden-
tal powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of bank-
ing." 239 The powers of the national bank were clearly restrained
power"), aff'd, 278 N.Y. 649 (1938); N.Y. Op. Att'y Gen. 159, 159-61 (1947)
(deciding that banks may not offer travel agency services because such activity
was not necessary to business of banking).
237. See 1 JOHN T. MORSE, JR., A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF BANKS AND BANK-
ING § 47, at 152 (1928). Morse discusses the incidental powers of banks:
The heart of the law of banking is that a bank has such powers as are
requisite for the safe and convenient attainment of the purposes of its
incorporation, the chief of these being to provide a place of safety in
which the public may keep money and other valuables, and to lend its
own money, and that of others deposited with it... for a profit, and to
act as agent in the remission and collection of money.
Id. at 153 (footnotes and emphasis omitted).
In 1884, the New York Court of Appeals, dealing with the powers of banks
under the state's free banking statute, wrote a testament to the separation of
banking from commerce that could stand today as a policy statement for the
cogency of that position:
The legislature intended by the act in question to inaugurate in
this State an entirely new system of banking, and thereby undertook to
provide for the establishment of moneyed corporations which should
furnish to the public a safe and reliable circulating medium for the
transaction of its business, and secure and solvent depositaries for the
custody of such moneys as were needed for current use by the business
public. The solvency of these institutions was guarded by special provi-
sions and limitations in the act authorizing their incorporation, and has
ever since been the object of sedulous care, both on the part of the
legislature and of the courts. The language employed in the act defines
their power and duties, and excludes by necessary implication a capac-
ity to carry on any other business than that of banking, and the adop-
tion of any other methods for the prosecution of such business than
those specially pointed out by the statute.
Nassau Bank, 95 N.Y. at 121 (citations omitted).
238. See National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99. In 1962, a prohibi-
tion of this type was included in the Federal Reserve Act as a limitation on the
powers of foreign branches of national banks. Federal Reserve Act of 1962,
Pub. L. No. 87-588, § 25, 76 Stat. 388, 388 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§ 604a (1988)). The provision was based on the assumption that the bank itself
could not engage in such merchandising operations. Although seeming to ex-
pand the powers given to foreign branches to make them competitive abroad,
the statute implicitly limited their powers.
239. National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106, § 8, 13 Stat. at 101. The same
language appears today at 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1988).
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from a wide foray into "commerce."2 40
The restriction of national banks to banking and their exclu-
sion from commerce generally may be considered a constitutional
truism. ChiefJustice John Marshall maintained that the power of
the. national government to create banks was one of "the great
objects for which the government was framed," within the realm
of "a national government with sovereign powers." 24' If Con-
gress were to include "commerce" (say, the ability to operate a
fried chicken franchise) within the powers of national banks, one
would have to search out its constitutional foundation.2 42 Indi-
vidual states, however, are not dependent upon the Federal Con-
stitution for their power to create banks. In this sense, there is
greater potential for state banks to mix banking and commerce.
5. State Bank Activities
The state bank system, at least until the FDIC Improvement
Act of 1991,243 consisted of some fifty separate legal jurisdictions,
each bound by its own set of laws. In theory, if the State of X
believed that its banks should engage in automobile manufactur-
240. Many decisions limit the reach of the incidental powers clause. See,
e.g., Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 472 F.2d 427, 438 (1st Cir. 1972) (holding that
incidental powers clause does not authorize travel agency business); Saxon v.
Georgia Ass'n of Independent Ins. Agents, Inc., 399 F.2d 1010, 1013-14 (5th
Cir. 1968) (ruling that incidental powers clause does not authorize unlimited
insurance agency business by bank).
More recently, the Comptroller of the Currency interpreted a national
bank's powers broadly enough to permit it to write annuities. Interpretive Let-
ter No. 499 to Goodhue County National Bank, 1990 OCC Ltr. LExIs 1 (Feb. 12,
1990). Other and larger banks have built upon this power. See Linda Corman,
NCNB, Citibank Selling Annuities; Delving into Market Despite Insurer's Legal Challenge,
AM. BANKER, May 31, 1991, at 7 (noting number of large national banks that
were entering annuities market despite opposition from insurance companies).
241. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 404 (1819). For a
discussion of the debate that foreshadowed the decision, see 29 ANNALS OF
CONG. 258-74 (1816) (statement of Sen. Wells).
242. Though there may be little basis in the Constitution to support the
idea of banks engaging in commerce, national banking activity in general finds
ample support. See, e.g., Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 294 U.S. 240, 303
(1935) ("The broad and comprehensive national authority over .... revenue,
finance and currency is derived from the aggregate of the powers granted to the
Congress, embracing the powers to lay and collect taxes, to borrow money,
[and] to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States
.... .); United States v. Kay, 89 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1937) ("In... making appropri-
ations for the general welfare, Congress is not confined within the scope of the
delegated powers but must merely act in furtherance of general or national ...
purposes."), vacated, 303 U.S. 1 (1938).
243. Pub. L. No. 102-242, § 303, 105 Stat. 2236, 2349 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1831a (Supp. III 1991)) (adding new federal regulatory
restrictions on activities of state banks that maintain federal deposit insurance).
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ing, it could pass a statute to that effect and no contrary federal
regulation, at least prior to 1991,244 would have been able to
trump it.245
In the twentieth century, state banks have been active in ex-
ploring ways to add to bank powers. These advances have cen-
tered around activities that lie in the broad grey area somewhere
between banking and commerce. Most recently, there have been
bold advances in increasing banks' insurance activities. 246 A
study by the FDIC provides authority for the proposition that
state banks may engage in insurance, securities and real estate ac-
tivities beyond the extent permitted to national banks.2 47 The
study also reveals that in 1987, eleven states permitted their
banks to buy stock in other businesses; of these, seven permitted
controlling interests to be acquired.2 48 According to the study,
this power has been used principally to put banks into the real
estate business, a business that is unquestionably closer to bank-
ing than, say, automobile manufacturing. 249
244. Id. Of course, for purposes of federal deposit insurance, the FDIC has
always had a continuing, strong oversight role in ensuring that no insured bank
(which essentially means all commercial banks) at the state level presents an un-
due risk to the fund. See 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (1988) (governing regulations for
insured banks). Activities, therefore, must be evaluated for their risk potential.
See, e.g., 52 Fed. Reg. 245 (1967) (reporting that Fed withdrew proposed regula-
tion that would have prohibited state insured banks from engaging in real estate
activities). This role requires independent action by the FDIC, and it seems
quite impossible to predict how the FDIC would react to automobile manufac-
turing or hamburger frying by state banks.
245. This description of a dual banking system is somewhat idealized. It
has been observed that the federal legal overlay is so pervasive that in reality the
states cannot be considered the equivalent of a second and competing system.
See Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual
Banking System, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 677, 678 (1988) ("Federal preemption and
uniformity, rather than competition and diversity, are the legal norms in banking
regulation."); Ginsburg, supra note 65, at 1150-51 ("Since FDIC insurance is a
practical necessity, Congress can regulate uniformly by conditioning FDIC in-
surance upon compliance with desired norms."). Moreover, one author devotes
an entire chapter to the "Causes of the Growth of State Banks" but does not
mention state bank expansion into commerce as a significant possibility. GEo. E.
BARNETT, STATE BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE NA-
TIONAL BANK ACT 79 (J.H. Hollander et al. eds., 1902).
246. See Citicorp v. Board of Governors, 936 F.2d 66, 75 (2d Cir. 1991)
(holding that Fed does not have authority to regulate or define state bank's sub-
sidiary insurance activity), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 869 (1992).
247. Victor L. Saulsbury, State Banking Powers: Where Are We Now?, F.D.I.C.
REG. REV., Mar./Apr. 1987, at 1.
248. Id. at 2-3.
249. Id. at 1. Since 1987, the Fed has been considering a regulation that
would deem real estate investment as "closely related to banking" under BHCA
§ 4(c)(8). Such a regulation, if promulgated, would in all likelihood be encoded
at 12 C.F.R. § 225.25(b)(25). A telephone conversation with Victor Saulsbury,
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Even within a bank holding company subject to and regu-
lated by the BHCA, a state bank has had full freedom, up until the
1991 FDIC amendments, to engage in whatever activities are au-
thorized by its chartering state.250 The Fed has traditionally taken
the position that it does not have to use, or does not choose to
use, the power to affect or control the activities of state banks in a
holding company system.2 5' The reach of the states' power here,
and the position of Congress in not fully separating bank holding
company activities from commerce, was summed up in a recent
case:
There can be no doubt that the Bank Holding Com-
pany Act is "intended to implement a congressional pol-
icy against control of banking and nonbanking
enterprises by a single business entity." What is less clear
author of the FDIC study, revealed that he was unaware of any state bank effort
to acquire control of a business as removed from banking as manufacturing or
retailing or the like. His informal view was, however, that state authorities in the
seven open states would probably not oppose such an effort.
250. This sweeping statement is subject to qualifications that do not detract
from the rule. For example, this power does not permit the perpetration of
fraud on the BHCA as may have been committed in Citicorp, 71 Fed. Res. Bull.
789 (1985). Citicorp was applying to the Fed, pursuant to § 3 of the BHCA, for
approval of Citicorp's acquisition of American State Bank of Rapid City, a state
bank chartered under the laws of South Dakota. Id. The Fed denied the applica-
tion because the Fed found that Citicorp's primary purpose in acquiring the
state bank was to evade the BHCA's prohibition against national banks partici-
pating in the insurance industry. Id. at 791. The Fed noted that American State
Bank of Rapid City was of limited value to Citicorp as a banking concern and
that South Dakota law permitted state banks to provide insurance coverage on a
national scale. Id.
251. See Merchants Nat'l Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 876, 878 (1987) (noting
that "[i]n the Board's view, the nonbanking provisions of section 4, do not apply
to limit the direct activities of holding company banks, except where the record
demonstrates the type of evasion described in the Citicorp/South Dakota case").
Under its "operating subsidiary" principle, the Fed has similarly disclaimed re-
sponsibility for subsidiaries of banks in bank holding company systems that are
performing functions directly accorded to the parent banks by the state. 12
U.S.C. § 1843(c)(1)(C) (1988). A subsequent Fed attempt to retreat from this
principle was rejected by the courts. See Citicorp v. Board of Governors, 936
F.2d 66, 75 (2d Cir. 1991) (concluding that Fed's view that BHCA did give it
control over subsidiaries was "an entirely untenable construction"), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 896 (1992); Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Board of Gover-
nors, 890 F.2d 1275, 1280-81 (2d Cir. 1989) (applying same principle to subsidi-
aries of banks that were performing functions other than those given to their
parent banks), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 810 (1990). The present position -that
banks and their subsidiaries are not under BHCA power restrictions-would
seem to comport with the BHCA's history. The House would have preferred to
regulate both bank and nonbank subsidiaries in their product offerings. The
Senate, however, ultimately prevailed in its view that only nonbank subsidiaries,
and only those that are not in turn subsidiaries of bank subsidiaries, should be
controlled. Golembe, supra note 213, at 5.
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is the extent to which Congress has decided to implement that pol-
icy. [Petitioner] contends that Congress has required a
nearly complete separation of banking and nonbanking
activities .... The Board believes that Congress has not
gone so far. In its view, Congress ...did not wish to
displace the traditional authority of state and national
bank chartering authorities to determine what nonbank-
ing activities could appropriately be engaged in by banks
that are subject to their jurisdiction, even though such
banks were owned by a bank holding company under the
jurisdiction of the Fed. 252
The states's freedom to allow banks to enter into commerce,
however, has not been used for over a century to empower banks
to engage in the more extreme examples of commerce such as
automobile manufacturing. The first expression of the banking-
commerce separation as a banking principle seems to have oc-
curred in 1943 when the Federal Reserve Board of Governors
wrote in their Annual Report: "Accepted rules of law confine the
business of banks to banking and prohibit them from engaging in
extraneous businesses such as owning and operating industrial
and manufacturing concerns. 2 s53
6. Conclusion on Banks and Commerce
It is fair to say that banking tradition since the middle nine-
teenth century has honored a division between banks and com-
merce. Before then, the division barely existed although its traces
can be observed.
With the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991, Congress has
strongly reinforced this separation.254 The powers of national
banks, excluded from commerce since their creation, were not ex-
panded. As for state banks, their potential was reduced to corre-
spond more closely with that of national banks. The essence of
section 303 of the FDIC Improvement Act provides that an in-
sured state bank may not engage in an activity prohibited to a
national bank unless:
(1) the [Federal Deposit Insurance] Corporation has de-
252. Independent Ins. Agents, 890 F.2d at 1280 (quoting Lewis v. BT Inv.Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 46 (1980)) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
253. 1943 FED. RESERVE Sys. BD. OF GOVERNORS ANN. REP. 36.
254. Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (codified in scattered sections of12 U.S.C.). Section 303 of the Act spells out this separation. Id. § 303, 105 Stat.
at 2349-53.
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termined that the activity would pose no significant risk
to the appropriate deposit insurance fund; and
(2) the State bank is, and continues to be, in compliance
with applicable capital standards prescribed by the ap-
propriate Federal banking agency. 255
To the extent that state banks have been perceived as leaders
in new banking activities, this new prohibition represents a strong
deterrent to further activity. 256 It may even be looked upon as a
threat to the dual banking system.2 57 Requiring FDIC approval as
a prior restraint upon state bank activities heightens the federal
supervision over state activity and diminishes whatever incentive
the state banks have to explore new businesses.
Depending upon the season, Congress blows hot and cold on
expanded activities for state institutions. The savings and loan
crisis provides a striking example. In 1982, the Senate noted that
"It]he potential benefits to thrifts that can be gained by authoriz-
ing the powers . . . are illustrated by the experience of state-
chartered savings and loan associations." 258 In 1989, however,
Congress concluded: "The results [of expanding the investment
powers of the thrift industry] were tragic." 259 However one may
have felt about the state banks and their potential for leading the
industry down new paths, it is obvious that Congress has most
recently laid a heavy hand upon their options. For the foresee-
able future, it seems unlikely that there will be any bank advance-
ment into the farther reaches of commerce. 260
255. Id. § 303, 105 Stat. at 2350.
256. See, e.g., ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE
REGULATION OF BANKS IN AN ERA OF DEREGULATION 3 (1988) ("The Commission
finds that the nation's dual banking system has many benefits for citizens, states,
and local communities. That system has been conducive to state experimenta-
tion, banking innovation, regulatory competition, and vitality in both banking
regulation and banking activity.").
257. See Melanie L. Fein, New Banking Law Imposes Restrictions On State Bank
Powers, BANKING POL'Y REP., Feb. 3, 1992, at 1 (describing FDIC Improvement
Act of 1991 as "a significant erosion of the dual banking system").
258. S. REP. No. 536, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3054, 3067.
259. H.R. REP. No. 54, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 297 (1989), reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 93.
260. It is not inconceivable, however, depending upon the outcome of
political pressures, that banks will engage in securities and insurance activities.
Whether such activities are better defined as "banking" or "commerce" is be-
yond the scope of this discussion.
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E. Bank Holding Companies and Commerce
When a bank's holding company or a nonbank subsidiary of
that holding company engages in nonbanking "commerce" activi-
ties, the "commerce" is separated from banking. Banking is con-
ducted in one corporate entity; commerce in another. The
separation is defined by the systems of law that deal with corpo-
rate entities generally and with banking in particular.26' If one is
convinced that banking has been historically separate from com-
merce, the issue then becomes whether their separation through a
holding company system honors that historical principle.
The United States has looked more favorably on the relation-
ship of commerce and banking through the holding company
structure than when commerce is engaged in by the bank itself.
One reason for this more liberal view is that in a bank holding
company, the character of the bank itself as an independent entity
does not change. It remains a bank, chartered by either state or
federal law; and that law continues to define and limit its powers.
The holding company umbrella affects only the relationship of
the bank with its sister corporations.
That relationship, however, is not insignificant. The bank
may favor its sister over other entities, may lend to its sister im-
providently, may cause its trusts to invest in its sister's stock or
may lend to its depositors to buy that stock. Moreover the mar-
ket, customers of the bank and even the bank regulators, may
view the holding company and the bank as a single entity. 2 62 Re-
cently, these facets of a bank holding company structure have
been criticized as indirectly threatening the bank insurance
system and perverting the "safety net" of federal regulation
designed to protect banks but not their nonbank sister corpora-
tions.263 The distorted relationship, if multiplied through numer-
261. See generally Note, supra note 15, at 650 (discussing regulation of activi-
ties of bank holding companies, including discussion of regulations separating
banking and commerce).
262. The bank holding company structure may also affect the security of
bank depositors. For a full exploration of these considerations, see generally
1986 Hearings, supra note 173, at 468.
In the same hearings, Paul Volcker testified that "a bank holding company
tends to operate as a coordinated whole, as I think does any business under
common ownership." Id. at 122 (statement of Federal Reserve Board Chairman
Paul Volcker).
263. See Corrigan, supra note 17, at 9 ("[T]he mere fact of permitting com-
mercial firms to own and control banking organizations carries with it at least the
implicit transfer of some elements of the safety net to such firms .... ").
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ous bank holding company systems, may become systemic and
affect the economy at large.
This issue, however, does not affect the current discussion.
We are exploring the contribution of history to the issue of
whether banking and commerce are separated in the U.S. banking
system. This section describes the banking history leading to the
development of the bank holding company structure and then
considers the modem implications of this history.
1. Early Ownership of Banks
A primary goal of early bank statutes was to promote wide-
spread individual stock ownership. The first Bank of the United
States was chartered by Congress on February 25, 1791. One
person could not own more than 1000 of the authorized 25,000
shares.2 64 The second Bank was chartered on April 10, 1816.
One person could not own more than 3000 of the authorized
350,000 shares. 265 One senior official currently active in bank
holding company issues has interpreted these early restrictions
on stock ownership as demonstrating the intent of Congress to
separate banking from commerce.2 66 Restrictions on the propor-
tion of the Banks' capital that could be owned by one person did
not, however, imply any intent to separate banking from com-
merce. Rather, the restrictions reflected the congressional intent
that the Banks create money and establish credit for the benefit of
the community at large instead of merely for the interests of a
few. 2
6 7
A review of the legislative debates supports the proposition
that Congress was not concerned with possible banking-com-
merce mixtures. The debates on the establishment of the first
Bank took place between February 1 and 8, 1791, primarily in the
House of Representatives. The major subjects debated were the
264. Act to Charter the Bank of the United States, Feb. 25, 1791, ch. X, 1
Stat. 191, 192, reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 25, at 307, 307.
265. Act to Charter the Second Bank of the United States, Apr. 10, 1816,
ch. 44, 3 Stat. 266, 267, reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 25, at
460, 461-62.
266. Statement of E. Gerald Corrigan Before the House Subcommittee on Telecommu-
nications and Finance, 77 Fed. Res. Bull. 411, 414 (1991).
267. In the 18th century and the first half of the 19th century, banks gener-
ally were established by legislative charter. For a discussion of this banking his-
tory, see supra notes 24-34 and accompanying text. Ownership was typically
closely held and the banks were operated with due regard for the needs of their
stockholders. See generally CHARLES BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 19-51 (1914) (discussing economic
interests of wealthy colonists in Revolutionary War era).
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general desirability of moving the economy of the new country
towards one based upon paper and credit as contrasted with land
and specie 268 and the constitutionality of the Bank as an instru-
ment of the United States. 269 Other debated issues included the
relationship of the federal government and the states,2 70 the ben-
efits of the Bank to farmers as contrasted with manufacturers,2 7'
the benefits to specialized regions of the country272 and the pow-
ers of chartered as contrasted with unchartered institutions.273
The debates do not contain discussions of concern about bank-
ing-commerce mixture.
Throughout the debates, there was a continuing apprehen-
sion that the Bank might achieve monopoly power and be used
for the benefit of specific groups. Congress was particularly con-
cerned about this risk because the Bank was specifically estab-
lished to accomplish certain functions generally perceived to be
governmental, primarily the creation of money and credit. Con-
gress addressed this concern by requiring the Bank's stock to be
widely dispersed and not closely held. 27 4
The debates on the establishment of the second Bank fo-
cused primarily on what the legislature could learn from the fail-
ure of the first Bank. 275 In addition, Congress discussed the
268. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1894-95 (1791).
269. Id. at 1893. The Supreme Court resolved the dispute over the consti-
tutionality of the Bank in McCulloch v. Maryland. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). Mr. ChiefJustice Marshall, in his famous analysis of
the implied powers of Congress, noted that "[t]he government which has a right
to do an act, and has imposed on it the duty of performing that act, must, ac-
cording to the dictates of reason, be allowed to select the means [to do that
act]." Id. at 409-10.
270. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. at 1897, 1917.
271. Id. at 1891.
272. Id. at 1919, 1938.
273. Id. at 1917, 1920.
274. See JOSEPH S. LAWRENCE, BANKING CONCENTRATION IN THE UNITED
STATES: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 237-38 (1930) (discussing anti-monopolistic provi-
sions in first bank charters). In connection with the charter of the first national
bank, Alexander Hamilton had also expressed concern that the traditional one
share, one vote principle of corporate law might render "a combination between
a few principal stockholders, to monopolize the power and benefits of the bank,
too easy." David L. Ratner, The Government of Business Corporations: Critical Reflec-
tions on the Rule of "One Share, One Vote", 56 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 6 (1970). This
view is additionally supported by the fact that the stock of both the first and
second Banks could be transferred freely after its original issue. See Act to Char-
ter the Bank of the United States, Feb. 25, 1791, ch. X, 1 Stat. at 195, reprinted in
1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 25, at 311; Act to Charter the Second Bank
of the United States, Apr. 10, 1816, ch. 44, 3 Stat. at 272, reprinted in 1 DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY, supra note 25, at 469.
275. See 28 ANNALS OF CONG. 671 (1814).
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issues of regional perks, 276 state rights, 277 the constitutionality of
the Bank278 and the policy behind an economy based upon
credit.2 79 A significant portion of the debate dealt with the capi-
talization of the second Bank.28 0 In these capitalization debates, a
statement by a Representative Wright confirms that the reason
for limiting subscriptions had nothing to do with the separation
of banking from commerce. As Mr. Wright was reported to
discuss:
Mr. W. was desirous not only that the United States but
that the agricultural interest of the country should hold a
due proportion in the stock of this bank, to keep it out of
the exclusive control of the commercial class, which he
intimated was generally in the British interest, and not a
few actually connected in business with British houses.
The landed and manufacturing interest, he argued,
ought to be at least equally interested in the bank with
the commercial.281
The quotation additionally suggests that, at least in Representa-
tive Wright's perception, commerce and banking had a synergistic
and beneficial connection so long as it was commerce of the
many, not of the few.
The history of the state bank chartering mechanisms reveals
a similar picture. Initially state banks were established only
through legislative charter. This process quickly gave rise to con-
cerns about the risks of closely held ownership if not outright mo-
nopoly.28 2 In response to this concern, state legislators added
276. Id. at 247-48 & 596.
277. Id. at 242, 244, 612, 1004, 1023.
278. Id. at 1022 (stating that lack of constitutional basis was one reason for
termination of first Bank's charter); id. at 260 (same). But see id. at 1340 (assert-
ing that "inexpediency" of first Bank was cause of its rejection).
279. Id. at 239-40, 248 & 592.
280. Id. at 592-94, 599-602, 609-11, 628, 635 & 1015.
281. Id. at 614-15. Throughout the debates on both the first and secondBanks, the question regularly arose whether the Banks should be owned by the
United States government or by private interests. The conclusion, for both
Banks, was that they should be owned by both, but that the Banks should repre-
sent a national interest and not the interests of any lesser group. Id. at 1144. In
response to an argument that the Banks should be entirely owned by the govern-
ment, one legislator stated that private interests should be represented because
"those institutions which derive their principle of action from private interest
are more active in pursuit of their object, more vigilant in the detection of error,
and more likely to prosper, than those which derive their impulse from the spirit
of patriotism and have in contemplation solely the public good." Id.
282. For a discussion of the establishment of banks through legislative
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charter provisions to ensure widespread stock ownership.283 The
same type of provision can be found in the free banking acts that
replaced state legislative charters. For example, the New York
State free banking Act of 1838 contained a provision stating that
"any number of persons may associate to establish [banks]. 28 4
The original national bank statutes also reveal a focus on
widespread ownership and a lack of concern regarding banking-
commerce activities. When national banks were first authorized
in 1863 and 1864, the statutes gave private individuals the right
to form an unspecified number of such banks. 285 These banks
were clearly private in nature. Congress gave little consideration
to the issue of bank ownership, stock dispersion or other activities
of the stockholders. 28 6 One provision which might be found to
address the issue of nonbanking activities gave the Comptroller
the power to deny a proposed bank its charter if "the sharehold-
ers thereof have formed the same for any other than the legiti-
mate objects contemplated by this act." 28 7 An objection to this
provision 288 was denied, and the language included in the Act.
Such language exists in the current version of the United States
Code with the most minor of modifications. 28 9 It seems plain that
charter and the corresponding Jeffersonian and Jacksonian fear of monopoly,
see supra notes 24-34 and accompanying text.
283. See HAMMOND, supra note 20, at 574 (describing New York bank legisla-
tion which included provision requiring that in any new bank charter, commis-
sioners appointed must "assure that fair opportunities were afforded the public
to purchase stock").
284. Act of April 18, 1838, ch. 260, § 15, 1838 N.Y. Laws 249. For a dis-
cussion of the New York Act, see supra notes 222-33 and accompanying text.
Experience prior to the New York free banking act had "led men to inquire into
the propriety of granting, by legislative enactment, exclusive rights to any class
of men whatsoever." 2 JABEZ D. HAMMOND, THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES
IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK 489 (1842). The Act, however, did not provide for
the review of the incorporators or the stockholders by any regulatory authority.
This type of regulatory authority was provided in 1864. See National Bank Act of
1864, ch. 106, § 34, 13 Stat. 99, 109-10 (requiring all associations incorporated
under Act to make detailed reports to Comptroller of the Currency).
285. See Act of Feb. 25, 1863, ch. 58, § 5, 12 Stat. 665, 666 (stating that"associations for carrying on the business of banking may be formed by any
number of persons"). For a further discussion of the statutory establishment of
national banks, see supra notes 238-42 and accompanying text.
286. The debates focused more on issues not related to banking-commerce
concerns. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1340 (1864) (statement
of Rep. Eldridge) (discussing whether blacks could own stock); id. at 1865-75
(debating issues related to deficiencies in National Bank Act of 1863).
287. National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106, § 12, 13 Stat. at 103.
288. See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1270 (1864) (statement of
Rep. Kernan).
289. See 12 U.S.C. § 27(a) (1988) ("[T]he comptroller may withhold [au-
thorization] whenever he has reason to suppose that the shareholders have
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early restrictions on stock ownership had nothing to do with con-
cerns over the combination of banking and commerce.
2. Corporate Ownership of Banks
The typical bank holding company structure consists of cor-
porate ownership of one or more banks. 290 These systems were
infrequent before the twentieth century. One early example is to-
day's Chemical Bank, which was created in 1824, by a chemical
manufacturing company.2 91 Whether the structure was a true
holding company is unclear.292 In the 1800s, "[t]he development
of the bank holding company depended upon amendments to
state laws to permit one corporation to purchase the stock of an-
other corporation. In 1889 New Jersey became the first state to
grant this power to corporations.- 2 93
The corporate bank holding company developed slowly
through the first quarter of the twentieth century. By 1929,
twenty-eight such holding company systems were reported, thir-
teen of them in the Pacific states.2 94 Although information is
scant, possibly deliberately so, 29 5 at least some of the early hold-
ing companies were involved in businesses other than banking.2 96
formed the same for any other than the legitimate objects contemplated by [the
Act].").
290. Another type of bank holding company is one owned by an individual
rather than a corporation. Few historical accounts exist to establish just when
individuals, or groups of individuals, began to perceive the benefits of owning as
many banks as they chose or could afford. FISCHER, supra note 38, at 5. This
form of bank holding, known as chain banking, did exist in the early nineteenth
century and continues today without significant legal interference. For a further
discussion of bank ownership by individuals, see infra notes 401-05 and accom-
panying text.
291. See Richard D. Hylton, The Bank Merger; "Manny Hanny" A Name for
History Books, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1991, at D6.
292. See id. (noting that "Chemical Bank was chartered.., as a subsidiary of
a chemical manufacturing company"). A Chemical Bank house document adds
the following: "The manufacturing company operated separately from the bank,
which was run by a small group of New York City merchants. Under a liberal-
ized banking law passed in 1838 and modified in 1840, the bank's directors liqui-
dated the chemical company and obtained a charter in 1844 to engage
exclusively in banking." CHEMICAL BANK CORP., HISTORY CAPSULE, CHEMICAL
BANK 1824-1986 1 (1986) (on file with the Villanova Law Review). For a further
discussion of Chemical Bank, see Sumner, supra note 206, at 171.
293. Donald T. Savage, A History of the Bank Holding Company Movement,
1900-78, in THE BANK HOLDING COMPANY MOVEMENT, supra note 145, at 24.
294. GAINES T. CARTINHOUR, BRANCH, GROUP AND CHAIN BANKING 102-03
(1931).
295. In view of the use of bank holding companies to circumvent bank
branching limitations, early developments of the idea tended to be conducted in
some secrecy. Id. at 97.
296. Foremost was Transamerica Corporation, "organized in 1928 by A.P.
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One possible source of information on early bank holding
companies and their banking-commerce activity is the congres-
sional hearings of the time. A search of these documents, how-
ever, reveals little such discussion. For example, in fifteen
hearings by the House Banking Committee in 1930 on the subject
of Branch, Chain, and Group Banking the subject of banking and
commerce was barely touched upon.297 These Hearings are a
logical place to look because group banking and chain banking
were the most common structures to utilize the holding company
format. "Chain banking [is] characterized as the ownership of
more than one bank by an individual or small group of individu-
als." 298 "Group banking, the early term for a bank holding com-
pany, is the ownership of two or more banks by a separately
organized corporation .. . ."299 One reason why there was so
little discussion of banking and commerce may be that the Hear-
ings were focused on concentration in banking rather than on its
relationship to commerce.300 Another possibility is that group
banking was, at the time, such a recent phenomenon that an in-
depth study hardly seemed called for.301
Where the subject of holding companies and commerce was
mentioned in these 1930 Hearings, albeit indirectly, it does not
Giannini for the purpose, among others, of facilitating control and management
through a single corporation of the banks and other corporations theretofore
operated under his general direction." Transamerica Corp., 38 Fed. Res. 'Bull.
368, 368 (1952), revd, 206 F.2d 163 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 901 (1953).
Another corporation, United Founders Corporation, was engaged in the holding
of banks, public utilities and railroads. See Bank Plan Ascribed to United Founders,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1929, at 26.
297. Branch, Chain, and Group Banking. Hearings Before the House Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 1017-21 (1930) [hereinafter 1930
Hearings] (statement ofJohn W. Pole, Comptroller of the Currency). Not once in
the entire statement, entitled "Banking and the New Financial Era," did Comp-
troller Pole mention the subject of banking and commerce. Such discussion was
also missing from the scholarly work of the time. See, e.g., H. PARKER WILLIS &
JOHN M. CHAPMAN, THE BANKING SITUATION 381-93 (1934) (discussing group
banking and chain banking, but failing to address the combination of banking
and commerce); see also KLEBANER, supra note 11, at 183 (stating that during that
time period, use of holding company device by banks "hoping to expand their
nonbank operations" did not suggest any danger).
298. Savage, supra note 293, at 23.
299. Id. at 24.
300. See, e.g., 1930 Hearings, supra note 297, at 1038 (statement of Robert 0.
Lord, President, Guardian Detroit Union Group) ("Banking, too, has felt the
pressure toward larger units and closer interconnection of units ....").
301. See id. at 1020 (statement of John W. Pole, Comptroller of the Cur-
rency) (stating that "[wie have witnessed within the last two years an amazing
development in the concentration of control over groups of unit banks"); see also
id. at 1681 (testimony of Max B. Naum, Vice President, Citizens National Bank,
Bowling Green, Ky.) ("Group banking is only two years old-less than that.").
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appear that the participants perceived the existence of any
problems, although the evidence is equivocal. Comptroller Pole,
for example, testified:
Where a State corporation is permitted to buy stock, I
think it would be legal for it to purchase stock in a na-
tional bank with which it might be affiliated. As to
whether or not I would deem that advisable if carried too
far, is of course another question. 30 2
The dominant interest of Congress, as well as the testifying
witnesses, was clearly the use of group or chain banking, both of
which allowed for the purchase of multiple banks, as a substitute
for branching. Bank branching was limited by both federal and
state law and was, as now, largely prohibited interstate. 30 3 The
concerns raised included discussions of: whether group banking
might supply a quasi-legal substitute for illegal branching;
whether ownership of banks in separate states might evade the
interstate branching prohibitions; whether competition would be
increased or decreased; and whether bank holdings would result
in undue aggregations of power and affect interest rates.30 4 The
fact that the parent corporation or other controlling interest
could engage in "commerce" was occasionally assumed,30 5 but it
was a distinctly subsidiary issue. Congress certainly displayed no
indication that it was improper or dangerous to combine banking
and commerce within the same holding company structure. This
lack of concern, however, might be related to the tendency of
these corporate holding companies to limit their nonbanking ac-
tivities to those closely related to banking. When on occasion a
witness was asked whether he was interested in engaging in activi-
ties outside the banking field, the answer was generally "No. 30 6
302. Id. at 142 (statement of John W. Pole, Comptroller of the Currency).
303. For a discussion of interstate branching, see supra notes 42-66 and ac-
companying text.
304. See 1930 Hearings, supra note 297, at 23-27 (opening statement of
Comptroller of the Currency Pole).
305. Id. at 755. For example, during the testimony of L.E. Wakefield, Vice
President of First Bank Stock Corporation, Minneapolis, Minn., Representative
Letts asked: "You are authorized to do almost any kind of business, are you
not?" Mr. Wakefield replied, "Well, sir, I have not read what the lawyers put
into the powers of that corporation; but I imagine they will let you do almost
anything." Id. at 954.
306. For example, the Articles of Incorporation of Northwest Bancorpora-
tion, a bank holding company, were printed in the record. They contained a
corporate authorization to "organize, incorporate, and reorganize subsidiary
corporations for all lawful purposes." When E.W. Decker, representing the cor-
poration, was asked whether the corporation had "engaged in any business up to
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In 1938, the Federal Reserve conducted a study of group
banking and again seemed unconcerned about any potential
problems with the combination of a commercial nonbanking cor-
poration with a bank or banks. 30 7 Another study, performed in
1941, also did not address banking-commerce combination is-
sues.308 Once again, this lack of concern may be based on the
banking-related nature of the nonbanking activities. For exam-
ple, in a 1955 Fed survey of the eighteen federally registered bank
holding companies, only one of the companies' was engaged in
manufacturing and one was in the fish business-and they may
have been the same company. The rest were in bank-related busi-
nesses, assuming that insurance is bank-related.30 9
These hearings and studies reveal an apparent lack of con-
cern during the early development of bank holding companies
about the mixture of banking and commerce within these corpo-
rate structures. Congress was, however, developing a belief that
the bank holding company structure should be regulated by fed-
eral legislation. The next section discusses the major bank hold-
ing company legislation enacted to address this concern.
3. The Bank Holding Company Act
The statute that today restricts bank holding companies from
combining banking and commerce within the same holding com-
pany structure is the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956. 310 The
this time other than the banking business and the handling of securities," he
answered, "No". Id. at 848; see also id. at 1501 (testimony ofJames A. Bacigalupi,
Vice Chairman of the Advisory Committee of Transamerica Corp.) (stating that
Transamerica would not take over other lines of industry "unless they are akin
to banking").
307. See Group Banking in the United States, 24 Fed. Res. Bull. 92 (1938) (sur-
veying various aspects of group banking without discussing nonbanking
activities).
308. C.E. Cagle, Branch, Chain, and Group Banking, in BANKING STUDIES 113
(Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ed., 1941). This study de-
scribed the development of bank holding companies. Id. Observing that "little
is known about the early development of group banking," the study reported
that a bank holding company existed as early as 1892 and that the "extensive
development" of the device occurred between 1927 and 1930. Id. at 134. As of
December 31, 1939, however, there were only forty-one "group banking sys-
tems" in the United States. Id. at 136; see also WILLIS & CHAPMAN, supra note
297, at 373 (reporting that "group banking as we know it today has had its prin-
cipal growth since the end of 1926").
309. See 1955 Hearings, supra note 67, at 92 (listing one company as being
involved in "[mietals manufacturing," and another as being involved in "catch-
ing, processing, and selling fish").
310. BHCA, ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1841-1850 (1988)).
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following subsections discuss the predecessors of the BHCA and
show how this restriction on banking and commerce activities
developed.
a. 1933 Bank Holding Company Legislation
The Banking Act of 1933 contained the first federal bank
holding company legislation.3 1 Section 19 of the Act required a
bank holding company, defined in section 2(b) as an entity own-
ing or controlling one member bank,3 12 to receive a permit from
the Federal Reserve System before voting its bank stock.31 3 The
Fed, before issuing a permit, typically required the applicant to
enter into an agreement that provided, among other matters, that
it would not engage in the securities business.3 14 The Fed did not
prohibit entry into other forms of commerce.
The 1933 legislation resulted in little meaningful control of
bank holding companies for three reasons. First, it applied only
to ownership of member banks. Nonmember banks were also in
holding company structures but were not regulated. Second, if a
state bank was a member bank and wanted to join an unregulated
bank holding company, it could simply give up its voluntary"member" status. Third, holding companies could control mem-
ber banks without formally voting their stock and, therefore,
never need the permit. Because of these concerns, Congress con-
sidered corrective legislation for many years.315 In 1966, well af-
ter passage of the BHCA, the voting stock permit provisions were
finally repealed. 316
311. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
312. Id. § 2(b), 48 Stat. at 162 (emphasis added). "Member" banks are
those banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System.
313. Id. § 19, 48 Stat. at 186-88. Section 19 also provided that a national
bank's holding company must have assets (excluding its bank stock) that were
worth at least 25% of the par value of the bank stock, presumably to give sup-
port to the national bank. Id.
314. Cagle, supra note 308, at 133. Cagle noted that the purpose of the
requirements and conditions was "that the holding company and its subsidiary
banks and other organizations [should] maintain a sound financial condition and
proper operating principles." Id.
315. See Regulation and Control of Bank Holding Companies: Hearings on S. 2398
Before the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1952)
[hereinafter 1952 Hearings] (statement of J.L. Robertson, Member, Board of
Governors of Federal Reserve System) ("Over the past 15 years Congress has
considered numerous bills on this subject [of the bank holding company].").
316. Act of July 1, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-485, § 13(b), 80 Stat. 236, 242
(repealing voting stock permit requirement); see also id. § 13(c), 80 Stat. at 242
(eliminating asset maintenance requirement).
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b. 1933 Securities Legislation
In another part of the Banking Act of 1933, generally re-
ferred to as the Glass-Steagall Act, Congress included provisions
limiting the opportunity of banks and companies affiliated with
member banks to engage in securities-related activities.3' 7
Although permitting all banks and their affiliates to engage in the
brokerage of securities, the Glass-Steagall Act: prohibited mem-
ber banks from owning stock in most, but not all, commercial en-
terprises;31 8 prohibited member banks from underwriting most,
but not all, commercial securities31 9 and limited the ability of affil-
iates of member banks to underwrite commercial securities3 20
The Glass-Steagall Act is occasionally referred to as creating
a wall between banking and commerce.3 21 This separation did
not occur. The Act was a congressional reaction to the Great De-
pression and the high-flying securities speculations engaged in by
some banks and their affiliates during the 1920s that Congress
considered partly responsible for the economic crisis.3 22 It was a
consequential, but limited, statute designed to correct a particular
problem: commercial banks doing investment banking. In areas
where Congress did not consider problems to exist, it left both
banks and their affiliates free to act, even in the securities busi-
ness. Nonmember state banks were not-and are not today-
prohibited by the Glass-Steagall Act from owning "commercial"
enterprises.
317. Banking Act of 1933, § 5, 48 Stat. at 164-66.
318. Id. § 16, 48 Stat. at 184-85.
319. Id. §§ 5, 16, 21, 48 Stat. at 164-66, 184-85, 189.
320. Id. §§ 16, 20, 32, 48 Stat. 184-85, 188-89, 194.
321. See H.R. REP. No. 387, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1969) ("This principle
[the separation of banking and commerce] has been embodied in Federal law
since the Glass-Steagall Act was passed in 1933."); Thomas E. Wilson, Separation
Between Banking and Commerce Under the Bank Holding Company Act-A Statutory Ob-
jective Under Attack, 33 CATH. U. L. REV. 163, 166 (1983) ("After the enactment of
the Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall Act), the principal federal law that rees-
tablished a rigid separation between banking and commerce .... banking and
nonbanking enterprises remained relatively separate until World War II.");
Mary J. Wetmore, Note, Banking and Commerce: Are They Different? Should They Be
Separated?, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 994, 996 (1989) ("[T]he Glass-Steagall Act
[is] the principal federal law reestablishing the rigid separation between banking
and commerce.").
322. See Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 630 (1971) ("The
Glass-Steagall Act reflected a determination that policies of competition, con-
venience, or expertise which might otherwise support the entry of commercial
banks into the investment banking business were outweighed by the 'hazards'
and 'financial dangers' that arise when commercial banks engage in the activities
proscribed by the Act.").
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c. The Federal Reserve Board and Transamerica
Between 1933 and 1956, the Fed was the prime moving force
in favor of restrictive bank holding company legislation. Its first
major push occurred in 1943 when, in its Annual Report to Con-
gress, it argued that, under "accepted rules," bank holding com-
panies should not be permitted to own institutions in
commerce.323
The focus of the Fed's dissatisfaction appears to have been
the unregulated activities of Transamerica Corporation. In 1943,
the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board first expressed disap-
proval to a congressional committee about the "improper and un-
sound policy" of Transamerica Corporation "in their purchase of
stock of banks and in their purchase of stock of corporations that
have nothing whatever to do with banks." 324 Transamerica, the
largest bank holding company of its time, by 1953 controlled
forty-one percent of all banking offices and thirty-nine percent of
all bank deposits in a five state area.325 The company also owned
a number of other businesses engaged in commerce: a manufac-
turer of tractors, aircraft parts and metal products; the producer
of ferrous and nonferrous casting and forgings; an operator of
foundries and producer of diesel engines, oil burners and other
equipment; and a fishery operator.3 26
In 1952, the Fed prosecuted Transamerica for violating sec-
tion 7 of the Clayton Antitrust Act.3 27 The allegations in the anti-
trust case were based upon a perceived lessening of competition
through the purchase of stock in many other banks, not the com-
merce-related activities of the bank holding company. The latter
was not against any law. The concerns verbalized by the Fed
dealt with the concentration of banking power. 328 A verdict of
guilty in a departmental hearing, 329 which ordered divestment of
the banks and not the subsidiaries in commerce, was reversed by
the Third Circuit. 330 The Third Circuit opinion does not even
323. 1943 FED. RESERVE Sys. BD. OF GOVERNORS ANN. REP. 36.
324. Federal Reserve Act Amendment: Hearings on H.R. 1699 Before the Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 133 (1943).
325. Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors, 206 F.2d 163, 167 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 901 (1953).
326. Transamerica Corp., 38 Fed. Res. Bull. 368, 370 (1952) (Clayton Act
proceeding), rev'd, 206 F.2d 163 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 346 U.S. 901 (1953).
327. Id. at 368.
328. Id. at 391.
329. Id. (directing Transamerica to divest all of its stock in certain banks).
330. Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors, 206 F.2d 163, 170-71 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 901 (1953).
[Vol. 38: p. I
BANK HOLDING COMPANY ACT
mention the subsidiaries involved in commerce. 331
Transamerica's ownership of companies engaged in com-
merce, however, was a continuing controversy between the Fed
and Transamerica. A key objective in the Fed's attempts to obtain
bank holding company legislation was to prevent Transamerica
from engaging in both banking and commerce.33 2 One commen-
tator stated that "the Bank Holding Company Act was aimed
principally at this institution, though public officials deny it."s
It is likely that the commerce activities of Transamerica's opera-
tions provided additional incentive to the Fed to initiate the Clay-
ton Act proceeding.
d. The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956
In a 1938 special message to Congress, President Roosevelt
asked for legislation imposing greater curbs upon bank holding
companies.33 4 The concept fell upon receptive congressional
ears and, while hearings were not held until 1947,335 they were
regularly held thereafter by both the Senate and House Banking
Committees until enactment of the BHCA in 1956.336 The reason
331. See, e.g., id. at 170 ("We conclude that since the Board failed to find the
facts as to lessening competition and tendency to monopoly in the areas of effec-
tive competition actually involved, its order is unsupported by the necessary
findings and cannot stand.").
332. See M. Walton Cloke, Transamerica Denies Stifling of Competition in Banking
Field, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1950, at 35, 38 ("[L]egislation under consideration
was 'aimed' at Transamerica" and "would require the company to give up some
of its holdings in non-banking enterprises.").
333. FISCHER, supra note 38, at 104.
334. S. Doc. No. 173, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 8-9 (1938). President Roosevelt
recommended that
Congress enact at this session legislation that will effectively control the
operation of bank holding companies; prevent holding companies from
acquiring control of any more banks directly or indirectly; prevent
banks controlled by holding companies from establishing any more
branches; and make it illegal for a holding company... to borrow from
or sell securities to a bank in which it holds stock.
Id.
335. Providing for Control and Regulation of Bank Holding Companies: Hearings on
S. 829 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1947).
336. See 1955 Hearings, supra note 67; Bank Holding Legislation: Hearings on S.
76, S. 1118 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 83d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1953) [hereinafter 1953 Hearings]; 1952 Hearings, supra note 315; Bank Holding
Bill. Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1950) [hereinafter 1950 Hearings].
In 1953, 14 companies, who identified themselves as representing 72% of
the bank officers and 62% of the resources of the bank holding companies regis-
tered with the Fed, presented a statement to the House Banking Committee re-
garding holding company legislation. 1953 Hearings, supra, at 143 (statement of
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for the delay may have been that commercial firms did not begin
to acquire subsidiary banks in any significant number until after
the end of World War II in 1945. 3 37 Bank holding company activ-
ity increased through the post-war period and, while not a funda-
ment of the banking system until much later, increased
substantially over what had existed in 1930.338 By 1950, if one
adopts a broad definition of "commerce," most of the holding
companies were engaged in some form of it. s3 9 In 1950, the
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board maintained that when a
bank holding company applied for a permit, the Board would ex-
amine the degree to which commerce or other business was con-
ducted within the holding company system.3 40 Despite the
apparent restriction, there was concern that bank holding compa-
nies would circumvent the regulation.34'
A first step in structuring comprehensive federal bank hold-
ing company legislation was to define which holding companies
would be regulated. A bill introduced and reported favorably by
the Senate Banking Committee in 1947,342 first established a
principle that would continue in all proposed bank holding com-
pany legislation until 1970. Mere ownership of a bank would not
cause the controlling entity to be considered a regulated bank
holding company.3 43 Until 1970, Congress required that the sub-
sidiary banking entity meet some designated size requirement.3 44
J. Cameron Thomson). This group opposed further bank holding company leg-
islation because the group feared potential interference with a form of business
that, through its opportunities in businesses other than banking, strengthened
the banking groups. Id. at 145.
337. See Wilson, supra note 321, at 166 ("After the war.., commercial and
industrial enterprises began with increasing frequency to acquire banks.").
338. For a discussion of the early development of bank holding companies,
see supra notes 290-309 and accompanying text.
339. The Fed reported that as of December 31, 1950, 28 groups were con-
sidered bank holding companies. 1952 Hearings, supra note 315, at 13. Of these
28 groups, 20 received voting permits and of those 20, 16 owned a total of 79
nonbanking organizations. Id. at 13, 31. These organizations included busi-
nesses closely related to banking, like "life insurance" and "home financing,"
and others more separate, like "fish catching and processing." Id. at 13.
340. 1950 Hearings, supra note 336, at 40.
341. See 1952 Hearings, supra note 315, at 20 ("The... problem arises from
the fact that a bank holding company may, without restriction under present law,
control not only banks but also various types of enterprises wholly unrelated to
the banking business.").
342. See S. REP. No. 300, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1947) (reporting that
"need" for S. 829, regulating bank holding companies, was "both pressing and
clear").
343. See id. at 3-4 (requiring that subsidiary bank operate at least one
branch in order for owner to be considered bank holding company).
344. Id.
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The size requirement changed in various ways with subsequent
legislation. Under the 1947 bill, if the subsidiary bank had at least
one branch the holding company was a regulated bank holding
company.3 45 This provision was amended in 1949 to require at
least four branches.3 46 A further amendment, introduced in
1950, stated that for a company to be a "bank holding company"
it must either own or control two or more banks or one bank with
four or more branches.3 47 In the 1956 BHCA, the requirement
was that the entity own at least two banks.3 48
Throughout the hearings, the proposed bank holding com-
pany legislation had two stated objectives. The first was to pre-
vent undue concentration in banking, and to prevent banks from
getting too large and wielding inordinate power through the
holding company system. The second was to prevent the mixture
of banking and commerce. Restricting coverage of the legislation
to multiple bank systems or to banks with branches clearly honors
the first goal. But the legislation does not honor the second ob-
jective when it permits a company that owns a single bank to en-
gage in commerce.3 49 As the Second Circuit observed "what is
less clear is the extent to which Congress has decided to imple-
ment that [second] policy."350
Banks, through their holding company systems were, as has
been discussed, well involved in commerce. Congress was pres-
sured by various interests led by the Fed to prohibit such a rela-
tionship.3 51 The proposed bills, however, did not contain such
comprehensive provisions. Bank holding companies owning one
bank while engaging in commerce were consistently defined out
of bank holding company legislation from the enactment of the
345. Id.
346. 1950 Hearings, supra note 336, at 12.
347. Id. at 1.
348. BHCA, ch. 240, § 2(a), 70 Stat. 133, 133.
349. This concept was actually incorporated into the 1933 bank holding
company legislation that limited such companies to those that owned member
banks, thereby leaving the owners of nonmember banks free of regulation. See
Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 2(b)(1), 48 Stat. 162, 165-66.
350. Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Board of Governors, 890 F.2d
1275, 1280 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 810 (1990).
351. For example, the following testimony appears in the 1953 Hearings:
Senator Goldwater: We find, for instance, packing companies in banks,
mercantile companies in banks .... The legislation should be written,
then, to limit banks to banking ....
Mr. Robertson: That is one of the purposes.
1953 Hearings, supra note 336, at 24-25 (statement ofJ.L. Robertson, Member,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
19931
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
BHCA in 1956 until its 1970 revision.3 52
The principle that banking and commerce should not be com-
bined was, however, almost unanimously espoused throughout
the hearing process.353 Several points should, however, be made
relative to this. First, the principle was derived from laws previ-
ously adopted for banks, not bank holding companies.3 54 Federal
Reserve Chairman Thomas B. McCabe made this apparent in a
report to Congress that provided: "Under the bill, the bank hold-
ing companies would be put in practically the same situation in
this respect as the banks which they control."3 55 The possibility
that bank holding companies would present considerations differ-
ent from banks was barely touched upon. There clearly was insuf-
ficient appreciation of the fact that, whatever the validity of the
argument that banks and commerce had traditionally been sepa-
rated in the United States, the argument had considerably less
weight and introduced new considerations when applied to bank
holding companies. Banks and bank holding companies are not
the same. Bank holding companies, through their corporate
structure, do separate banking from commerce. To an undue de-
gree, however, banks and bank holding companies were treated
by Congress as if they were the same.3 56 The behavior of Con-
gress, as contrasted with the rhetoric, demonstrates that it was the
dangers of size that were paramount in its eyes, not the mixing of
352. See Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
607, § 101, 84 Stat. 1760, 1760 (changing requirement to include companies
that own "any bank").
353. See, e.g., 1950 Hearings, supra note 336, at 59 (discussing danger of bank
involvement in nonbanking activities).
354. See id (noting that commerce restrictions applied to banks, not bank
holding companies).
355. Id.; see also 1952 Hearings, supra note 315, at 20 (statement ofJ.L. Rob-
ertson, Member, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) (stating
that "[o]ur banking laws have long recognized the desirability of prohibiting
banks from engaging in extraneous business" (emphasis added)). This theme
runs through the hearings on bank holding company legislation. See 1955 Hear-
ings, supra note 67, at 328 (statement of Rep. Brent Spence, Chairman of the
House Banking Committee) ("While you are not a bank you can be considered a
bank that doesn't do any banking business."); 1953 Hearings, supra note 336, at
60 (statement of D. Emmert Brumbaugh, President of the Independent Bankers
Association of America) ("This bill is designed to forbid holding companies
from doing anything that banks cannot do themselves .... ").
356. "Surely there is no lack of logic in the request that bank holding com-
panies be prevented by effective laws from doing what a bank cannot do under
Federal and State banking laws. This is simply applying the good old-fashioned
American rule of fair play." 1955 Hearings, supra note 67, at 207 (statement of D.
Emmert Brumbaugh). But see 1969 Hearings, supra note 70, at 905 (statement of
Robert H. Volk, President of Union Bancorp) (distinguishing between banks and
their holding companies).
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banking and commerce. Through the original drafting of the
BHCA, a holding company owning one bank without branches,
and after its passage, a single bank regardless of the number of
branches, were free to engage in commerce through the holding
company system. Up to 1970, the only banks held subject to
BHCA limitations were banks that presented risks resulting from
their size. 3 57
Second, no evidence of loss or bad banking was presented to
prove that banking and commerce were dangerous bedfellows.3 58
This aspect of the BHCA was and continues to be based upon
congressional speculation. In 1952, Governor Robertson opined
that "the very nature of the holding company mechanism makes
certain abuses possible and gives rise to certain problems which,
we believe, should be considered and dealt with by Congress."3 59
The Senate Report on the 1970 amendments stated: "It is clearly
understood that the legislation is to prevent possible future
problems rather than to solve existing ones. ' 360 The same focus
on future prevention existed in 1986.361
Examples of combinations of banking and commerce were
occasionally available for examination. For example, in a 1953
Senate Banking Committee hearing, Senator Goldwater stated:
"We find, for instance, packing companies in banks, mercantile
companies in banks."3 62 There is no evidence, however, that
357. For a discussion of the number of subsidiaries required to make an
entity subject to bank holding company legislation, see supra notes 342-48 and
accompanying text.
358. It is impossible to know everything that was submitted to Congress.
For example, one report listed cases that occurred "not too long ago," cases
from the early 1930s and some securities-related cases that the Banking Act of
1933 "aimed at preventing." H.R. REP. No. 609, supra note 66, at 4, 5.
359. 1952 Hearings, supra note 315, at 19. The counter-position that when
banks enter commerce they acquire strength was then, as now, a contested issue.
See 1950 Hearings, supra note 336, at 155 (statement of Samuel B. Stewart, coun-
sel to Transamerica Corp.) ("May I suggest, gentlemen, that this committee
should face the problem squarely and decide, first, whether diversification of
assets in a bank holding company is a source of strength and safety to the banks
and their depositors or a source of weakness.").
Federal Reserve Board Chairman Thomas B. McCabe testified in 1950 that
the bank holding companies then owning nonbanking businesses "might be sub-
jected to strong temptation" to favor those businesses. However, no example of
succumbing to temptation was given. Id. at 59 (emphasis added).
360. S. REP. No. 1084, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1970), reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5519, 5522.
361. See 1986 Hearings, supra note 173, at 16 (statement of George D.
Gould, Under Secretary for Finance, Department of the Treasury) (discussing
fear of bank holding company "misuse" of subsidiary banks).
362. 1953 Hearings, supra note 336, at 24.
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such combinations hurt the banks, the packing or mercantile com-
panies, or, for that matter, society.363
Given our nation's long and often troubled banking history,
examples of irregularities in the operation of bank holding com-
panies do, of course, appear. In Georgia in 1926, a chain banking
system collapsed apparently because its owners syphoned off
funds into their real estate investments.3 64 One commentator
noted that "the head office which exercised control over all of
these banks was itself not under the supervision of the banking
department because, theoretically at least, it did no banking busi-
ness. "3 65 Instances of this type of abuse are available, but they
are not central to the operation of the banking system. They may,
on one hand, be considered no more than examples of isolated
cases of wrongful behavior that are either inevitable in any large
human operation or are controllable through existing bank regu-
latory devices. On the other hand, such abuses may support the
need for a BHCA and the separation of banking and commerce.
This core question deserves the discussion it has never received.
Congress dealt with the perceived holding company prob-
lem, however, without receiving evidence of real widespread
abuse. The general absence of abuse continues. In fact, the
Chairman of the FDIC wrote in 1955, that "on the whole, banks
owned and directed by holding companies have presented fewer
problems as to capital funds, asset condition, and management
than have unit banks under independent management and con-
trol."3 66 A subsequent Chairman took an even stronger position
and actually advocated repeal of the BHCA, a suggestion that was
363. See generally 1986 Hearings, supra note 173, at 2 (opening statement of
Chairman Barnard) (noting that separation of banking and commerce may be
outdated).
364. Haynes McFadden, The Chain Bank Crash in Georgia, AM. BANKERS
Ass'N.J., Sept. 1926, at 137.
365. CARTINHOUR, supra note 294, at 87. Cartinhour relates this kind of
abuse more to chain banking (ownership by individuals) than group banking
(ownership by a corporation). Id. at 89. As later discussed, however, the con-
temporary equivalent of chain banking is permitted under the BHCA. For this
discussion, see infra notes 401-05 and accompanying text.
366. Control of Bank Holding Companies: Hearings on S. 880, S. 2350 & H.R.
6227 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 84th Cong., 1st
Sess. 99 (1955) (statement of H.E. Cook, chairman of FDIC). It was also re-
ported that during the Depression "[t]he failure rate of holding company sub-
sidiary banks appear[ed] . . . to be about one-half that for all banks." Savage,
supra note 293, at 30. Furthermore, a bank with greater product diversification
had and has the potential of being stronger than a less diversified bank. LITAN,
supra note 183, at 97.
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later softened, possibly in light of political pressures. 367
Third, through the years leading to the original enactment of
the BHCA in 1956, the proponents of restrictive legislation-
comprising almost all the witnesses in the 1950 and 1952 Hear-
ings 368-were hard put to find bank holding companies that had
actually entered commerce through the holding company device.
Indeed, this is probably one reason why no pattern of abuse ex-
isted. There simply was not enough activity to represent any
tradition. 369
The BHCA, as it was enacted in 1956, did not separate bank-
ing from commerce. It left companies owning .only one bank free
from activity restriction. 370 This provision represents the single
most definitive statement by Congress that further separation of
bank holding companies and commerce was not required in the
absence of actual abuse and the absence of a requirement that
they become more separate in principle. Perhaps Congress did
see a need for such separation but perceived the risks of combin-
ing banking and commerce to be present only in larger institu-
tions. With such an argument, however, the issue becomes size,
not the mixture of banking and commerce.37'
367. See Nathaniel Nash, FDIC's Chairman Suggests Eliminating Bank-Holding
Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1987, at Al. A pamphlet was published the same
year by the FDIC which asserted that "direct regulatory or supervisory authority
over nonbanking affiliates is not necessary." FEDERAL DEPOSIT INS. CORP., MAN-
DATE FOR CHANGE: RESTRUCTURING THE BANKING INDUSTRY 95 (1987). Addition-
ally, the pamphlet observed that "[t]he main vehicle for controlling and limiting
the activities of affiliated organizations is the Bank Holding Company Act." Id.
at 96 n. 1.
368. See 1952 Hearings, supra note 315, at 265 (statement of Senator Tobey)
("[O]nly two organizations appeared here in opposition to this bill.").
369. See id. at 48 (statement of Harry Harding, President, First National
Bank of Pleasanton, California). Mr. Harding testified:
As far as engaging in nonbanking business is concerned, there are re-
ally only a few, very, very few companies, that engage in nonbanking
businesses in a large way. The Equity Corp., which owns the Morris
Plan Banks, and Transamerica Corp., particularly. Some of the others
do to a lesser degree, but those two organizations do it in a very large
way, and practically everybody is agreed on the divestment of nonbank-
ing businesses as something that is essential to protect the banks of the
country.
Id.
370. For a discussion of the size requirements, see supra notes 342-48 and
accompanying text.
371. In 1955, one year before the BHCA's enactment, the House Banking
Committee issued a report that the United States would, through bank holding
company expansion, become like "England whose many banks became the Big
Five," and would no longer be "served by home-owned and home managed
banks." H.R. REP. No. 609, supra note 66, at 2, 6.
Subsequent BHCA amendments suggest continuing congressional intent to
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This historical review reveals that the primary goal of the
BHCA was to prevent undue concentration in banking. The
BHCA pursued this goal through a system of regulatory review of
the creation and operation of holding companies involving more
than one bank. 372 This is not to deny that there was continuing
verbiage to the effect that the BHCA had two goals; with the sec-
ond concerning the combination of banking and commerce. As
noted previously, for example, some legislators stated that the
BHCA was designed to impose the same commerce-related re-
strictions on bank holding companies that had previously been
placed on banks. 373 This design, however, was not adopted by
Congress.
e. The 1970 Amendments
The 1970 BHCA amendments eliminated the one-bank hold-
ing company exemption, making the BHCA applicable to holding
companies that owned only one bank. 374 Between 1956 and
1970, Congress intermittently had considered applying the
BHCA requirements to one-bank holding companies. As a 1966
Senate Report explained:
The Committee heard many witnesses and received
many letters and statements in connection with the pro-
cover only the larger institutions. For example, in 1966, banks conducting only
safe deposit businesses were eliminated from coverage. See Act of July 1, 1966,
Pub. L. No. 89-485, § 8(c)(1)(B), 80 Stat. 236, 239. Congress reported that the"objective [of the BHCA] can be achieved without applying the act to savings
banks." S. REP. No. 1179, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 7 (1966), reprinted in 1966
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2385, 2391. In 1970, banks making only consumer loans were
eliminated from the BHCA and permitted to affiliate with businesses in "com-
merce." Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607,
§ 101(c), 84 Stat. 1760, 1762. This event gave rise to a controversy concerning"nonbank banks" and a subsequent BHCA amendment to change the definition.
See Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 101(a), 101
Stat. 552, 554 (changing definition of "bank" and exceptions thereto). For a
discussion of nonbank banks, see infra notes 414-24 and accompanying text.
372. Because banks, through a combination of the federal McFadden Act
and state banking laws, could not, with the most minor exceptions, branch
across state lines, there was little fear that one bank could grow large enough to
present an undue concentration of power. The BHCA, therefore, was directed
at the multi-bank holding company which could, but for the BHCA, cover more
than one state and bypass the McFadden Act. For a discussion of the McFadden
Act's branching restrictions, see supra notes 47-64 and accompanying text.
373. See 111 CONG. REC. 20,541 (1965) (statement of Sen. Morse) ("[T]he
act places on bank holding companies some of the same restrictions placed on
banks.").
374. Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
607, § 101, 84 Stat. at 1760.
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posal to repeal the exemption for one-bank holding
companies .... After considering all of this testimony,
the committee came to the conclusion that there was no
substantial evidence of abuses occurring in one-bank
holding companies. Furthermore, the committee re-
ceived much testimony to the effect that repeal of the ex-
emption would make it more difficult for individuals to
continue to hold or to form small independent banks." 75
The Report shows that the Banking Committee utilized a cost-
benefit analysis.3 76 The Committee found that the benefits of the
one-bank exemption outweighed the detriments and conse-
quently proposed no corrective legislation.377 In addition, the
Committee found no abuses in the one-bank system.3 78
This lack of actual abuse did not prevent continued attempts
to bring one-bank holding companies within the regulatory
framework. The expressed concern still focused on the potential
for future abuse. In re-proposing such legislation in 1970, the
Senate Banking Committee, consistent with its earlier findings,
once again reported: "This step is being taken in order to guard
against the possiblefuture perpetration of abuses occasioned by a
company's unregulated control of a single bank."3 79 A Fed study
submitted to Congress in 1986, reviewed the history of the BHCA
and the combination of banking and commerce and made the
same point: "[T]he potential of the holding company device to un-
dermine the historic separation of banking and commerce.., was
375. S. REP. No. 1179, supra note 371, at 5, reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
2389; see also Amend the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956: Hearings on S. 2353, S.
2418 & H. R. 7371 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. 138 (1966) [hereinafter 1966 Hearings].
376. S. REP. No. 1179, supra note 371, at 5, reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
2389 (analyzing costs and benefits of making one-bank holding companies sub-
ject to regulation).
377. Id.; see also 1955 Hearings, supra note 67, at 13 (statement of Federal
Reserve Board Chairman William McChesney Martin) (cautioning that "further
regulation of bank holding companies should be kept to a minimum necessary to
meet whatever problems may exist in this field").
378. S. REP. No. 1179, supra note 371, at 5, reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
2389 ("[T]he committee came to the conclusion that there was no substantial
evidence of abuses occurring in one-bank holding companies."). As noted pre-
viously, abuses had not been uncovered for even the multi-bank holding compa-
nies when the BHCA was first considered. For a discussion of this lack of actual
abuse, see supra notes 358-67 and accompanying text.
379. S. REP. No. 1084, supra note 360, at 4, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5522 (emphasis added); see also 1969 Hearings, supra note 70, at 1205 (statement
of Rep. Brock of the House Banking Committee) (stating that "what we are talk-
ing about here is not demonstrated abuse").
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of such concern to the Congress that the restrictions of the Bank
Holding Company Act were deemed necessary. "380
Potential abuse is, of course, a legitimate concern. 38' Con-
gress is fully justified, having perceived a risk, in taking appropri-
ate action to prevent its occurrence. What exists with the BHCA,
however, is a lack of evidence of actual abuse despite prolonged
periods of unregulated banking and commerce activities, by all
bank holding companies prior to 1956 and by one-bank holding
companies prior to 1970. Admittedly, the size of bank holding
companies grew mainly after 1960, but it is that growth in size
that really concerned Congress, not the combination of banking
with commerce. 382
Actual abuses did not seem to exist in 1970 any more than
they had in 1966. This is not to say that purported actual abuses
were not reported to the Congress when the one-bank amend-
ments were considered. These "abuses," however, were those
suffered by competitors of banks who found themselves losing their
own business in the market. "As we see it," said one spokesman,"we are literally fighting for our lives." 383 Primarily, these com-
petitors were securities dealers, insurance agents, sellers of data
processing equipment and supporting software, travel agents, ac-
countants, income tax preparers and providers of courier serv-
ices. All of these had jousted, and some continue to joust, with
the banks and the bank holding companies before the regulatory
380. 1986 Hearings, supra note 173, at 398 (emphasis added).
381. See Corrigan supra note 17, at 7 (discussing risks associated with com-
mercial firms controlling banks).
382. For a discussion of the growth of bank holding companies, see infra
notes 406-13 and accompanying text.
383. 1969 Hearings, supra note 70, at 718 (statement of Morton White).
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agencies, 384 in the courts 385 and before Congress 386 with varying
degrees of success, continuously asserting violations by the bank-
ing system. The BHCA, however, was not enacted to protect
competitors.3 87 Moreover, the businesses that were considered
appropriate for BHCA protection did not report abuses. No alle-
gations of practices such as special favoritism to businesses within
the holding company or the denial of credit to businesses outside
the holding company were reported; all was, and continues to be,
speculation.
What did occur in 1970, as contrasted with 1966, and the ear-
lier years was the increasing congressional concern about the
rapid expansion of one-bank corporate agglomerations. Con-
gress remained concerned, however, with maintaining the benefit
to small independent banks as discussed in the 1966 committee
384. See, e.g., Citicorp, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 473 (1987) (adjudicating dispute
between bank holding company and securities industry competitors), aff'd, Se-
curities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 839 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988); Citicorp, 71 Fed. Res. Bull. 789 (1985) (adjudicat-
ing dispute regarding insurance activities of bank holding companies).
385. See, e.g., Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 468 U.S. 207,
214 (1984) (affirming Fed holding that authorized acquisition of nonbanking af-
filiate engaged in securities brokerage by bank holding company because securi-
ties brokerage is "closely related" to banking); American Ins. Ass'n v. Clarke,
865 F.2d 278, 281-82 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that national bank holding com-
pany proposal to offer municipal bond insurance was permissible because pro-
posed activity did not violate National Banking Act); Association of Data
Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Board of Governors, 745 F.2d 677, 689 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (considering question of whether data processing activities proposed by
bank holding company were "closely related to banking" and therefore permis-
sible); National Retailers Corp. v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 411 F. Supp. 308, 315 (D.
Ariz. 1976) (finding that national banking association could provide data
processing service to bank depositors unless the "performance of the data
processing service is not 'convenient or useful,' or does not bear a direct rela-
tionship to the bank's performance of any of the express powers specified in the
National Bank Act"), aff'd in part and dismissed in part, 604 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1979).
386. See, e.g., Bill Atkinson & Robert M. Garsson, Insurers Outlobbied Bankers,
AM. BANKER, Nov. 6, 1991, at 1 (discussing fight between insurance industry and
banking industry over omnibus banking bill).
387. Other laws, however, were enacted for the purpose of protecting com-
petitors. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988) (Sherman Act) ("Every contract ... or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States . . . is
declared to be illegal."); id. § 14 (Clayton Act) (forbidding sale or lease of goods
on agreement that purchaser or lessor not use competitor's goods). Certain tie-
ins between banking and insurance, one of the practices particularly objected to
by the insurance industry, are also made illegal. See 12 U.S.C. § 1972 (1988)
(prohibiting certain tying arrangements); see also Joseph C. Chapelle, Note, Sec-
tion 1972: Augmenting the Available Remedies for Plaintiffs Injured by Anticompetitive
Bank Conduct, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 706 (1985) (examining anticompetitive
statutory protections and interpreting § 106(b) of 1970 BHCA amendments).
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report.388 Indeed, Congress struggled in 1970 to accommodate
small banks and their holding companies. Grandfather provisions
were incorporated into the amendments to protect modestly sized
bank holding companies that were engaged in commerce. 38 9
Overall, however, the dominant factor that led to the 1970
amendment was the perceived risks resulting from the expansion
of some one-bank holding companies.3 90
The fear of the large banks, and not of the connection be-
tween banking and commerce, is evident in the following state-
ment of House Banking Committee Chairman Patman:
What chance will the small banks of the country have in
the future if the big banks in New York spread out over
the 50 States and take off the cream of the business in all
the States and different communities? What chance will
the moderate size bank and the little bank have?39'
Obviously Chairman Patman was not concerned about abuses
that might occur if banking combined with commerce or the risk
that a bank might favor its affiliates in commerce to the detriment
of competitors without bank connections. His concern was with
the size and geographic spread of banks irrespective of whether
this occurred through banks alone or through banks combined
with other businesses. Congress enacted the 1970 amendments
to include one-bank holding companies within the regulatory net
because the one-bank holding companies had grown large and
were growing larger, not because banking and commerce were
mixed.
388. See S. REP. No. 1179, supra note 371, at 5,reprited in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 2389.
389. S. REP. No. 1084, supra note 360, at 4-6.
390. The Senate Committee reported that, in 1966, only two of the 51
banks in the United States with deposits of over $1 billion were owned by one-
bank holding companies. Id. at 2-3. By 1970, this number had grown to 23. Id.
at 3.
The House.Banking Committee, considering the same legislation, reported:
In the last 3 years a significant number of banks in the United States
have converted to one bank holding company status. At the same time
there have been a number of instances where large nonbanking corpo-
rations have gained control of a single bank. Within the last 18 months
a substantial number of the largest banks in the country have also con-
verted to one-bank holding company status.
H.R. REP. No. 387, supra note 321, at 2.
391. 1969 Hearings, supra note 70, at 1105.
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4. Holding Company Systems in Commerce Today
Today, in spite of the 1970 BHCA amendments, there re-
main two significant areas where, without measurable abuse, bank
holding company systems unite banking and commerce under the
law. 392 This section discusses these areas.
a. Savings and Loan Holding Companies
Whether a savings and loan association is, strictly speaking, a
"bank" is a definitional question whose subtleties need not be
discussed. 393 Under statutes in 1980 and 1982, however, Con-
gress, subject to certain limitations, gave federal savings and loan
companies (S&Ls) broad powers, including those of accepting de-
mand deposits and making commercial loans.3 9 4 Since the stat-
utes' enactments, S&Ls have engaged in activities that, by any
definition, are the essence of banking.
The law regulating S&L holding companies limits the "com-
merce" activities in which they may engage. 395 Those limitations
do not apply, however, to an S&L holding company that controls
only one S&L. 396 That S&L holding company is free, as was the
392. Although two areas are significant for purposes of this discussion,
there are seven areas in which it is permissible for bank holding companies to
mix commerce and banking in the United States. These areas are:
1. "Nonbank banks" having federal deposit insurance but not falling
within the coverage of the Bank Holding Company Act;
2. State chartered nonmember banks;
3. State holding companies that are grandfathered as to certain
activities;
4. Foreign bank holding companies that own U.S. banks;
5. Overseas operations of U.S. banks and holding companies;
6. Edge corporations; and,
7. Unitary savings and loan holding companies.
See 1986 Hearings, supra note 173, at 386-87 (letter to Federal Reserve Board
Chairman Volcker from House Subcommittee Chairman Barnard).
393. Under the BHCA, an S&L, although meeting the preliminary defini-
tion of "bank" as an institution accepting demand deposits and making commer-
cial loans, is excluded from the definition as an insured institution. 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1841(c)(1)(B) & 1841(c)(2)(B) (1988).
394. See Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No.
97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.);
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.).
395. See 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(c)(1) (Supp. III 1991). This section prohibits
S&L holding companies from commencing "any business activity" other than
those exempted. Id. § 1467a(c)(1)(B). The exempted activities include insur-
ance, assets or properties management and acting as a trustee. Id.
§ 1467a(c)(2).
396. Id. § 1467a(c)(3)(A).
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one-commercial-bank holding company before the 1970 BHCA
amendments, to engage in commerce without restriction.
Thus, the one-S&L holding company has been free from re-
strictions upon its activities in commerce since the original S&L
holding company legislation was enacted in 1959.397 This is con-
sistent with the original purpose of the statute, "to promote and
preserve local management of savings and loan associations by
protecting them against encroachment by holding companies. ' 's98
At that time, however, federal S&Ls were not in "banking"-they
did not take demand deposits, make commercial loans or engage
in many of the other activities that define commercial banking.3 99
When those powers were given to the S&Ls in 1980,400 it was ap-
parently deemed unlikely that the new powers would create
problems regarding banking and commerce combinations within
the S&L industry. Therefore, the one-S&L holding company was
left and still remains free to engage in commerce.
b. Individual and Family Bank Owners
Individual and family-owned bank holding companies repre-
sent the other significant area where banking and commerce can
mix under the law. It was noted as early as 1950:
I daresay, without fear of successful contradiction, that
the most frequent instances of single domination or con-
trol over both banking and nonbanking interests in the
United States today exist among the individual owners of
relatively small unit banks who devote only a part of
their attention to the banking business, and the rest of it
to diverse other activities in which their ownership of a
bank is useful in the making of personal profits. Yet such
individuals are expressly exempted by the proposed bill
from any regulation of any kind.40 1
Throughout the history of the BHCA, and obviously before
397. Act of Sept. 23, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-374, 73 Stat. 691.
398. S. REP. No. 810, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1959), reprinted in 1959
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2883, 2883.
399. See Carl Felsenfeld, The Savings and Loan Crisis, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. S7,
S10 (1991) ("The federal S&L system was essentially restricted to making loans
on the security of first mortgages on the security of their borrower's homes.").
400. See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of
1980, §§ 401-409, 94 Stat. at 151-60 (allowing S&Ls to exercise many powers
associated with traditional banking).
401. 1950 Hearings, supra note 336, at 152-53 (statement of Samuel B. Stew-
art, counsel to Transamerica Corp.).
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its inception, an individual could own banks and simultaneously
engage in commerce without legal restrictions. In the early peri-
ods of American banking, stock in banks was typically in "even
distribution... among a considerable number of members of the
wealthy mercantile class." 4 0 2 It is likely that this class was not un-
mindful of the needs of their own separate enterprises.
Today, a bank holding company is limited under the BHCA
to a "company," defined as a "corporation, partnership, business
trust, association, or similar organization.- 4 0 3 Individual owners
of banks are excepted. A substantial number of today's smaller
banks exist within this structure.404 With an individual rather
than an entity as the bank owner, there is less fear of undue con-
centration of power. 40 5 As this Article has suggested, undue con-
centration of power is the real concern of Congress in dealing
with the BHCA. The connection of banking and commerce nev-
ertheless exists and, it appears, with no particular problem.
5. Modern Growth of Bank Holding Company Systems
Why, then, was there so little mixing of banking and com-
merce through corporate holding companies over the many years
when it was legal? The question, a perfectly obvious one, was
naturally asked in the congressional hearings. House Banking
Committee member Widnall asked Federal Reserve Board Gover-
nor Robertson on June 24, 1952: "Well if it has a tendency to
crush the smaller bank and absorb that bank, why hasn't there
been more marked progress in that direction over a period of 20
years?" 4 0 6 The answer, which I shall neither quote nor attempt to
summarize, can only be described as mush.
One approach to answering this question is that its underly-
402. 1 REDLICH, supra note 23, at 17.
403. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841(a)(1) & 1841 (b) (1988).
404. A proposal to make individual owners subject to BHCA restrictions
was introduced in the House by Representative Doug Barnard in 1991 as an
amendment to the Treasury proposals. The amendment would expand the
word "company" in § 2 of the BHCA to include individuals. The amendment
was opposed by the major banking trade groups, who asserted that "half of the
nation's 10,000 community banks would feel the negative impact." Jim
McTague, Individuals Face Tough Sledding as Bank Owners, AM. BANKER, Sept. 16,
1991, at 1.
405. But see CARTINHOUR, supra note 294, at 89 (commenting on unscrupu-
lous practices by individuals who own chain bank systems and favor their own
separate businesses). Despite reports such as this, these types of unregulated
chain bank systems remain legally in place while similar holding company sys-
tems with corporate ownership are tightly controlled by the BHCA.
406. 1952 Hearings, supra note 315, at 34.
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ing assumption is wrong; banking and commerce are massively
and inextricably combined. If one eliminates the extreme exam-
ples of commerce like manufacturing automobiles and cooking
hamburgers, everything that banks do-with the exception of tak-
ing deposits40 7 -is done by other businesses in all branches of
commerce. Loans, investment advice, credit card activities, the
movement of money, the sale of travelers checks and, of course,
securities activities and insurance are all examples of "banking"
activities performed by nonbank businesses. Nonbank institu-
tions such as finance companies, credit unions, insurance compa-
nies, mutual funds and even department stores actively compete
with banks in some or all of these bank functions.408 At the same
time that these institutions perform bank functions, they simulta-
neously engage in commerce.
One scholar of the banking scene has suggested that in the
earlier years of holding company evolution, the major banks were
careful not to stimulate bank holding companies unduly for
two reasons. First, the potential breadth of bank holding com-
pany activities would bring them into conflict with the major
banks. Second, if the idea caught on, other banks might form
holding company systems themselves that would offer new
competition. 409
Into the 1950s, there was no great movement into bank hold-
ing company structures. 410 Those holding companies that did ex-
ist were clearly interested in acquiring banks principally as a
method of expanding into areas that were not limited by the re-
407. Perhaps even deposit taking can be done by nonbanks. See, e.g., Letter
from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to Joseph Diamond
concerning the Merrill Lynch Cash Management Account 1 (July 13, 1977) (on
file with the Villanova Law Review) (concluding that proposed program involving
cash transfer to brokerage firm did not violate banking regulations); see also 42
Op. Att'y Gen. 273 (1981) (finding that balances in Merrill Lynch Cash Manage-
ment accounts consisting of proceeds from securities margin accounts, money
market funds and credit card accounts were not "deposits").
408. The invention by investment bankers of money market funds in the
late 1970s is an example of a function that smacks of banking. Investments with
brokers can, through the ingenious interrelationship of money market funds
with banks, be accessed with bank checks and used for credit card purchases.
Although these actions by the investment banking community have not resulted
in their direct supervision by banking authorities, they have been closely scruti-
nized to see whether such regulation might not be appropriate. See Letter from
the Board of Governors to Joseph Diamond, supra note 407 (dealing with Mer-
rill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith fund).
409. FISCHER, supra note 38, at 78.
410. See Savage, supra note 293, at 39-40 (observing that despite broad defi-
nition of what constituted bank holding company, there were only 46 holding
companies nationwide by 1954).
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strictive McFadden Act branching laws and comparable state leg-
islation. The ability to enter into "commerce" was not a
significant factor.
The major growth in bank holding companies, which hap-
pened after 1960, occurred for various economic reasons. First,
the improvements in electronic technology played a central role
in bank holding company growth because the technology in-
creased the variety of business activities available to banks and
facilitated interfacing those activities with existing business equip-
ment.4 1' Second, a long term flattening of available markets for
traditional bank offerings stimulated a quest for new markets in
new areas.4 12 Congress experienced a concern, natural in a body
well entrenched in the historic American support of the small
bank, about the growing size of these institutions. Insofar as the
combination of banking and commerce is concerned, however,
there is no sign that the attitude of Congress changed from 1956,
when banking and commerce could clearly combine, to 1970,
when a higher level of Fed supervision was introduced. The rhet-
oric of 1956 was repeated in 1970; so, it would seem, was the
underlying philosophy.413
6. The Nonbank Bank
Congress did draw its actions closer to its rhetoric in 1987
when it disposed of the "nonbank bank." Prior to the Competitive
Equality Banking Act of 1987,414 "bank" was defined in the BHCA
as an institution that
(1) accepts deposits that the depositor has a legal right
to withdraw on demand, and
(2) engages in the business of making commercial
loans. 415
Thus, prior to 1987, it was possible for institutions to engage
in the commercial banking business and refrain from either the
411. Id. at 54, 57.
412. See Rose, supra note 166, at 140 (indicating that although such activi-
ties increase holding company flexibility, they also may increase bank risk).
413. For examples of the congressional rhetoric, and how it stays the same
over time, see H.R. REP. No. 387, supra note 321, at 2; H.R. REP. No. 1416, supra
note 100, at 3, reprinted in 1960 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1996; S. REP. No. 1095, supra
note 4, at 1-2, reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2482-83.
414. Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552 (codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.).
415. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(1) (1982) (emphasis added) (amended by the
Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, § 101(a)(l), 101 Stat. 552, 554).
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business of accepting demand deposits or the business of making
commercial loans, and thus not be defined as a bank under the
BHCA. Because such an institution was still a chartered bank, 416
it was dubbed the "nonbank bank."'417
The Fed perceived the nonbank bank as a legal loophole that
permitted banking institutions to engage in commerce because
they were not banks under the BHCA and were therefore, not
covered by the BHCA's restrictions on combinations of banking
and commerce. 418 Others argued that the nonbank bank could
only be a small bank because either it could not issue demand
deposits or it could not make commercial loans, and banks of ap-
preciable size must be able to perform both activities. This argu-
ment maintained that Congress did not intend the BHCA to reach
banks that stayed inconsequential by their natures. Therefore,
the nonbank bank-far from being a legal loophole-was within
the intent of the BHCA framers. 41 9
In 1987, Congress definitively sided with the Fed and legis-
lated the nonbank bank out of existence by redefining a BHCA
"bank." 420 In taking this action, Congress reiterated some of its
earlier positions. First, Congress failed to distinguish between a
bank and a bank holding company system. 421 In so doing, Congress
still did not acknowledge the effects of the separation present be-
tween the chartered, insured bank and its parent holding com-
pany. The legislators seemed uninterested in the differences
between the bank risks that might occur if the bank itself engaged
416. The charter could be obtained under either state or federal law.
417. See Board of Governors v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 374
(1986) ("Rather than defining'bank' as an institution that offers the functional
equivalent of banking services, however, Congress defined with specificity cer-
tain transactions that constitute banking subject to regulation.").
418. See Carl Felsenfeld, Nonbank Banks-An Issue in Need of a Policy, 41 Bus.
LAw. 99, 100 (1985) (describing Fed's attempts to curtail ability of "banks" to
use this device).
419. See id. at 120-22 (arguing that nonbank banks are both within contem-
plation of BHCA and important in banking system because nonbank banks do
not present same risks as commercial lending institutions).
420. Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, § 101(a), 101 Stat. at 554.
Section 101(c) of the Act provides a grandfather clause for already existing non-
bank banks and some of them live on. It is difficult to find reason behind Con-
gress' decision to eliminate nonbank banks. Consumer thrifts, like S&Ls, are
analogous to banks without commercial loan operations. These thrifts, how-
ever, are not banks and can exist in a one-bank holding company setting with
their parent companies engaged fully in any line of commerce. For a discussion
of S&L holding companies, see supra notes 393-400 and accompanying text.
421. See S. REP. No. 19, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. 489, 498 ("Most corporations are free to engage in any lawful
business; banks, by contrast, are limited to the business of banking.").
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in commerce and the bank risks if the bank's parent holding com-
pany engaged in commerce. Second, despite over half a century
of dealing with various combinations of banking and commerce,
Congress still did not find any actual abuse. Congress once again
was concerned with potential risk that would occur, this time
through the new institutional framework: "[The nonbank bank]
raises the risk that banks' credit decisions will be based not on
economic merit but on the business strategies of their corporate
parents." 422
The mix of the nonbank bank structure was essentially new to
Congress. It involved a necessarily small bank combined with a
company that knew no size limit. This suggests that Congress was
really concerned with the growth of large organizations in bank-
ing, and not the mixture of banking and commerce. "The impetus
for nonbank banks stems primarily from large diversified compa-
nies wanting to invade the banking business while avoiding the
regulatory restraints of the Bank Holding Company Act." 423 If it
was not size that concerned Congress, but rather the entry by
small banks into commerce, Congress' action in outlawing the
nonbank bank represents a strangely puristic adherence to the
doctrine that banking and commerce should be kept separate. 424
7. Today-The Treasury Proposal
Under the BHCA, before a bank holding company may en-
gage in an activity through a company that is not a bank it gener-
ally must satisfy the Fed that it has met the two standards
established by section 4(c)(8): that the activity is "closely related
to banking or managing or controlling banks" 425 and that it also
422. Id. at 8, reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 498.
423. Id. at 6, reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 496. One of the first compa-
nies to take advantage of the nonbank bank format was Gulf & Western. See
Letter from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to Robert C.
Zimmer, counsel for Gulf & Western (Mar. 11, 1981) (on file with the Villanova
Law Review) (describing Fed approval of nonbank so long as bank continued to
refrain from engaging in commercial loan activities).
424. For an example of this puristic adherence to separation, see Competi-
tive Equality Banking Act of 1987, § 10 1(c), 101 Stat. at 557-64 (grandfathering
existing nonbank banks, but limiting their future asset increases to 7% per year).
425. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1988). In applying this test, the Fed usually
follows a set of rules laid down in National Courier Ass'n v. Board of Governors. See
National Courier Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 516 F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
The court identified three factors that can be used to determine whether an ac-
tivity is closely related to banking:
1. Banks generally have in fact provided the proposed services;
2. Banks generally provide services that are operationally or function-
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is a "proper incident thereto." 426 The burden of meeting these
conditions precedent to doing business has weighed heavily upon
the banking community since 1970, when the tests were intro-
duced into law. It is not surprising, therefore, that proposals to
modify the burdens have been introduced from time to time. By
and large, the Treasury Department has taken the lead in recom-
mending these BHCA changes. It proposed in 1981, for exam-
ple, removing Fed approval as a condition precedent to many
nonbank financial activities within a holding company struc-
ture.427 Congress rejected this approach. Other proposals to
lighten the BHCA burden followed with little success. 428
In 1991, the Treasury Department proposed revisions to the
BHCA that would allow commerce and banking to coexist in a
holding company system. 429 This Article maintains that there has
been no tradition of keeping banking and commerce separate
when the relationship is through holding companies. The current
idea that banking and commerce relate through such a system is
an evolution out of a past in which holding companies have com-
bined banking and commerce. Only in recent years have holding
companies been somewhat restrained from the combination. The
Treasury Department's approach is harmonious with this ration-
ale. Its 1991 proposal recommends that industrial firms be per-
ally so similar to the proposed services as to equip them particularly
well to provide the proposed service; and
3. Banks generally provide services that are so integrally related to the
proposed services as to require their provision in a specialized form.
Id. at 1237.
426. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8); see also D.H. Baldwin Co., 63 Fed. Res. Bull.
280, 281-82 (1977) (clarifying that both "closely related" and "proper incident"
tests are required). The proper incident test requires a determination by the
Board that the activity by a bank holding company can be expected to result in
public benefits that outweigh potential adverse effects. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8).
The Fed has used considerable flexibility in its application of the "proper inci-
dent" test. Compare Baldwin, 63 Fed. Res. Bull. at 286-87 (holding proper inci-
dent test not satisfied) with Citicorp, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 656, 658 (1982) (holding
proper incident test satisfied in factual situation similar to Baldwin).
427. Jay Rosenstein, Treasury Proposes Legislation to Greatly Expand Bank Hold-
ing Company Services, AM. BANKER, Nov. 18, 1981, at 1 (indicating that in lieu of
Fed approval on case-by-case basis, Fed should establish broad list of types of
"financial services that bank holding companies could offer").
428. See LITAN, supra note 183, at 49-50 (describing rejected proposals that
would have given bank holding companies ability to perform broad range of
financial activities through separate corporate subsidiaries).
429. In addition to recommending a banking-commerce mixture in holding
companies, the Treasury Department's proposal also recommended nationwide
banking through both bank branching and holding companies systems. For a
discussion of these aspects of the 1991 Treasury Department's proposals, see
supra notes 153-64 and accompanying text.
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mitted to own bank holding companies: "The time is right to
permit broader combinations of banking and commerce. Com-
mercial companies have been an important source of capital,
strength, management expertise, and strategic direction for a
broad range of non-banking financial companies as well as thrift
institutions." 43 0
Significantly, for the first time, in the Treasury Department's
proposal, a major bank regulator looked at the actualities of
abuse rather than at the potential for abuse. The latter has been
the approach taken throughout BHCA consideration and re-
view. 43 1 In surveying the experience of permissible combinations
of commerce and financial institutions, the Treasury Department
stated: "Indeed, none of the hypothetical problems of combining
banking and commerce has been evident among the commercial
companies that currently own depository institutions (thrifts,
nonbank banks, and industrial banks). 43
The Treasury Department proposed the combination of
banking and commerce by creating a new form of holding com-
pany called a "diversified holding company" (read General Mo-
tors or Sears-Roebuck). 433 A diversified holding company could
engage in businesses prohibited to ordinary bank holding compa-
nies (read Citicorp or BankAmerica) and could, subject to qualifi-
cations434 not germane to this Article, acquire such ordinary bank
holding companies (read General Motors can acquire Citicorp
without curtailing the businesses of either).43 5
This approach separates the diversified bank holding com-
pany from the bank by requiring that they retain the traditional
430. Modernizing the Financial System, supra note 154, at 56; see also S. 713,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 201-202 (1991) (proposing as part of Treasury bill that
industrial firms be allowed to own bank holding companies).
431. For a discussion of the focus on potential abuse throughout the con-
sideration of the BHCA, see supra notes 358-67 and accompanying text. As con-
trasted with the specters of abuse that resulted in the BHCA, it has been
observed that "throughout the savings and loan debacle, not a single thrift that
was a subsidiary of a commercial firm failed." 1991 Hearings, supra note 174, at
86-94 (statement of Peter J. Wallison).
432. Modernizing the Financial System, supra note 154, at 56-57. For a discus-
sion of savings and loan holding companies, see supra notes 393- 400 and accom-
panying text. For a discussion of nonbank banks, see supra notes 414-24 and
accompanying text. An industrial bank is a limited powers state institution that
can take deposits and operates principally a consumer loan business.
433. S. 713, § 201(a)(1)(B). S. 713 is the bill introduced to Congress by the
Treasury Department that includes the concepts of the Treasury Department's
proposal in legislative form.
434. Id. at § 203 (imposing special capital requirements).
435. Id.
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bank holding company layer between them. The proposal does
not permit a business in a nonfinancial area of commerce to own a
bank directly. Only a bank holding company can directly own a
bank. 43 6 The proposal also creates some additional barriers be-
tween the diversified bank holding company and the bank, the
most significant of which is a strengthened set of "firewalls." 43 7
The term "firewalls" describes legally imposed separations be-
tween business activities. Even with these "firewalls," the Treas-
ury Department's proposal essentially breaks the wall imposed by
the BHCA between banks and commerce.
The proposed combination of banking and commerce was
approved by the House Banking Committee, 43s with dissent.439 It
was, however, disapproved by the Senate Banking Committee. 440
The proposal was not enacted in either house.44 ' As with the Ad-
ministration's proposals on interstate banking, its reintroduction
has been proposed.442
F. Conclusion on the Traditions of Banking and Commerce
Although the evidence is less than conclusive, it is fair to say
that the United States has a tradition that banks themselves
should not be in commerce. As to bank holding companies and
the relationship of their bank and nonbank subsidiaries, it is diffi-
cult to conclude that such a tradition exists. Bank holding compa-
nies were not introduced in any number until the twentieth
century, and at least some of the early holding companies were
engaged in commerce. When federal bank holding company leg-
islation was first considered in 1931, four bills were introduced.
None of them suggested that holding companies should be sepa-
436. Id. This type of bank holding company ownership is consistent with a
concept discussed by Litan. See LITAN, supra note 183, at 148. The Treasury
proposal, however, does not go as far as Litan, who recommended that banks
perform core banking business and that businesses in the nonbank holding com-
pany structure conduct the remaining operations. Id.
437. See S. 713, § 204 (describing barriers placed between bank and non-
bank portions of diversified holding company).
438. H.R. REP. No. 157, supra note 161, at 1. For a discussion of the House
approval of the Treasury Department's proposals on branching, see supra note
161 and accompanying text.
439. Congressman Bruce F. Vento criticized the proposal as allowing banks
to enter into "riskier activities with a likely greater financial exposure to the
American taxpayer." H.R. REP. No. 157, supra note 161, at 383.
440. S. REP. No. 167, supra note 126, at 150-51.
441. For a discussion of the proposal's failure in both Houses of Congress,
see supra note 163 and accompanying text.
442. For a discussion of suggestions made to reintroduce the Treasury De-
partment's proposal, see supra note 164 and accompanying text.
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rated from commerce.443
Situations existing today combine commerce both with banks
and with other institutions that are almost carbon copies of banks.
These are generally small organizations, which supports the con-
clusion that Congress' true concern is with undue size-not with
the combination of banking and commerce. As noted earlier,
commerce in a bank holding company is separated from banking.
History illustrates that within the U.S. tradition this degree of
separation is sufficient.
Whether banking and commerce should be separate but re-
lated through the holding company structure and, if so, under
what conditions of separation, can best be described as a continu-
ing issue, not a debate that history has settled. The Treasury De-
partment has taken one side; the Congress, led by the Federal
Reserve Board, has most recently taken the other. There should
be an ongoing open dialogue on whether the BHCA serves a pub-
lic purpose in sustaining the separation.
IV. CONTINUING BANK REGULATION
A. Introduction
Eliminating the BHCA would leave the great bulk of bank
regulation intact. The regulations that treat banks as special insti-
tutions and those that regulate banks along with the remainder of
U.S. business would be left undisturbed. Much of this body of law
deals with the kinds of problems regularly identified as requiring
the BHCA for resolution. Therefore, even without the BHCA,
the size of banks and their concentration in the marketplace will
continue to be monitored as will the relationship of banks with
their affiliates. 444 The following sections survey that other body
of law.
443. For a discussion of the four 1931 bills, see CARTINHOUR, supra note
294, at 189-91.
444. Professor Clark made this monitoring point when he considered the
usefulness of the BHCA. See Robert C. Clark, The Regulation of Financial Holding
Companies, 92 HARV. L. REV. 789 (1979) (arguing for strengthened bank holding
company regulation to ensure financial stability of holding companies). Profes-
sor Clark asserted that the goal of separating financial holding companies from
other business is tied to antitrust policies and that the goal could be advanced
"by general antitrust regulatory techniques and does not justify very much spe-
cial legislation directed at financial holding companies." Id. at 791. Professor
Clark further noted "that important features of existing law serve no legitimate
purpose and should be abolished." Id.
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B. Sections 23.4, 23B and Other Firewalls
Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 445 enacted as part of
the Banking Act of 1933, regulates certain transactions between a
bank446 and its affiliates. It requires that loans447 from a bank to
its nonbank affiliates448 be collateralized at a percentage between
100 and 130%-a heavy requirement that is not imposed on
loans to unaffiliated third parties.449 Section 23B450 imposes a
more generalized duty that loans to, and many other transactions
with, affiliates be on terms substantially comparable to such trans-
actions with nonaffiliated companies. 45' Section 23B was added
to the Federal Reserve Act in 1987 and, consequently, will not be
part of the historical discussion that follows.
One recent observer has written that in 1933 a primary pur-
pose behind section 23A was "[tlo separate as far as possible na-
tional and member banks from affiliates of all kinds." 452 With this
stated purpose, it is curious that section 23A received so little at-
tention during the gestation of the BHCA. This suggests that a
more accurate understanding of the BHCA's effects would have
reduced the perceived need for it, and that Congress was virtually
steamrollered into approving the BHCA concept. Notably, the
existing protections of section 23A were discussed in the 1950
Hearings by one of the few BHCA opponents, who suggested that
if section 23A were deemed to be inadequate, it could be
strengthened. 453 An opponent to the BHCA's amendment in
445. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 23A, 48 Stat. 162, 183 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 371c (1988)).
446. See FDIC Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, § 306(k),
105 Stat. 2236, 2359 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1828(j) (Supp. III 1991)) (provid-
ing that §§ 23A & 23B apply to every nonmember insured bank).
447. 12 U.S.C. § 371c-1(a)(2) (stating that §§ 23A and 23B apply to set of
transactions basically including loans and purchases of assets).
448. 12 U.S.C. § 371c(d) (excluding loans to bank affiliates from collateral-
ization requirement).
449. 12 U.S.C. § 371c(c). The collateral rule for loans to nonbank affiliates
has been described as "a chilling requirement that many bankers would regard
as a virtual prohibition on loans to affiliates." Clark, supra note 444, at 803.
450. Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86,§ 102(a), 101 Stat. 552, 564 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 371c-1).
451. 12 U.S.C. § 371c-1(a).
452. Veryl V. Miles, Banking Affiliate Regulation Under Section 23A of the Federal
Reserve Act, 105 BANKING L.J. 476, 481 (1988). As noted, § 23A now also applies
to nonmember banks. FDIC Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242,
§ 306(k), 105 Stat. at 2236. Although Professor Miles provided a thorough anal-
ysis of the regulatory mechanisms and the role of § 23A, she did not discuss the
BHCA.
453. 1950 Hearings, supra note 336, at 152 (statement of Samuel B. Stewart,
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1966 made a similar point.4 54
The relationship of section 23A to the BHCA has been insuf-
ficiently explored. The major congressional reports on each of
the statutes make no mention of the other.455 The joint congres-
sional report developed when the BHCA was adopted in 1956
does not indicate that section 23A is any part of the BHCA's his-
tory.4 5 6 Section 23A's restraining effect upon the connection of
banking with commerce could be instructive should the BHCA be
reviewed. This Article previously commented on the absence of
actual abuses throughout the history of the BHCA.457 Section
23A may have played a useful role in this absence of abuse.
Section 23A, while the dominant firewall, is not the only one.
Through the years, bank regulators have established others as
needed. Examples include the firewalls (also called Chinese
walls) that were: 1) created by the Comptroller of the Currency in
separating lending from trust activities in national banks;458 2) es-
tablished by the FDIC in authorizing nonmember state banks to
set up underwriting affiliates; 459 and 3) established by the Fed in
administering the Glass-Steagall Act.4 60 In its 1991 proposal, the
Treasury Department also proposed new firewalls to keep bank-
counsel for Transamerica Corp.). Mr. Stewart added: "I will observe that I see
no evidence that [§ 23A's provisions] are inadequate." Id.
454. 1966 Hearings, supra note 375, at 139 (statement by Oliver H. Hughes
on behalf of several smaller banks).
455. For legislative reports on the BHCA, see, e.g., S. REP. No. 1095, supra
note 4, at 1, reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2482; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1747,
supra note 144, at 1, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5561. For a report on
§ 23A, see, e.g., S. CONF. REP. No. 641, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), reprinted in
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3054. In 1966, § 23A was amended in various respects to
conform to the newly enacted BHCA amendments. See S. REP. No. 1179, supra
note 371, at 11-12, reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2395-96; Act ofJuly 1, 1966,
Pub. L. No. 89-485, §§ 12(a), 13(h), 80 Stat. 236, 241, 243 (amending § 23A to
allow activities of bank holding companies as "affiliates" to be covered by
BHCA).
456. See S. REP. No. 1095, supra note 4, at 3-5, reprinted in 1956
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2484-86 (making no mention of § 23A).
457. For a discussion of the lack of actual abuse in banking-commerce mix-
tures, see supra notes 358-67 and accompanying text.
458. 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(2)(d) (1992) (providing that bank board must develop
and enforce policies and procedures that maintain appropriate separation of
trust department activities from other bank activities).
459. 12 C.F.R. § 337.4 (1992) (restricting ability of insured nonmember
banks to extend credit or make loans to investment company involved with
bank's subsidiaries or affiliates).
460. See, e.g., Citicorp, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 473, 478-79 (1987) (identifying"principal or substantial activity" limitation on impermissible investment activ-
ity, among others, as Fed-imposed firewall), aff'd, Securities Indus. Ass'n v.
Board of Governors, 839 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1059
(1988).
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ing sufficiently separate from commerce. 46 1 As prudence war-
rants, even without the BHCA, the general rule-making authority
of federal and state bank regulators is sufficient to add additional
firewalls as needed.
C. General Bank Regulation
It would be almost comical to suggest that the repeal of the
BHCA would leave banks, including their relationships with their
nonbank affiliates, as unregulated businesses. A vast body of stat-
utes, regulations, orders, cases and tradition would remain in
place. 46 2
For example, the chartering provisions under both federal
and state law limit what banks can do. These provisions include
restrictions on the ability of banks to open new branches. 463 Both
federal and state banks are subject to "convenience and advan-
tage" (C&A) requirements which have the effect of protecting ex-
isting banks from new competition. 464 The new bank or branch
must prove that it will benefit the community; undue or illicit
methods of competition are inconsistent with this requirement. A
bank making loans to sweetheart companies rather than to other
needy applicants is not satisfying its communal duty. 46 5 Current
law construes C&A, not as a one-shot test to be satisfied in order
to get a charter or branch, but as an ongoing commitment. 466
Federal and state chartering provisions also provide the re-
sponsible agencies with broad investigative and regulatory pow-
461. Modernizing the Financial System, supra note 154, at 57.
462. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-35.8 (1992) (regulations of Comptroller of
the Currency applicable to national banks); id. §§ 201.1-281.2 (regulations of
Federal Reserve System applicable generally to member banks but also occa-
sionally to other financial institutions); id. §§ 303.0-360.2 (regulations of FDIC
applicable to federally insured bank and thrift institutions).
463. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1828(d) (1988) (regulating opening of bank
branches); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 29 (McKinney 1990) (same).
464. For a discussion of the C&A requirements, see supra notes 82-86 and
accompanying text.
465. Under § 3(c) of the BHCA, the Fed is directed to factor in the C&A
requirements in evaluating the acceptability of bank acquisitions. BHCA, ch.
240, § 3(c), 70 Stat. 133, 135 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (1988)).
There is confusion engendered by this standard because it was created for one
purpose and applied in another. See, e.g., Mercantile Texas Corp. v. Board of
Governors, 638 F.2d 1255, 1262 (5th Cir. 1981) ("The [BHCA] twice uses the
same term, 'convenience and needs' only a few lines apart. The term is first used
to state circumstances that may outweigh even Clayton Act anticompetitive ef-
fects. It is next used to state a criterion to be applied 'in every case.' ").
466. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 2901(a)(3) (1988) ("[Rlegulated financial institu-tions have continuing and affirmative obligations to help meet the credit needs
of the local communities in which they are chartered.").
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ers. The Fed has additional authority to regulate member banks.
Major congressional enactments in 1989467 and 1991468 have ad-
ded to the range of regulatory restrictions and also to the regula-
tors' enforcement powers. Finally, the FDIC has regulatory
authority over insured banks, whether or not these banks are
members of the Federal Reserve System. 469 Overall, the bank
regulators have extensive and continuing powers of examination.
As the Supreme Court noted:
But perhaps the most effective weapon of federal regula-
tion of banking is the broad visitatorial power of federal
bank examiners. Whenever the agencies deem it neces-
sary, they may order "a thorough examination of all the
affairs of the bank," whether it be a member of the FRS
or a nonmember insured bank. Such examinations are
frequent and intensive.470
When transactions are more closely related to the BHCA, the
Bank Merger Act 47' applies Clayton Act and Sherman Act anti-
trust standards to insured bank consolidations and mergers. Sim-
ilar standards are applied by the FDIC to changes in the control
of insured banks. 472 Depending upon the type of bank involved,
467. The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of
1989 (FIRREA), Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. §§ 1811-1834(b) (Supp. III 1991)). FIRREA deals with "concern with
reform of the system of federal regulation of depository institutions, and partic-
ularly of savings institutions." Michael P. Malloy, Nothing to Fear But FIRREA
Itself Revising and Reshaping the Enforcement Process of Federal Bank Regulation, 50
OHIO ST. L.J. 1117, 1118 (1989).
468. FDIC Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236
(codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). In addition to its assault on the
dual banking system, the Act requires each appropriate federal banking agency
to prescribe standards relating to internal controls and audit systems, loan docu-
mentations, credit underwriting, interest rate exposure and compensation for
executive officers, employees, directors and principal shareholders. Id.
When considering the federal deposit insurance system in this regard,
§ 1818(a) and § 1818(b) are of particular note. The former empowers the FDIC
to withdraw insurance from a bank conducting "unsafe or unsound" practices.
12 U.S.C. § 1818(a)(2) (Supp. III 1991). The latter is a roughly parallel provi-
sion directing the other federal regulators to take their own action upon their
perception of such practices. Id. § 1818(b)(1).
469. For a discussion of some aspects of the FDIC's regulatory authority,
see supra notes 243-44 & 254-55 and accompanying text.
470. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 329 (1963) (ci-
tations omitted).
471. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
472. Change in Bank Control Act of 1978, tit. VI, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92
Stat. 3683 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1817(j) (1988)). Section 17 of
the Act excludes transactions subject to the BHCA and would, of course, include
such transactions if the BHCA were repealed. 12 U.S.C. § 1817(j)(17).
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the appropriate federal agency must perform some type of anti-
trust evaluation prior to approving the acquisition. Capital stan-
dards imposed by federal regulators also limit the operations of
banks and their ability to acquire other businesses. 473 State re-
views of mergers and acquisitions exist. 4 74 Finally, if a bank con-
siders entry into certain specialized businesses that have
traditionally been considered on their own merits, the bank may
find such businesses to be governed by special legislation. 475 De-
bate on the propriety of mixing banking and these other busi-
nesses has, and may continue to have, its own special life.
One perceptive commentator noted that as banks are permit-
ted, either directly or through their affiliates, to enter into other
fields-and as other businesses are permitted to enter into func-
tions that smack of banking-the watchful eye of government is
necessarily broadened to survey these additional areas.476 Super-
vision becomes more pervasive without the need to enact new
laws or regulations because an expanding scope of activities be-
comes subject to the "imposition of reserve requirements, de-
posit insurance, access to Federal Reserve services that
accompanies these restrictions, and all the related regulations
that are now viewed as necessary to protect the deposit fund." 477
The concern that will naturally be felt when repeal of the
BHCA is even considered may be tempered with some relief
stemming from the existence of this vast regulatory structure. 478
473. These capital standards are created jointly by the Comptroller of the
Currency, 12 C.F.R. §§ 3.1-.21 (1992); the Federal Reserve, id. part.225 app. A;
and the FDIC, id. §§ 325.1-.6. See 53 Fed. Reg. 8550 (1988) (proposing adop-
tion of uniform capital requirements "developed jointly ... by supervisory au-
thorities from 12 major industrial countries").
474. See MICHAEL P. MALLOY, THE CORPORATE LAW OF BANKS § 9.4 (1951 &
Supp. 1991) (surveying state laws regulating bank mergers and acquisitions).
475. For example, sections of the Glass-Steagall Act exemplified a congres-
sional attitude that certain combinations of commercial banking and investment
banking should be prohibited. See Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, §§ 5(c), 16, 20,
21 & 32, 48 Stat. 162, 164, 184, 188-89 & 194 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 24(7), 78, 335 & 377-378 (1988)). Today, the specialized businesses most
frequently at issue are securities operations and insurance. Insurance restric-
tions have been injected into the BHCA but could easily be covered by separate
legislation should the BHCA disappear. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1988).
476. Shull, supra note 184, at 276.
477. Id.
478. One must wonder about the utility of the continuing proliferation of
laws. A bank problem is regularly met with new laws that are designed for yes-
terday's issues and are of questionable value tomorrow. This approach seems to
be more widely accepted than the possibility of utilizing the existing laws more
efficiently. The S&L crisis, the most recent example of this form of behavior,
was met with the massive FIRREA legislation. Ultimately, particularly in areas of
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In no way would banks be left to the play of the free market.
D. Banking Crimes
The deterrent effects of an established body of criminal law
also provides continuing protection to bank operations. As one
commentator observed:
Banks enjoy greater protection under federal criminal
statutes than do any other commercial enterprises.
Among the most important criminal provisions applying
to banks are those that proscribe wrongdoing by insid-
ers: bank officers, directors, employees and agents. 479
This same protection extends to the banking activities of bank
holding companies and will continue to do so if the BHCA
disappears.
E. The Antitrust Laws
1. Core Laws
It is well established that, despite the "extensive blanket of
state and federal regulation of commercial banking, much of
which is aimed at limiting competition," 480 the United States'
core antitrust statutes (the Sherman and Clayton Acts) apply to
banks. 48 1 There is respectable opinion that "existing antitrust
laws are fully adequate to guard against anticompetitive mergers
or acquisitions, or other anticompetitive activity, in the banking
industry." 482 A proposal to remove the BHCA, however, is not a
supervision, it is individuals who make the difference. Even with a law in place,
the results may be unsatisfactory. See Theodore J. Jacobs, Send In the Reserve,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1991, at A19 (discussing supervision of foreign banks in
light of Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) scandal).
479. Bruce A. Green, After the Fall The Criminal Law Enforcement Response to
the S&L Crisis, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. S155, S157 (1991) (surveying bank criminal
laws and their sources).
480. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 375 (1963)
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
481. Id. at 323-24; Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors, 206 F.2d
163, 165-66 (3d Cir.) (applying Clayton Act antitrust restrictions to banks), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 901 (1953).
482. Rill Says No Change in Law Is Necessary to Address Megamergers, BANKING
POL'y REP., Oct. 21, 1991, at 5 (reporting statement of James F. Rill, Assistant
Attorney General in charge of the Justice Department's Antitrust Division). The
Justice Department's antitrust enforcement standards are documented and peri-
odically revised. The most recent version was published in 1992. Merger Guide-
lines, supra note 138, at 20,569; see also 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,101-
13,103 (containing 1968, 1982 and 1984 versions ofJustice Department merger
guidelines).
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suggestion that only the Sherman and Clayton Acts would impose
antitrust limitations on banks. The other bank laws and regula-
tions would continue in effect.483
Whether the antitrust laws are sufficient to curb bank abuse
that is otherwise dealt with by the BHCA has been disputed. One
relatively early opinion suggested that illicit bank behavior is "al-
most impossible to detect and prove in a court of law" and, con-
sequently, explicit legislation, like the BHCA, which foreclosed
banks from other fields was desirable.48 4 In contrast, a former
Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust later opined that
bank antitrust problems within the BHCA sphere are simply tradi-
tional antitrust issues that can be dealt with by those laws.485 He
was countered by a then current Attorney General for Antitrust
who believed the BHCA was essential to keep banks separate
from commerce.486 Because these last two views were expressed
in 1969 and 1970, one must assess current antitrust laws to ana-
lyze what view is valid today.4 7
There is a high degree of flexibility in the antitrust laws. One
of the functions of the antitrust laws is to adapt their application
to the particular industry under consideration and to the particu-
lar markets within which the industry operates. 488 The general
483. For a discussion of other antitrust limitations in banking laws, see
supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
484. 1969 Hearings, supra note 70, at 738 (statement of Robert Pitofsky).
Professor Pitofsky, later Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, was writ-
ing on behalf of the Independent Insurance Agents Association. Id. at 734.
485. Robert A. Hammond, Antitrust Laws Sufficient to Limit Acquisitions By One-
Bank MCs, AM. BANKER, May 12, 1970, reprinted in One-Bank Holding Company Leg-
islation of 1970: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 247 (1970) [hereinafter 1970 Hearings]. In a later statement at
the same hearings, Mr. Hammond commented that for effective antitrust super-
vision over bank holding companies, the market would have to be redefined to
include more than the line of commerce consisting of a "cluster of products,"
such as checking accounts and trust administration, "denoted by the term 'com-
mercial banking.' " Id. at 873-74. As banking changes its nature, this process is
under way. See, e.g., Republic of Texas Corp. v. Board of Governors, 649 F.2d
1026, 1046 (5th Cir. 1981) (affirming Fed's refusal to redefine product market to
include thrifts when considering anticompetitive effects of bank acquisition).
486. See 1970 Hearings, supra note 485, at 238 (statement of Richard W. Mc-
Laren) (cautioning against wholesale elimination of bank holding company regu-
lations). This Article proposes a more searching investigation into the antitrust
issues raised by Mr. Hammond and Mr. McClaren.
487. The BHCA imposes standards of competition even more severe than
those in the Sherman and Clayton Acts. See Dibidale of Louisiana, Inc. v. Ameri-
can Bank & Trust Co., 916 F.2d 300, 305 (5th Cir. 1990) ("[A]nti-tying provi-
sions [of the BHCA] were intended to regulate conditional transactions in the
extension of credit by banks more stringently than had the Supreme Court
under the general antitrust statutes."), modified, 941 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1991).
488. See Merger Guidelines, supra note 138, at 20,571 ("The analytic process
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approach of the antitrust laws towards a merger or consolidation
of the sort that currently requires preapproval under the BHCA is
to accept the industry in its existing form as the norm and then to
establish the effects of the merger or acquisition in terms of its
effects on that norm. The net effect is the antitrust laws' disposi-
tion in favor of the existing structure.
The Justice Department has the power under existing law to
challenge banking mergers and acquisitions for violation of the
antitrust laws even when the Fed has first found the BHCA's anti-
trust tests satisfied. 48 9 For example, in December 1990, the Jus-
tice Department challenged the acquisition of First Interstate of
Hawaii, Inc. by First Hawaiian, Inc. under the BHCA even though
the Fed had approved the transaction. The suit was settled by the
agreement of the parties to a divestiture plan proposed by the
Justice Department.490 InJuly 1991, theJustice Department chal-
lenged an acquisition by Fleet/Norstar of assets from the FDIC
after the transaction was approved by the Fed under the Bank
Merger Act.49 1 As these two cases show, the Justice Department
has sufficient regulatory authority to police the antitrust aspects
of bank acquisitions effectively without the BHCA statutory
protections.
2. Federal Trade Commission Act
Secondary to the core antitrust laws, and of more potential
than experiential significance in regulating bank holding company
behavior in the absence of the BHCA, is the Federal Trade Com-
described in [these guidelines] ensures that the Agency evaluates the likely com-
petitive impact of a merger within the context of economically meaningful mar-
kets ....") After establishing the relevant market, the Justice Department uses
the Herfindahl Index to evaluate the effect of a merger and the change in the
relevant market in order to determine whether a challenge is appropriate. Id. at
20,573-75.
489. 12 U.S.C. § 1849(b) (1988). With reference to an identical Justice De-
partment power under the Bank Merger Act, it was observed: "Such antitrust
actions maintained after the banking agency has approved the merger are com-
mon." Jung, Note, supra note 139, at 737.
490. United States v. First Hawaiian, Inc., 1991-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
96,457, at 65,924 (D. Haw. 1991) (requiring banking organization to terminate
banking service franchise agreement and divest six branches in order to acquire
commercial bank).
491. United States v. Fleet/Norstar Fin. Group, Inc., 1991-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 69,646, at 66,902 (D. Me. 1991) (requiring financial group to divest
bank branches to protect banking business' competitive market); see also Steven
C. Sunshine, Clearing a Bank Merger Through the Department ofJustice: The 1992 Hori-
zontal Merger Guidelines, 110 BANKING L.J. 188 (1993) (describing use of Justice
Department merger guidelines in evaluation of recent bank mergers including
Fleet/Norstar and First Hawaiian).
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mission Act (FTC Act). 49 2 In its broad scope the FTC Act is inap-
plicable to banks. 493 The FTC, however, may require banks to
produce documentary evidence required during agency investiga-
tions.494 The FTC Act's basic function is the prevention of
precisely the type of activity that banks and their nonbank affili-
ates were accused of in the initial drafting of and amendments to
the BHCA 49 5-the perpetration of "unfair methods of
competition. "496
Despite its limited applicability to banks in its major prohibi-
tions, the FTC Act could have considerable significance to bank
holding companies (which are generally not banks) and to their
nonbank affiliates. One would think that an exclusion for banks
would not exclude companies that are not banks. 497 The author
is unaware of any clear holding on this subject, although at least
one FTC opinion letter and a District Court holding on the same
case have reached opposite conclusions on the question.498
The FTC Act supplements the Sherman and Clayton Acts.
492. Act of Sept. 26, 1914, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (current version at 15
U.S.C. §§ 41-57c (1988)).
493. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (1988) (exempting institutions such as banks,
S&Ls and credit unions from FTC's regulatory power). Banks "were doubtless
excluded from the provisions of the [FTC] act, because [they were] subject to
the direction and control of a separate commission similar to that of the Trade
Commission." T.C. Hurst & Son v. FTC, 268 F. 874, 877 (E.D. Va. 1920) (refus-
ing to block enforcement of FTC sanctions). The case was given a more current
status through its citation in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374
U.S. 321, 336 n. II (1963). This comment upon the bank regulatory structure
might well be utilized by bank regulators as an incentive to perform the duties
assigned to the FTC for nonbank entities.
494. 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1988); see also FTC v. Rockefeller, 441 F. Supp. 234
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (noting that FTC may command banks to produce information
in connection with authorized study of energy industry).
495. For a discussion of the current BHCA antitrust tests, see supra notes
92-99 and accompanying text.
496. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (1988); see also FTC v. Sperry Hutchinson Co.,
405 U.S. 233 (1971) (clarifying that in order to find violation of FTC Act, it is
not necessary to find violation of Sherman Act); FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S.
643 (1931) (contrasting scope of FTC Act antitrust provisions to reach of other
antitrust statutes).
497. An analogous situation exists in the Bankruptcy Code, under which
banks are excluded from the protection of both Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 of the
Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 109 (1988). The Supreme Court nevertheless assumed
that a nonbank affiliate of a bank in a holding company system could file for
bankruptcy under Chapter 11. Board of Governors v. MCorp Fin., Inc., 112 S.
Ct. 459 (1991).
498. See FTC v. Citicorp, 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,671, at 77,800
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("We are skeptical of the view asserted in the FTC's letter opin-
ion that a bank holding company is not within the Section 6 exemption for
banks.").
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When alleged restraint of trade is at issue the antitrust acts re-
quire the presence of some form of contract or combination;499
the FTC Act merely requires violative behavior. 50 0 Thus, if insur-
ance agents or stock brokers asserted some form of illicit compe-
tition through a bank holding company, the FTC Act (assuming
its application to nonbank affiliates of banks) would apply even if
the antitrust acts did not.
F. Conclusion on Continuing Bank Regulation
The special prior restraints of the BHCA may not be neces-
sary in view of both the forcefulness and the flexibility of the vari-
ous antitrust and other bank regulatory laws. 50' The nature of
the banking market-a set of relatively concentrated markets
when local markets are considered, but a highly unconcentrated
market when considered on a national scale-will be the norm,
and the antitrust laws will, by their very nature, impose a continu-
ing restraint upon those who attempt its change.50 2
It has been asserted that banks are specially protected by fed-
eral deposit insurance and the other federal and state regulatory
controls (the "safety net") that exist for the benefit of banks. The
argument continues that it is fundamentally unfair to expect com-
petitors of banks to deal in the same markets opposite this sys-
tem.50 3 Whatever truth is present in this approach, the BHCA
does not fundamentally deal with the unfairness; it is dealt with by
the remaining legal structure.
Banks themselves, protected by deposit insurance, exist now,
and will continue to exist without the BHCA, with whatever spe-
cial status they get from deposit insurance. Holding companies
are not banks and have no deposit insurance. This too will not
change. Where the activities engaged in through the holding
499. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988) (Sherman Act; requiring "contract, combina-
tion ... or conspiracy"); 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988) (Clayton Act; requiring acquisi-
tion of stock or assets).
500. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (prohibiting unfair methods of competition).
501. There is no support for Itatements like that of Congressman Bruce F.
Vento in opposition to the 1991 Treasury Department proposal. He stated that
if the bill were enacted, "our nation's banking system would be totally deregu-
lated." H.R. REP. No. 157, supra note 161, at 383 (dissenting view of Rep.
Vento).
502. For discussions of bank numbers, bank markets and bank concentra-
tions, see La Ware, supra note 10, at 932-35. For a general discussion of the topic,
see supra notes 111-52 and accompanying text.
503. 1970 Hearings, supra note 485, at 239 (statement of Richard W. Mc-
Laren) ("Banks are protected by regulation from free entry of other competi-
tors, and therefore from the full rigors of unregulated competition.").
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company are "closely related to banking," they will, as they do
today, continue to benefit from whatever advantage they derive as
a result of the affiliated bank's deposit insurance. Unanswered
questions that are not addressed by the BHCA would remain if
the BHCA is repealed. For example, to what extent do finance
company activities such as the discount of retail installment pa-
per, the offering of credit cards or the making of small loans give
a bank affiliate competitive benefits over companies without bank
affiliates that are conducting the same activities? 50 4 Where spe-
cial problems result from the entry of banks, or for that matter
bank holding companies, into a particular field, is regulation
through special legislation like the Glass-Steagall Act for securi-
ties activities sufficient, or is a BHCA wall more appropriate?
The Sherman and Clayton Acts together with the FTC Act
and the numerous bank regulatory statutes supply a heavy layer
of protection. This Article again suggests an open dialogue di-
rected at the need for the BHCA. The new perception of banks as
profit-making businesses engaged in competition with foreign be-
hemoths on a world stage sustain an argument for a lessening of
the regulatory framework which keeps banks smaller than other
businesses and, in their affiliations, constrained beyond their
needs. If, as Senator Fulbright asserted in 1960, banks are differ-
ent from other businesses and require different antitrust legisla-
tiohf, 5° 5 the availability of the rest of the legal landscape can
reasonably be viewed as supplying such legislation.
504. E. Gerald Corrigan, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, considers the relationship to be not only of competitive importance but
also a risk to the "safety net" provided by the deposit insurance fund and the
other bank regulatory legislation and regulations. Corrigan, supra note 17, at 2.
Various legal provisions do establish intercorporate relationships in a hold-
ing company system, but they do so in such a way as not to impose risk upon the
safety net or the insurance fund. For example, § 206(e) of FIRREA requires
each insured bank in a holding company system to guarantee to the FDIC insur-
ance losses of other insured banks, but the guaranty does not extend beyond
insured banks. 12 U.S.C. § 1815(e) (Supp. III 1991). 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)
(1992) requires a holding company to serve as a "source of strength" to its sub-
sidiary banks. Here, however, the obligation is to the insured institutions, not by
them. See Kieran J. Fallon, Note, Source of Strength or Source of Weakness? A Critique
of the "Source of Strength" Doctrine in Banking Reform, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1344, 1349
(1992) (arguing against "enhanced source-of-strength powers" for federal bank-
ing regulators).
505. 106 CONG. REC. 9711 (1960) (statement of Sen. Fulbright) ("Banking
is too important to depositors, to borrowers, to the Government, and the public
generally, to permit unregulated and unrestricted competition in that field.").
BANK HOLDING COMPANY ACT
V. CONCLUSION
I have tried throughout this Article to avoid an opinion on
(1) whether banks should be larger and more concentrated; and
(2) whether they should be in commerce. Massive studies have
addressed those two issues and considerable literature is easily
available. 50 6 What I have tried to do is to demonstrate two
propositions.
First, the general perception has shifted so that now, as con-
trasted with fifteen years ago, there is a respectable body of opin-
ion that banks should become larger and more concentrated.
The United States has seen a reduction in the number of banks
from over 30,000 in 1920, to fewer than 25,000 in 1929, to under
14,000 today. 50 7 What seems to be different is the growing per-
ception, as banks grow larger and more concentrated, that this
development is more desirable than not. If anything, one senses
shock, perhaps even shame, that our banks are losing in interna-
tional competition.
Second, banking has never really been separated from com-
merce. Ford Motor Company and Sears-Roebuck own institu-
tions that take demand deposits and make commercial loans.
There is another respectable body of opinion that supports the
growth of such activities.
The Bush Administration, through the Treasury Department,
was the leading advocate in both of the foregoing propositions.
The current Administration should openly acknowledge this and
go where the propositions lead. The propositions undercut the
two foundations of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956.
Changes in our thinking require a reevaluation of that Act, and
the Treasury Department is the natural bellwether.
The BHCA does, perhaps not inconsequentially, serve pur-
poses beyond its enumerated major functions. Through the
BHCA, the Fed has dealt with illegal branch banking.50 8 Through
it, the Fed is attempting to require bank holding companies to
supply capital to their subsidiaries. 50 9 The bulk of the recent Fed
506. For a good discussion of both issues, see LITAN, supra note 183, at 60-
98.
507, For a discussion of U.S. bank concentration, see supra notes 9-10 and
accompanying text.
508. See Michigan Nat'l Corp., 64 Fed. Res. Bull. 127 (1978) (rejecting "ac-
commodation and transaction services" program as unlawful attempt at branch
banking).
509. MCorp Fin., Inc. v. Board of Governors, 900 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1990)
(holding that BHCA does not authorize Fed to require holding company to
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decisions seems devoted to the goals of the Community Reinvest-
ment Act and the record of applicant institutions in meeting local
credit needs. It has been maintained that through the separation
of banking from commerce the Fed is better able to implement
monetary policy.5 10 Furthermore, the Fed has, in no small mea-
sure, based its quest to apprehend the Bank of Credit and Com-
merce International on its duties under the BHCA. This type of
benefit is certainly at best incidental to the reasons for the origi-
nal BHCA.5 11 To utilize these benefits as reasons to retain the
massive structure of the BHCA smacks ofjustifying the characters
in Charles Lamb's essay burning down their homes in order to
enjoy the taste of crackling.5 12
One may also assert that the BHCA has lifted the Fed into its
current place as the generally acknowledged senior bank regula-
tor, and that this centralization of authority in one agency is desir-
able. This position should not be discounted. It should not,
however, cause one to assume the permanent presence of the
BHCA with its allied detriments. The appropriate role of the Fed
in our bank regulatory system is another subject to be evaluated
along with the BHCA itself.
Most of the policy questions raised in this Article are not
new. Views are frequently expressed on whether there should be
interstate branching, whether the remaining restrictions on inter-
state banking that is not branching should be relieved and
whether banks should be permitted further into commerce. The
arguments, however, generally assume continued retention of the
BHCA. This Article suggests that the issues can be productively
addressed in the context of whether that bulwark of the current
bank regulatory system should remain.
One may assume that, even without the BHCA, bank holding
transfer assets to troubled bank subsidiaries), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 112 S.
Ct. 459 (1991).
510. See Wetmore, Note, supra note 321, at 995 ("There is also a concern
that by allowing banking and commercial activities within one company, the abil-
ity of the [Fed] to coordinate monetary policy . . . will be hampered.").
511. Any extra benefits of the BHCA have been offset by bureaucratic over-
kills on behalf of the BHCA. For example, bank activity approved by the Comp-
troller of the Currency under the National Bank Act has then been attacked by
the Fed under the BHCA. See, e.g., Synovus Fin. Corp. v. Board of Governors,
952 F.2d 426, 428 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
512. Charles Lamb, A Dissertation Upon Roast Pig, in 3 THE COMPLETE WORKS
AND LETrERS OF CHARLES LAMB 203, 203-04 (1860) ("[He] let some sparks es-
cape into a bundle of straw, which kindling quickly spread the conflagration over
every part of their poor mansion, till it was reduced to ashes .... [F]or the first
time in his life ... he tasted-crackling [pig]!").
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companies will remain a consequential part of the banking sys-
tem. What banks may do will continue to be governed by the
laws, both federal and state, that define banks. As those laws
evolve, they may or may not widen the power of banks to include
securities, insurance, real estate investment, data processing and
other activities. If the BHCA restrictions are removed, other
businesses could be conducted only outside the bank itself by af-
filiated companies within a holding company structure. Such op-
erations will, as contrasted from today's approach, be established
as the market dictates.
The commercial banking system is faced with serious
problems. It is not, however, in a state of crisis. 51 3 Now is a good
time to deal with fundamental questions of bank regulation. The
BHCA should be thoroughly reviewed "calmly and with great
care and restraint" to establish whether it should remain as part
of our bank regulatory structure.51 4
513. Approximately 500 banks out of a total of 13,000 have failed over the
last three years. This represents a fundamentally different picture from the S&L
crisis, in which there has been a collapse of some 50% of the savings and loan
system.
514. 101 CONG. REC. 8032 (1955) (statement of Rep. Rains). With those
words, Congressman Rains presented the BHCA to Congress. Congressman
Rains encouraged Congress to act on the BHCA "while our economy is gener-
ally healthy [and] while competition still exists." Id.
1993]

